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The relationship between Miguel de Unamuno and Jorge Luis Borges remains understudied. In this 
thesis I compare both authors according to their shared interest in reading and rewriting Miguel de 
Cervantes’s Don Quijote de la Mancha.  Across their vast respective bibliographies on Cervantes, 
from Vida de don Quijote y Sancho and ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, both examine the 
canonical Spanish work from anachronistic perspectives, and re-author it according to personal 
circumstances and points of view. 
 
I interrogate a series of works that both authors produce on Cervantes’s masterpiece, and outline the 
comparable yet contrasting aesthetic approaches that underlie their arguments.  From this I show that 
the aesthetic models of reading that they produce are strongly derived from aspects of the Quijote, a 
novel whose narrative complexities compel the reader into a more active, critical role in interpreting 
the work.   
 
Beyond demonstrating the Cervantine echoes in their works, I argue that the non-intentionalist 
approach that Unamuno and Borges take when reading texts including and especially the Quijote fits 
comfortably within the realm of literary theories that were formalised much later on.  In particular I 
focus on the reader-response theories of thinkers such as Hans Robert Jauß and Wolfgang Iser, as 
well as Stanley Fish’s affective stylistics.  I adopt key critical terms from the works of these theorists 
in order to critique the way Unamuno and Borges interpret the Quijote across their careers.   
 
Chief among my concerns is how the reader’s cultural and historical circumstances produce unique 
meanings in the text that the author cannot prohibit.  I also explore the question common to these 
theorists as to the principle by which an interpretation of a work can be considered acceptable or 
unacceptable.  By tracing the commonalities and contrasts between Unamuno’s and Borge’s readings 
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I. Introduction 
There are few narratives that have been revisited and reworked quite as much as Miguel de 
Cervantes’s Don Quijote de la Mancha.  Few stories have been the subject of such a rich history of 
readings and revisions as Cervantes’s masterpiece; from the author-centric Golden Age view of the 
text as a comedic aping of the chivalric form, to the 19th Century Romantic view of don Quijote as a 
kind of hapless tragic hero. 
 
The present study is dedicated to investigating how two avid readers of Cervantes in the 20th Century: 
Miguel de Unamuno and Jorge Luis Borges, revisit and appropriate the Quijote in the service of their 
overarching approaches to reading as a practice.  I also show how these two approaches to the Quijote 
can communicate with each other: Unamuno’s view of quijotismo as a cultural and philosophical 
export plays into the same suspicion of the authority of authorship as explored most prominently in 
‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  
 
Common to their extensive bibliographies on Cervantes’s work, which I will explore throughout this 
thesis, is a method of reading that questions authorial intention as a source of literary meaning.  In 
my research I position both authors in relation to each other, as well as to modern theories of 
intentionalism and reader-response which bring the theoretical implications of their works into 
sharper focus.  
 
In doing so, I achieve two key aims, which will constitute the chief contribution of my work: to shed 
light on how their complementary yet contrasting views on reading can help produce new meanings 
in the 17th Century Spanish classic, and to explore what these new meanings might say about the 
process of reading in and of itself.  
 
I.1 Unamuno and Borges: readers on the margin 
 
Any serious analysis of the relevance of Cervantes’s Quijote to Unamuno and Borges must not ignore 
the cultural circumstances in which they read the Golden Age masterpiece.  Those cultural 
circumstances are particularly of interest in a study that emphasises the possibility of reading the 
Quijote from a unique point of view.  As such I will show that their emphasis on the reader’s role in 
creating meaning in the work is equivalent to their emphasis on the validity of reading canonical 
literature from marginal perspectives.  Here I will set out some of the relevant context in which they 
read the Quijote, in order to explain why both authors are at pains to reclaim the Quijote and read it 
   2 
afresh from a new perspective.  This will also help to explain my choice of reader-response theory as 
a tool for the comparison. 
 
Unamuno’s revisitation of the Quijote cannot be extricated from his interest in national regeneration.  
Unamuno’s career began just as Spain’s colonisation of the Americas was giving its swan song.  In 
this context he produced his first major engagement with the Quijote in the essays that in 1895 would 
come to be known as En torno al casticismo.  Unamuno, one arm of the Generación del ’98, begins 
to re-read and reengage with the Spanish national text at a point when much of the intellectual 
discussion in Spain was centred around the lack of an overarching literary and philosophical tradition.  
Ganivet’s 1889 España filosófica contemporánea lamented the dearth of intellectual spirit in Spain 
in light of philosophical models abroad.  Much of the work of the Generation was marked by a spoken 
need to emulate European intellectual trends.1  Unamuno’s membership of a cosmopolitan generation 
of writers who often looked abroad for philosophical inspiration underlies much of his work on the 
Quijote.  For as I will show, his insistence on reading the novel as a crystallisation of literary 
influences is one of the bases on which Unamuno disavows Cervantes’s authority to determine the 
whole of the meaning of the novel.  
 
His work on the Quijote must also be contextualised in his disagreement with Ganivet’s insistence 
on a Volksgeist as a source of national ideals, as well as the latter’s promotion of a small patriotic 
elite that would ‘españolizar nuestra obra’ (Shaw 1975: 27-28).  In this sense, Unamuno’s nuanced 
approach to casticismo — where what is universal is also what is specific — presents a countercurrent 
to some of the ideas of his generation. Through En torno al casticismo, which explores many of the 
pitfalls of dogmatic regionalism, and even in light of what might be considered a turn against 
Europeanisation in some of his later works, Unamuno never strays far from the discourse of 
transnational ideological exchange.  For bare casticismo, an over-insistence on national 
exceptionalism, is intellectually stifling.  Though most of my argument will focus on the literary-
theoretical implications of Unamuno’s and Borges’s interpretations of the Quijote, it is also important 
to note that their promotion of the reader in the interpretive act is commensurate with their promotion 
of cosmopolitan literary approaches. 
 
Their perspective on the Quijote is also a marginal one.  For, inasmuch as Unamuno was a major 
                                               
1 As Donald Shaw shows in his brilliant The Generation of 1898 in Spain, the philosophical ideals of 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were formative to many of the works of ’98 thinkers such as Baroja, 
Azorín and Maeztu (Shaw 1975: 13).  Azorín’s novel, La voluntad, for example, is clearly lifted from 
the pages of Schopenhauer. 
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figure in Spanish intellectual life, he was often at pains to stress his identity as a Basque national 
through many of his literary works.  One of his most significant chapters on the Quijote, as I shall 
discuss in the fourth chapter, is overwritten in Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho with a eulogy to his 
corner of northern Spain.  When he writes Cómo se hace una novela in exile in Hendaye in 1927, the 
tantalising presence just over the border is not Spain itself, but his native País Vasco.  I will show 
that his particular brand of Spanishness, where the regional, national and international are not 
mutually exclusive, is a driving force behind his readings of the Quijote, permitting him to set out an 
aesthetics of reading that ignores authorial intention per se.  In other words, his empowerment of the 
reader in the interpretive act is always in line with the empowerment of readers external to the 
communities in which canonical works of literature are written.  Reader-centrism in Unamuno and 
Borges, as I will demonstrate, always drives at opening the borders of literary discourse and inviting 
perspectives on literary works from the margins.  Margins that both of these authors occupy. 
 
I must credit Jon Juaristi’s brilliant recent biography of Unamuno with this connection to Borges: 
 
Lo que va del silencio a la bulla o de la intrahistoria a la historia se desvanece con la muerte 
y no hay otra forma de revivirlo que el arte y en eso, Borges y Unamuno estaban a la par; tan 
lejos uno de la Argentina de las patriadas como el otro de la Vasconia de los banderizos, 
objetos fantasmales de un deseo irremediablemente destinado a la melancolía o a la escritura. 
(Juaristi 2015: 42) 
 
Unamuno and Borges are both writers whose specific contexts always stood in some marginal 
relationship to Castilla.  Borges too writes from the perspective of a cosmopolitan reader born in a 
country much newer to the world than the one that had created it.  His national literary culture is 
younger too.  The gauchesque genre specific to the Southern Cone was a 19th Century invention, and 
was Shumway points out, was often used to represent populist political movements:  
 
Populist gauchesque literature sought to affirm a place in the country’s guiding fictions for 
the common folk, the rural poor, the mixed-bloods, the non-elite.  In this endeavour, 
[Bartolomé] Hidalgo identifies the gaucho not only as one more kind of Argentine but also as 
the authentic Argentine, the true symbol of an emerging nation. (Shumway 1991: 68) 
 
Gauchesque literature hones in on the lives of the bárbaros who exist outside of civilisation, outside 
of culture, but who are represented lyrically within it.  Borges’s complex relationship to the genre 
goes some way to explaining his interest in taking on the Quijote.  Some of his most important fictions 
derive in form and content from El Gaucho Martín Fierro in particular, including ‘El Sur’ and ‘El 
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Fin’.  Also his ‘Biografía de Tadeo Isidoro Cruz’ represents an interest in rewriting as well as in the 
national literature, given that it focalises the narrative of Martín Fierro through the gaucho’s 
companion.  But his interest in what is particular to Argentina, including what might be termed the 
Argentine Quijote in Hernández’s 1872 epic poem coexists with a love of international literature.  
While there is no denying Borges’s early insistence on the creation of a national culture — his Fervor 
de Buenos Aires and El idioma de los argentinos both state Argentina’s contribution to world 
literature — his vision for Argentine culture takes him very close to Unamuno’s rejection of 
casticismo in 1895.  In their view, a national literature is the product of international exchange. 
 
In this sense, Borges is an inheritor of Domingo F. Sarmiento, who made the term ‘gaucho’, 
‘synonymous with country-dwelling nomads whom he viewed as natural supporters of caudillismo 
and thereby an obstacle to progress’ (Shumway 1991: 70).  Shumway argues that the raison d’être of 
gauchesque poetry was to bring the gaucho into the cultural mainstream, to civilise them by 
representing them in culture (73).  The pre-existing models which provided for this were, of course, 
European.  And European literary ideals were placed next to civilisation itself: the liberal opposition 
to Perón used the Europeanising Sarmiento as a symbol of modern civilisation (Balderston 1993: 95).  
Sarmiento, like Bartolomé Mitre and Nicolás Avellaneda, was interested in cultural and economic 
exchanges with Europe.  As Williamson also shows, the point in Sarmiento’s biography of Facundo 
Quiroga, the caudillo whom Juan Manuel Rosas had murdered in 1835 was to promote the European 
Enlightenment as a source of political ideals for the modern Argentina (Williamson 2005: 6-7).  
Beatriz Sarlo’s Una modernidad periférica expresses the complexities of Borges’s view of 
Argentina’s place in the world of literature: 
 
En el juicio de Borges sobre Sarmiento, la argentinidad ha encontrado su fórmula: la ausencia 
de límites frente a la cultura occidental y a sus traducciones de oriente.  Sin embargo, aun esta 
ausencia de límites, plantea problemas de legitimación: ¿a quiénes les está permitido elegir 
de todas partes?  Podría decirse, sin exagerar, que en los años veinte y treinta los escritores 
argentinos eligen de todas partes, traducen y el que no puede traducir lee traducciones, las 
difunde, publica o propagandiza. (Sarlo 1988: 43) 
 
The Europeanising Sarmiento provides a model of Argentine identity for Borges, where national 
literature can be extracted and displaced from all corners of the world.  Moreover, Borges’s 
membership of groups such as that of Sur further emphasises his desire to bring Argentina into a 
global cultural mainstream.  The journal was produced, as John King notes, at a time of similar 
cultural crisis to the one in which Facundo was written, when ‘Federalist dictator Juan Manuel Rosas 
was attempting to organise the country under his exclusive rule and shut it off from outside 
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influences’ (King 1986: 7).  Ultimately, Borges produces literature at a point when Europeanisation 
is a very current political theme.  That is reflected in his engagement with European literature, 
particularly the Quijote.  It is little surprise that someone like Borges would emphasise the closeness 
of his own national culture to Europe.  His grandmother Fanny Haslam had introduced him to the 
literature of Kipling, Dumas and the Brothers Grimm, to name just a few.  His experiences of Europe, 
from a stint in Geneva during the First World War, his introduction to ultraísmo in Mallorca in 1919, 
and his publication of an ultraist manifesto in Nosotros in December 1921, further emphasise 
Borges’s position as a writer between multiple national poles.   
 
Edwin Williamson even argues that Borges considered Buenos Aires, after his return from Europe, 
to be ‘a philistine place, where, as he put it to Sureda, there reigned a “disheartening incomprehension 
of and indifference to anything connected with art”’ (Williamson 2005: 94). The disaffection he felt 
on his return to Argentina might account for his exploration of the Quijote’s status as a national text.  
The provocative statement that a modern Frenchman’s version of the canonical text is superior to 
Cervantes’s must be rooted to a large extent in Borges’s personal closeness to European literature.  
That does not mean that Argentina escaped his interest: his project from the mid 1920s was to use 
ultraist techniques to produce a work that could project the criollist soul of his native country 
(Williamson 2005: 135).  So his engagement with European literature is often reflective of his own 
country’s status as an off-cut of a European power, one still finding its place within world culture.  
What I term Borges’s non-intentionalist method of reading the Quijote promotes the reader in the 
interpretive process.  He offers readers across all national cultures the same validity in interpreting 
the work.  As such, his reader-centric approach to the Spanish canon, which reaches its apex in his 
1939 ‘Pierre Menard’, also serves to open the discussion of the Quijote to national cultures including 
his own.   
 
My argument will not strictly emphasise the specific aspects of Spanish and Argentine culture that 
produce specific readings of the Quijote.  Nor will I analyse in detail the possible postcolonial 
interpretations of their various readings of the novel, though this is an aspect I will touch upon in 
order to signpost the possibility of further research.  Simply, I will show that their arguments on how 
the Quijote can be read are always commensurate with the marginal position in which they read it.  I 
will link this to ideas of reader-response theory, from the way in which historical circumstances 
promote and permit certain readings, to the interpretive role of the reader’s horizon of expectations 
(a term I will define in the following chapter), as well as the ways in which acceptable strategies for 
interpreting a work are in a state of constant updating.  In doing so, I will be able to demonstrate that 
Unamuno and Borges read the Quijote, the most canonical work in the Spanish language, according 
a radical, non-intentionalist method in a way appropriate to their cultural circumstances.   
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I.2 Roadmap of the thesis 
 
A thesis comparing Unamuno and Borges as readers of the Quijote will be complex in method and 
draw on a wide range of material.  As such I will separate my study into five key, discrete chapters.  
I will start in the second chapter by exploring the various theories I will be drawing on when I arrive 
at my comparison between Unamuno’s and Borges’s methods of reading the Quijote.  My use of 
terms such as ‘reader-centric’ and ‘non-intentionalist’ must be justified in line with extant literary 
theory.  Much literary theory produced since the beginning of the 20th Century has called into doubt 
the role of the author in the creation of a text’s meaning.  I will start with some of the works of Roland 
Barthes and Michel Foucault, which re-think the importance of the author at the moment of reception.  
This will also take me through a discussion of intentionalism and non-intentionalism in literature, 
starting with a discussion of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay on intentionalism in the 1940s.  The key 
literary theorists I will be drawing on to support my argument are reader-response theorists Hans-
Robert Jauß, Wolfgang Iser and to a smaller extent Stanley Fish.  I will also be drawing on the works 
of modern thinkers such as Paisley Livingston and Sherri Irvin who have dealt specifically with 
intentionalism as an interpretive practice.  From this I will extrapolate the key theoretical ideas that 
will form the basis of my arguments in later chapters.   
 
I will dedicate the third chapter to the changing reception of Cervantes’s work over time and across 
different national spaces.  For it is important not to take Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings in a 
vacuum, but to show an understanding of how the two authors contribute to the history of ideas on 
Cervantes’s work.  I will lead a discussion of the amply-studied individual connections that both 
authors share with Cervantes, starting with Unamuno’s vast oeuvre on the work in Chapter IV and 
and moving onto Borges’s in Chapter V. 
 
In my specific chapters on Unamuno and Borges I will position my argument in terms of the literature 
that has sought the traces of Cervantes in their works.  Though the relevance of theories of reader-
response to individual authors such as Unamuno and Borges has been mentioned before, no detailed 
analysis of that relationship has yet been produced.  Most of the work on Unamuno and Borges as 
readers of the Quijote has sought the specific Cervantine influence on their work, and I will engage 
with much of it later in the study.  My aim is not to render such scholarship obsolete, rather to expand 
upon it and broaden it in scope.  For it is amply demonstrated that Unamuno and Borges inherit 
techniques and approaches from the works of Cervantes.  It has yet to be demonstrated, however, that 
their inheritance of Cervantine ideas positions them comfortably in the 20th Century development of 
non-intentionalist literary theories, which recommend reading without emphasising the author’s 
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ostensible intent.  I will therefore extrapolate an aesthetics of reading from both of their works that 
can shed light on their vast oeuvres in the most general sense, oeuvres which often emphasise the 
reader’s creative role in the act of reading.  I will go a step further and hold their shared aesthetics of 
reading up to the light of modern reader-centric literary theories. 
 
In this sense I do not close any doors in the discussion of Unamuno and Borges, and my work does 
not represent a paradigm shift to the extent of dismantling or invalidating previous scholarship.  This 
thesis will broaden the discussion on both authors.  Positioning them in a literary-theoretical trend 
that can be traced back at least to Cervantes, and which strongly anticipates many contemporary 
critical methods, does not overwrite any major approach to either author.  Rather it will add weight 
to the vast possibilities of reading their works.  For both authors enjoy reading works such as the 
Quijote through interpretive frameworks unavailable to the author.  Their respective aesthetics of 
reading therefore promote a freedom of scholarship on their oeuvre.   
 
This will allow me to compare the ways in which Unamuno and Borges revisit and reclaim the Quijote 
according to individual circumstances in the sixth chapter.  In this sense my approach will be a trans-
national one, taking into account the role of their respective national and historical contexts in their 
reading.  I will demonstrate how their contexts produce readings of the Quijote that Cervantes could 
never have accounted for.  Their personalised, often adventurous and controversial readings of the 
Quijote can therefore be explored in terms of reader-response theory, which broadly emphasises the 
role of the individual reader in creating a unique meaning that an author cannot specifically intend.  
Their Cervantine works adopt and recommend such methods.  As a result, they discover in 
Cervantes’s novel a wealth of meanings that would be prohibited by intentionalist interpretations.  
 
In the conclusion I will mention just some of the ways my research could be furthered by taking into 
account reader-response ideas that are beyond the scope of my thesis.  As such, this thesis will open 
doors rather than closing them.  It will demonstrate the possibility and importance of revisiting 
Unamuno and Borges with modern literary theory in mind.  It will also, I hope, provide for an 
exchange of new ideas on both authors, both together and separately, by reading them according to 
new interpretive trends.   
 
I.3 Approaches to Unamuno and Borges 
 
There is a small yet significant number of studies which have traced the relationship between the 
works of Unamuno and Borges.  The first major investigation into this relationship was written by 
Anthony Kerrigan in 1972.  His article ‘Borges/Unamuno’ takes broad strokes in pointing to a series 
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of shared literary interests between them.  Most interestingly, Kerrigan shows that both Unamuno 
and Borges exist on the periphery of Spanish letters; Unamuno as a Basque writer and Borges as an 
Argentinian one.  Neither author is strictly Castilian, rather they had Castilian Spanish thrust upon 
them, feeling conquered in linguistic, cultural and geographic terms (Kerrigan 1972: 296).  I am 
particularly indebted to Kerrigan’s study in this sense.  For I will show that both take a cosmopolitan 
approach to the novel appropriate to their peripheral perspectives on the Spanish canon.  These 
peripheral perspectives are the ideal platform from which to launch non-intentionalist investigations 
of the work. 
 
Kerrigan is also one of a small number of critics who have paid attention to the presence of dreams 
as metaphors in their work: ‘Unamuno, and then Borges, both wonder (Unamuno, desperately; 
Borges, deviously) whether we have anything whatsoever to do with molding and imagining life — 
either in terms of dreams or dreamers or (and herein is the essential and annihilative doubt) as 
dreamed’ (Kerrigan 1972: 302).  Many of the works Unamuno and Borges produced on the Quijote 
have taken the dream as a guiding metaphor.  The current trend among critics who have undertaken 
comparisons of their works is to treat dreams as an exploration of the insecurity of the self in the face 
of existential doubt.2  Dolores Koch’s 1984 ‘Borges y Unamuno: Convergencias y divergencias’ 
compares ‘Las ruinas circulares’: a narrative in which the protagonist is horrified to find that he has 
no objective reality outside of the mind of another, to Unamuno’s Niebla: a novel (or nivola) where 
the author and his character are seen to exist on the same plane (Koch 1984: 114).  She adds that their 
oneiric narratives are often based in a shared existential doubt: ‘el hombre de ayer muere en el de 
hoy, y el de hoy en el de mañana; y como a Heráclito “que no bajarás dos veces al mismo río”.  No 
sólo el río es otro, puntualiza Borges, él también es otro’ (118).  So far, scholarship has highlighted 
the way in which Borges and Unamuno question the objectivity of the world around them, whether 
we are not simply the fiction of another, whether our perception of external reality corresponds to the 
world as it is.   
 
My contribution to the work of scholars like Kerrigan and Koch will be to show that the motif of 
dreams in Unamuno and Borges has an additional function.  I will demonstrate how the dream serves 
                                               
2 Borges’s works on dreams have also, I would add, attracted psychoanalytic readings.  Catalina 
Bronstein’s 2002 ‘Borges, Immortality and the Circular Ruins’ analyses ‘Las ruinas circulares’ and 
‘El inmortal’ as indications of a human desire for immortality; Thomas Ogden’s 2003 ‘On not being 
able to dream’ reads ‘Funes el memorioso’ as a literary representation of a human condition in which 
subjects are psychologically incapable of dreaming, and of forming psychic distinctions between the 
states of sleeping, dreaming and perceiving. 
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both authors well as a metaphor for the relationship between author and reader.  Both present 
authorship as an act of dreaming, a kind of passive event in the mind, so as to limit the author’s scope 
to provide an objective meaning in the text.  This helps to explain the choice of the Quijote as a bridge 
between these two authors.  Its narrative devices, including Cervantes’s claim to be the stepfather of 
the novel, its feigned historicity which only serves to reinforce its sense of fictionality, and the 
protagonist’s constant poeticisation of the prosaic worlds he lives in, make the text a useful tool to 
two writers who agree that the act of reading cannot produce anything other than a subjective version 
of the text.   
 
I am also by no means the first to note the comparison between Unamuno and Borges as readers of 
the Quijote.  This comparison is most often made between Unamuno as a rewriter of the Quijote in 
1905 and Pierre Menard as a literal rewriter of the novel in 1939.  Roberto Yahni (1992) and Fernando 
Iwasaki Cauti (2005) have both opened the discussion of how Unamuno’s approach to the Quijote 
communicates with that of the apocryphal Borgesian author.  Yahni in fact points to Unamuno’s non-
intentionalist method of reading Cervantes as a point of crossover with Pierre Menard: 
 
En el citado ensayo [‘Sobre la lectura e interpretación del Quijote’], Unamuno, de forma más 
clara y tajante que en su Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, expone su voluntad de desentenderse 
de lo que quisiera o no quisiera decir Cervantes, autor que, incapaz de entender a Don Quijote 
y menos a Sancho, es inferior a su obra. (Yahni 1992: 1009) 
 
Where Unamuno calls Cervantes a malicious historian whose total oeuvre was frankly second-rate, 
Yahni sees a point of contact with the later Menard, whose impossible enterprise of rewriting the 
Quijote verbatim without plagiarism produces a work not only superior to Cervantes’s, but the rest 
of Menard’s oeuvre (1013).  I will nuance this understanding of their relationship by pointing to 
shared affinities between Unamuno, Pierre Menard, Pierre Menard’s contemporary in the narrator, as 
well as Borges himself.  No single figure comfortably embodies any of the others; all add their voice 
to a discourse on the Quijote that serves to explore some of the narrative experiments undertaken by 
the novel over four centuries ago.   
 
There is also a trend among commentators of positing Unamuno as a causal precursor to Menard: 
‘Unamuno resultó ser por segunda vez el motivador de otra de las ficciones borgianas, sin duda una 
de las más originales.  ¿No es esto lo que Pierre Menard deseaba?  Poder atribuir a Unamuno un relato 
de El Aleph, “no puebla de aventura los libros más calmosos?”’ (Yahni 1992: 1014).  Causality is 
always difficult to prove.  While it is clear that Borges had read Unamuno’s Vida de Don Quijote y 
Sancho before he published his own ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, it seems to do an injustice to 
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the intellectual and literary richness of the novella to reduce its meaning to a simple homage to 
Unamuno.  By giving authorial credit to an invented Arabic historian, the Quijote lends itself well 
enough to an investigation into the role of attribution in literary reception on its own.  The main 
literary influence on ‘Pierre Menard’, in my view, is the Quijote itself.  I therefore find the conclusion 
that Borges arrived at ‘Pierre Menard’ strictly through his reading of Unamuno to be much too hasty.   
 
This does not, however, devalue my examination of the myriad affinities between Unamuno’s 
provocative reading of the novel, and Pierre Menard’s act of modernising the novel by reproducing 
it from a contemporary, international frame of reference.  For Pierre Menard’s task, of finding new 
content in the same form, communicates with Unamuno’s task of overwriting the narrative with a 
series of political, religious and cultural observations.  It also, however, communicates with 
Cervantes’s stated task of editing a translation of an historically dubious document.  Borges’s act of 
attributing the Quijote to Menard is commensurate with Cervantes’s act of attributing it to Benengeli.  
Both claim that a fictional character of their own invention penned the fictional text.  As such, the 
relationship between Pierre Menard and Unamuno is complicated by the lurking ever-presence of the 
original author, Cervantes.  I will contribute to the discussion of Menard’s affinities to Unamuno by 
studying them from a literary-theoretical point of view, to discover what both authors can tell the 
reader about the Quijote, and by extension, the act of reading itself.  This will nuance the relationship 
between Unamuno and Menard, placing them into a discourse rather than positing one as the 
necessary predecessor to the other. 
 
Fernando Iwasaki Cauti’s study, ‘Borges, Unamuno y el Quijote’ (2005) also makes the claim that 
Pierre Menard is an avatar of Miguel de Unamuno.  Cauti goes so far as to suggest that Borges 
effectively ‘pilfered’ (‘birló’) his idea for ‘Pierre Menard’ from Unamuno’s numerous vituperations 
against Cervantes.  He even argues that Borges’s spoken distaste for Unamuno’s ‘incontinencias 
patéticas’ towards the hidalgo (‘Presencia de Unamuno’, 1937) is disingenuous in light of Borges’s 
similarly charitable reworkings of Martín Fierro.  ‘Si reescribir el Quijote fue fruto de la patética 
incontinencia,’ asks Cauti, ‘¿no tendría «Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote», algún tic o agónico 
ramalazo unamuniano?’ (Cauti 2005).  I do not consider all rewriting of the Quijote to be analogous.  
Unamuno’s uncontrolled pathos towards a protagonist whose historian maliciously invites the reader 
to delight in his mishaps, motivates him to rework the novel by interspersing its narrative episodes 
with personal commentary.  In Borges’s view, such an approach to the Quijote teaches us little about 
the text.  It would be so much more interesting to reconstruct the circumstances in which the Basque 
could arrive at a reading of the text empathetic to the protagonist, and antipathetic to the author.  In 
Borges’s text, that is the value of Menard’s rewriting: it demonstrates the extreme subjectivity of each 
reading as conditioned by historical and cultural circumstances, thereby negating the notion of an 
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objective, ‘correct’ reading of a text.  Unamuno’s brief is different.  It is to produce a text that is 
different in form and content in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the author as an omniscient 
source of meaning.  In that sense, I believe that Borges’s and Unamuno’s rewritings are not equal, as 
Cauti argues, but mirror images of each other.  Pierre Menard empowers the reader in spite of the 
author.  Unamuno, meanwhile, disempowers the author in favour of the reader.  Any comparison 
between Unamuno’s version and Menard’s must take their differing points of departure into account.   
 
Cauti does note some positive associations between Unamuno and Menard.  Menard’s ‘obra visible’ 
is, he argues, strongly reminiscent of the work of Unamuno, who also wrote various works on 
reforming language and orthography, to name just one example.  There are further resonances.  Both 
have a connection to the Basque Country, albeit on different sides of the Pyrenees.  Menard, who 
hails from Nîmes, seems to write his version in Bayonne, a mere hundred miles from Unamuno’s 
native Bilbao.  They also come to the Quijote from a peripheral perspective.  At a time when the 
Spanish national culture is rethought as a set of disparate regional mores revolving around the central 
nucleus of Castilla, Unamuno’s perspective on the Spanish canon is seen to come, to some extent, 
from the fringes.  Menard is a Frenchman whose expertise in Spanish letters is born of personal 
interest and not a national connection.  Both, as I will show, extricate the Quijote and its readings 
from Spain, and open the doors to cross-border communication and interpretations of the great work.  
 
Their modi operandi are not fully divorced from each other either: both repudiate a majority reading, 
and from their respective peripheries, identify a broader intellectual and philosophical significance in 
the Quijote that goes far beyond the satirical interpretation common to cervantistas and intentionalist 
readers in general.  Both do so in the exercise of different techniques.  That distinction is the reason 
that I cannot agree with Cauti that ‘Pierre Menard es un trasunto de Miguel de Unamuno’.  Moreover, 
my inquiry into the relevance of Unamuno’s and Borges’s works to modern reception theory will be 
consistent with the theory itself.  It is of much greater interest to see how their texts communicate 
independently, rather than trying to grasp some slippery causality between the two authors.  So, while 
Cauti’s section ‘Unamuno, autor de Borges’ is titled appropriately for a study on Menard’s affinities 
to Unamuno, the statement that Unamuno authored Borges is less meaningful, in my view, than to 
treat both as authors of comparable yet contrasting versions of the Quijote.  The way the texts interact, 
comment upon and shed light on each other is much more informative from the perspective of a 
literary-theoretical analysis.   
 
Two relatively recent studies have examined in minute detail the intellectual and literary interchanges 
between Unamuno and Borges: J. Óscar Carrascosa-Tinoco’s 2006 book, La utopía de la eternidad 
en Miguel de Unamuno y Jorge Luis Borges; and Miguel Gorka Bilbao Terreros’s 2009 PhD thesis, 
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Divergencias y convergencias en la literatura transnacional de principios del siglo XX: El caso de 
Jorge Luis Borges y Miguel de Unamuno.  Their approaches to the comparison are quite contrasting: 
Tinoco situates their relationship within the history of Spanish letters, whereas Terreros situates the 
two authors in a pan-European, philosophical framework.  Tinoco’s analysis relies on a construction 
of the cultural milieu in which their respective works communicate: 
 
Hemos de definir [la Modernidad] en relación a unos rasgos diferenciadores: confianza 
ilimitada en la razón, conciencia histórica, utopía del progreso, principio de inmanencia, 
reivindicación de la libertad y ateísmo.  Sobre estas bases, ambos autores construirán un 
edificio ideológico en el que las voces históricas y las poéticas se confundirán de igual manera 
que en la lectura cervantina, lo que nos brindará la posibilidad de asistir al paso del yo lector 
al yo creador. (Carrascosa-Tinoco 2006: 13-14) 
 
I will add to the discussion on the Cervantine influence on Unamuno and Borges, which Tinoco has 
inaugurated, by showing how the development of reader-centric literary theory provides a useful 
intersection between them, and situates them in a theoretical discourse that can be traced back at least 
to Miguel de Cervantes. 
 
I am also indebted to Terreros’s thesis, which refocused the discussion from Unamuno’s influences 
on Borges, to a search for the affinities and literary commonalities between the two.  Terreros’s 
method —which I intend to emulate— is to consider how the works of Unamuno and Borges elucidate 
each other, rather than reducing their relationship to a straight line between a predecessor and a 
successor.   
 
Terreros pays little attention to their shared interest in Cervantes, and instead draws on 
Kierkegaardian concepts such as the maieutic ideal that an individual must search for their own 
version of truth, as well as Schopenhauer’s philosophy of deterministic causation, as the basis of his 
comparison.  So, although the content of our studies various greatly, Terreros’s emphasis on the 
transnational status of both writers will form a significant basis of my analysis.  Both take avid interest 
in literary works and ideas well outside of their own regional and national borders.  They both write 
from a certain geographical periphery, from the Basque Country to Buenos Aires, from Fuerteventura 
to Mallorca, from Hendaye to Geneva.  Their periphery is intellectual as much as it is geographic.  
Their attributions of the text to imagined authors, and their appropriation of the novel’s form and 
content in order to reinforce particular viewpoints on the relationship between author, reader and text, 
present a countercurrent to majority readings.  Those include the satirical response that Unamuno 
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admonished in Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, and the tendency among Spaniards to see the Quijote 
as a compendium of national clichés, which Borges criticises through Pierre Menard.   
Tinoco also notes that Cervantes’s works are one of the myriad links between Unamuno and Borges.  
In his view, the motif of dreaming in their works makes a cervantine comparison all the more valid, 
for Augusto Pérez’s existential dilemma in Niebla is strongly echoed in Borges’s ‘Las ruinas 
circulares’ (Tinoco 2006: 54).  And given that Niebla itself carries a series of resonances from 
Cervantes, including the mention of the Quijote in the prologue, to Orfeo’s epilogue, Tinoco sees 
Unamuno and Borges as inheritors of Cervantes.  And what unites them is the repeated use of 
dreaming as a metaphor in their works; Unamuno is the dreamer of Augusto, and in ‘Las ruinas 
circulares’, the narrator’s project is to ‘soñar un hombre […] soñarlo con integridad minuciosa e 
imponerlo a la realidad.’  Tinoco’s discussion implies a productive element of dreaming.  Unamuno 
dreams Augusto Pérez into being through an act of literary creation.  The narrator of ‘Las ruinas 
circulares’ fears that he is the dream of another, and quite rightly, as he is a fiction of Borges’s design.  
I will build on Tinoco’s insights into dreams in Unamuno and Borges in order to bring my theoretical 
approach to their works into sharper focus.  I will argue that dreams not only serve to explore 
metaphysical questions on the objective nature of existence, but that the use of dreams as  a metaphor 
for writing literature is interesting to reader-response theorists, for dreaming implies an act of creation 
not wholly in control of the author.  This, as I will show, helps to state the case that the author has 





II. Theories of rewriting 
 
In order to ground my discussion properly in modern literary theory, and to show how the 
development of reader-oriented thinking can contribute to our understanding of Unamuno’s and 
Borges’s response to the Quijote, I must explore that development.  I will start by outlining the 
potential of Cervantes’s works to provide theoretical models for later readers.  In the subsections that 
follow I will outline many of the 20th and 21st Century approaches to problematising authorship, 
from the work of Barthes and Foucault, to modern reader-response theorists, to contemporary critics 
who have explored the merits and pitfalls of anti-intentionalist readings.  A study of those theoretical 
trends will provide me with the key intellectual tools to explore the reader-centric approaches that 
Unamuno and Borges take to Cervantes’s Quijote. 
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II.1 Cervantes as a reader-centric author 
 
When Cervantes addressed his reader in 1605 as the desocupado lector, he anticipated a trend of 20th 
Century theoretical approaches to reading — a tradition in which Unamuno and Borges are firmly 
embedded.  In fact, Cervantes’s masterpiece opens with an ironic admission of authorial inadequacy, 
a failure of the historian to convey everything he has wished to: ‘Desocupado lector: sin juramento 
me podrás creer que quisiera que este libro, como hijo del entendimiento, fuera el más hermoso, el 
más gallardo y más discreto que pudiera imaginarse’ (Cervantes 2010: 13). 
 
Here is an instruction to reassess one’s relationship to the text, from an idle recipient to active 
participant.  It deliberately draws attention to the artificiality of the work, departing markedly from 
the Spanish works of chivalry that Cervantes so famously parodies.3 Rather than attempt to persuade 
a reader of the historical veracity of the account, the same way for example that the prologue to the 
1508 version of Amadís de Gaula, a favourite of our hidalgo, promises its reader that the narrative is 
constructed on a foundation of historical truth, here the reader is allowed to labour under no such 
misconception.  The Quijote is the fictional product of an inadequate mind:  
 
Y así, ¿qué podrá engendrar el estéril y mal cultivado ingenio mío sino la historia de un hijo 
seco, avellanado, antojadizo y lleno de pensamientos varios y nunca imaginados de otro 
alguno, bien como quien se engendró en una cárcel, donde toda incomodidad tiene su asiento 
y donde todo triste ruido hace su habitación? (13) 
 
In pointing to the fictionality of the text, the authorial-narratorial voice redefines narrative in relation 
to those chivalric fictions which had fraudulently pretended that their stories were true histories rather 
than invented fictions (Puig 2009: xiii).  Narrative, rather than being secondary to the event, is 
constitutive of it.  In other words, chivalric authors would write in post-hoc style, as if their narratives 
were informative of some objective event that took place in the past.  Yet in reality, fictional narration 
always precedes the story; it is the condition by which the events it describes can be said to have 
taken place.   
                                               
3 As Puig puts it: ‘The Spanish libros de caballerías were works that repeatedly drew the reader’s 
attention to the conditions of their own existence, but they did so in a fraudulent and defensive manner 
because their authors were reluctant to admit that they were actually writing fiction, and so they 
resorted to a number of stock devices to pretend that their narratives were true histories’ (Puig 2009: 
xiii). 
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Under these circumstances, a reader can free themselves from their idle role.  The notion of ‘story as 
history’ appeals to the inscrutable knowledge of those who were there.  Textual exegesis can scarcely 
take place if it is assumed that the text reflects events in the world unseen by the reader.  It can, 
however, when a text admits to its being a fabrication.  A reader is now encouraged to criticise the 
product of the estéril y mal cultivado ingenio of Cervantes, and to find within it whatever they wish.  
In sum, Cervantes’s admission of the fictionality of his text places the reader in the active position of 
a critic.4 
 
Moreover, presenting authorship as a sort of parenthood, Cervantes implies that the author is ill-
qualified to understand the merits of the text: ‘Acontece tener un padre un hijo feo y sin gracia alguna, 
y el amor que le tiene le pone una venda en los ojos para que no vea sus faltas, antes las juzga por 
discreciones y lindezas y las cuenta a sus amigos por agudezas y donaires’ (13). 
 
The author’s emotional connection to his text might blind him to its inadequacies, which might be 
more easily caught by a vigilant reader who has not suffered the process of writing.  As such, the text 
can only be interpreted in an objective sense from the perspective of a third party. 
 
Cervantes famously complicates this notion of authorship as parenthood by claiming: ‘Pero yo, 
aunque parezco padre, soy padrastro de don Quijote, no quiero irme con la corriente del uso, ni 
suplicarte casi con las lágrimas en los ojos, como otros hacen, lector carísimo, que perdones o 
disimules las faltas que en este mi hijo vieres’ (14).  Cervantes subverts the author’s position as sole 
progenitor of the text, to such an extent that parenthood is not an adequate metaphor for writing.  In 
doing so, Cervantes abjures his claim to being what Barthes would much later call the ‘author-God’.  
The text is not a result of a single point of origin, and it does not spring up in a vacuum free of external 
literary and cultural influences.  In that case, how can the author be the sole source of meaning in a 
text?  A text can be situated within a preceding literary tradition, for example.  A work which relies 
so heavily on a pre-existing literary model, in this case tales of chivalry, cannot lay claim to the sort 
of originality which would justify reading it from an author-centric perspective.  As I will show later, 
Unamuno’s claim that the eponymous hidalgo is extracted from the intra-historic Spanish spirit is just 
                                               
4 Robert Bayliss persuasively argues that the various discursive models in the Quijote, from the ever-
presence of the chivalric literary form, to Renaissance humanism, forbid the text any straightforward 
reading: ‘The upshot of this discursive hybridity is that the Quixote subverts authorial claims to guide 
interpretation along predetermined ideological lines; Cervantes refuses to explicitly prescribe how 
his work is to be read’ (Bayliss 2007: 388). 
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as narratologically interesting: his existence within a Spanish culture shared by more than just 
Cervantes gives all of those who continue to live within it an equal share in determining the narrative’s 
meaning. 
 
The prologue shows a profound awareness of that narrative difficulty, and in fact avoids instructing 
the reader on how to approach the text to come: ‘puedes decir de la historia todo aquello que te 
pareciere, sin temor que te calunien por el mal ni te premien por el bien que dijeres della’ (14).  The 
reader is offered a radical freedom by this literary stepfather to read as they see fit, for any reading is 
as good as any other.  Because the text, for all of its subversion of literary norms, still relies on those 
norms in order to be meaningful, it is impossible for this author to define what the text can or cannot 
be taken to mean.  In that sense, the conditions by which one reading can be considered superior to 
another remain unclear.  This idea, as I will argue later on, is close to Borges, whose meta-rewriting 
of the Quijote shows how each act of reading is an inevitable consequence of each reader’s precise 
circumstances.  
 
This is also a text written in an ostensibly collaborative way.  Cervantes’s interlocutor comes to his 
aid during a period of writer’s block, and issues an instruction that is of particular interest: 
 
Lo primero en que reparáis de los sonetos, epigramas o elogios que os faltan para el principio, 
y que sean de personajes graves y de título, se puede remediar en que vos mesmo toméis algún 
trabajo en hacerlos, y después los podéis bautizar y poner el nombre que quisiéredes, 
ahijándolos al Preste Juan de las Indias o al Emperador de Trapisonda, de quien yo sé que hay 
noticia que fueron famosos poetas […] ya que os averigüen la mentira, no os han de cortar la 
mano con que lo escribistes. (17) 
The prologue therefore practises a sort of false attribution that is famously explored in Borges’s 
‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  Cervantes lets his reader in on the literary ruse of attributing the 
paratextual elements of the work to other, ostensibly real authors, as great texts must naturally follow 
the strictures of being prologued by known figures.  The reader is originally invited to interpret the 
paratextual elements (Juan Gallo de Andrada’s Tasa, for example) as had they been written by 
someone other than Cervantes, so as to offer the text the appropriate amount of prestige.  The 
attribution of the sonnets, epigrams and elegies at the beginning to other poets is designed to program 
the reader to interpret the text as if it had been written by a well-connected and prestigious literary 
figure.  It is through this lens that a reader might expect to view the Quijote, before the ruse is revealed 
in the prologue, after which the text must be re-read with a different emphasis.  In other words, a 
reader will inevitably alter their view of a text, even if subtly, depending on the attribution of aspects 
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of it to another author.  This phenomenon is particularly relevant to Pierre Menard, whose verbatim 
rewriting relies on a reader effectively attributing to him the authorship of the Quijote. 
 
There is also evidence that Cervantes’s introduction aligns itself with what would later be termed 
‘non-intentionalist’ or reader-centric approaches to writing.  What Cervantes ought to create, says his 
friend, is a text that is malleable to the demands of each reader: 
 
Procurad también que, leyendo vuestra historia, el melancólico se mueva a risa, el risueño la 
acreciente, el simple no se enfade, el discreto se admire de la invención, el grave no la 
desprecie, ni el prudente deje de alabarla.  En efecto, llevad la mira puesta a derribar la 
máquina mal fundada destos caballerescos libros, aborrecidos de tantos y alabados de muchos 
más; que si esto alcanzásedes, no habríades alcanzado poco. (22) 
 
In other words, the text ought to conform to the tastes of each reader.  If Cervantes can dismantle the 
machinery of chivalric literature, and disavow fiction’s claim to historical truth, then he can allow a 
reader to take from literature not what they ought to read, but precisely what they wish to.  This 
approach strongly aligns Cervantes with the late 20th Century development of reader-response 
theory, a movement in which Unamuno and Borges would have felt quite comfortable.5 
In 1614 Cervantes becomes a reader of his own prologue to Don Quijote de la Mancha when he also 
prologues his Novelas ejemplares.  Beginning also with an admission of his failure to repeat previous 
successes, marked by a kind of tragicomic self-effacement, he laments that he was unable to find a 
prologuist to extol his virtues.  Yet he admits that such an introduction would have been dishonest: 
 
Y cuando a la deste amigo, de quien me quejo, no ocurrieran otras cosas de las dichas que 
decir de mí, yo me levantara a mí mismo dos docenas de testimonios y se los dijera en secreto, 
con que extendiera mi nombre y acreditara mi ingenio.  Porque pensar que dicen puntualmente 
                                               
5 It also, as Parr notes, distances Cervantes from the textual practices of his time: ‘The subverting of 
auctoritas in Don Quixote transcends Cervantes’s masterpiece, for it has implications for the 
appreciation of all writing, implicitly advocating as it does a skeptical posture with regard not only 
to fiction, whether in the original or in translation, but also to history and even the Bible.  For 
Cervantes’s time, still basking in the afterglow of the Council of Trent, with the Counter Reformation 
proceeding apace, it is a revolutionary and therefore a hazardous position to advance, once calling for 
both ingenuity and courage.  At the same time, it is one of the qualities of this protean text that helps 
bring it alive for the sophisticated, skeptical reader of today.’ (Parr 1988: 39)  
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la verdad los tales elogios es disparate, por no tener punto preciso ni determinado las alabanzas 
ni los vituperios. (Cervantes 2005: 134) 
 
Here Cervantes highlights a few narrative issues.  Is writing about another person not contaminated 
with the voice of that person?  How can textual tributes to Cervantes’s greatness be trusted when 
these might be nothing but a device of his own invention?  On a broader level, the prologue warns us 
against the extraction of truth from text.  Praise or vituperation might be born of biases, interpersonal 
loyalties, or even third-party interference.  In an even broader sense, Cervantes problematises 
narration.  A narrative voice may be contaminated by voices of others; authors might be nothing but 
mere padrastros of the narrative.  When the voice of the author-narrator is difficult to distinguish 
from interfering voices, it is difficult to see that voice as the source of the text’s meaning. 
 
The meaningfulness of these texts lies in their exemplarity: ‘no hay ninguna [novela] de quien no se 
pueda sacar algún ejemplo provechoso’ (134-135).  In other words, the text is not meaningful in as 
far as the author has intended it to say anything specific: rather it is meaningful in possibly infinite 
ways, according to each specific reader for as long as those readers find some personal relevance in 
it.  Though paradoxically, Cervantes ties the notion of reader-centric interpretations of his text to his 
intentions as an author: ‘Mi intento ha sido poner en la plaza de nuestra república una mesa de trucos, 
donde cada uno pueda llegar a entretenerse, sin daño de barras; digo sin daño del alma ni del cuerpo, 
porque los ejercicios honestos y agradables antes aprovechan que dañan’ (135).  Cervantes seems to 
suggest that there are some texts whose meaning is fixed by the author.  This, though, is a text 
specifically designed to open itself to an endless string of equally valid interpretations, where each 
one of us can entertain ourselves without impinging on the enjoyment of others.  By this argument, 
meaning in this text exists only to the extent that it is enjoyed as an aesthetic event.  
 
Those who see true exemplarity in a fictional work, run the risk of misappropriating it, expecting it 
to do more than it is capable of.  Cervantes hence concludes with this warning: 
 
Una cosa me atreveré a decirte: que, si por algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas 
pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún mal deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la 
mano con que las escribí, que sacarlas en público.  Mi edad no está ya para burlarse con la 
otra vida, que al cincuenta y cinco de los años gano por nueve más y por la mano. (135) 
 
Cervantes here argues that a text can be misread to the extent that it can incite a reader to ill action.  
The validity of a text’s interpretation can thus be measured by the moral goodness of the reader’s 
response.  For allowing each reader the space to determine the meaning of the work complicates the 
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discussion as to what constitutes an acceptable reading of it.  A reading is unacceptable not in terms 
of its relationship to the text, but to the real world in which the text is read.  The reader’s ethical 
responsibility to eschew interpretations that can lead them to ill deeds is, as I will show, scarcely 
interrogated in Unamuno’s work on Cervantes, whereas in Borges’s it is ever-present, even if 
obliquely. 
 
II.2 Reception theory 
 
Much modern criticism has since caught up with Cervantes’s narrative games.  As Eagleton points 
out, the overwhelming trends towards reading can be broadly split into the author-centric Romantic 
tradition, the text-centric practices of the New Critics, and now in the modern day to a more reader-
centric method (Eagleton 1996: 66).  I think Borges’s and Unamuno’s mutual interest in Cervantes 
can be explored in terms of a reader-centric model.   
 
Reader-centrism was the subject of much writing in the latter half of the 20th Century.  Most notably 
Hans-Robert Jauß was at the forefront of the movement that would later come to be known as 
reception theory.  His 1982 Toward an aesthetic of reception distanced the act of reading away from 
a formalist approach of close reading, and argued instead that reading is a process that is inalienable 
from the historical moment in which it takes place.  In other words, Jauß argues that the aesthetic 
value of the work is determined in an historical chain of readings, in which the significance of the 
work changes commensurately and consecutively with cultural progress: 
 
A literary work is not an object that stands by itself and offers the same view to each reader 
in each period.  It is not a monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence.  It is 
much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that 
frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence. (Jauss 
1982: 21) 
 
The notion that a text does not contain a monolithic, unchanging set of meanings is central to both 
Borges and Unamuno, whose interest in the Quijote extends to how it ought to be read in their 
particular circumstances, both geographic and temporal.  To Jauß, the circumstances in which a text 
is read are absolutely formative to the meaning that a reader discovers in it.  In his words, each reader 
receives a text according to an individual horizon of expectations (Erwartungshorizont), which will 
inevitably produce a unique reading in each case (23-24).  Given that those horizons of expectations 
are historically-bound, the meaning of a text is subject to constant development, where previous 
readings are overwritten by new ones.  We will see later how the different horizons of expectations 
   20 
of a 19th and 20th Century Spaniard and of a 20th Century Argentine respectively serve to revive the 
text: the former in terms of resurrecting the hero and his quest, the latter in terms of allowing the 17th 
Century text to comment on the 20th Century status quo. 
 
In Jauß’s view, a text has an infinite potential to produce meaning in as far as it is received as part of 
a sort of dialogue with the reader:  
 
Only as the horizon changes and expands with each subsequent historical materialisation, do 
responses to the work legitimise particular possibilities of understanding, imitation, 
transformation, and continuation — in short, structures of exemplary character that condition 
the process of the formation of literary tradition. (64) 
 
Readers and texts stand in a dialectical relationship.  A reader approaches the text with a horizon of 
expectations, which is subtly altered by the text.  A text is both subjected to and formative of a reader’s 
horizon of expectations.  As such, to read one text will impact on how we read another.  This is 
precisely how the historical meaning of a text in Jauß is subject to constant change: new texts add 
themselves to a reader’s frame of reference, and inevitably impact on the ways in which older texts 
are received.  So: for as long as time passes, and new readers come to revisit old texts, the potential 
of the work to produce meaning might be endless.  This is an idea that Borges apparently arrives at 
in his essay ‘Kafka y sus precursores’, but I will demonstrate later on how this constant updating of 
reader’s expectations is the basis on which Pierre Menard’s version of the Quijote can be said to be 
different to that of Cervantes. 
 
The fact that a reader’s horizon of expectations is inevitably altered by each act of reading suggests 
that no two readings of the same work are every fully alike.  A text can never be brought back to 
mean exactly what it meant on a previous reading, as cultural frames of reference are constantly 
updated.  So says Jauß:  
 
Every reader is familiar with the experience that the significance of a poem often discloses 
itself only on rereading, after returning from the end to the beginning.  Here the experience of 
the first reading becomes the horizon of the second one: what the reader received in the 
progressive horizon of aesthetic perception can be articulated as a theme in the retrospective 
horizon of interpretation. (143) 
 
Jauß argues that a re-reading, can never fully extricate itself from the previous reading, even if they 
do not quite arrive at the same meaning in a text.  The first reading will always provide the conceptual 
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framework by which the second reading is carried out, the second reading will provide the next 
framework, and so on.  This is the limitation of reader-centrism.  Under Jauß, it does not allow for a 
fully anarchistic style of reading in which every reading is as valid as any other.  Rather, Jauß’s 
aesthetic of reception describes the process by which readers’ expectations of texts, and the possible 
meanings they might find there, are in constant historical flux.  It does not preclude the possibility of 
an unacceptable reading of a text, as Stanley Fish later discusses.  Instead, ‘literary hermeneutics 
poses the hypothesis that the concretisation of the meaning of literary works progresses historically 
and follows a certain ‘logic’ that precipitates in the formation and transformation of the aesthetic 
canon’ (147).  In other words, the range of acceptable readings of a text is given by the way in which 
the aesthetic canon interacts with the progress of historical change.  As I will demonstrate in the third 
chapter, Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote in light of the ostensible intra-historic Spanish spirit, 
which moves across historical generations, is in this sense a means by which to return the text to an 
original or ‘source’ meaning.  By contrast, Borges presents a possibly unacceptable reading of the 
Quijote that defies the development of historical events, or that ought not to have been produced 
according to the horizon of expectations of a wartime European intellectual. 
 
Wolfgang Iser’s The Act of Reading placed him at the forefront of a movement of reader-based 
aesthetics.  Broadly, Iser’s work defines aesthetic responses as a ‘dialectic relationship between text, 
reader, and their interaction’ (Iser 1987: Preface, x).  A text is therefore best understood in terms of 
an ‘effect theory’ (Wirkungstheorie), an investigation into its effect on the reader.  Iser does not feel 
that the meaning of a text can be prescribed by the circumstances in which it is read: ‘It would not be 
unfair to say that, at least since the advent of “modern art,” the referential reduction of fictional texts 
to a single ‘hidden’ meaning represents a phase of interpretation that belongs to the past’ (10).  So, to 
read as if to discover meaning rather than to produce it, is outdated.  A text can convey new and 
original meanings should a reader approach it with that possibility in mind.  It simply sets out the 
rules of the game of interpretation, and a reader is allowed to process the text according to their own 
desires (108).  As such, ‘The reader’s enjoyment begins when he himself becomes productive, i.e., 
when the text allows him to bring his own faculties into play’ (108).  Simply, in Iser’s view, a text is 
meaningful only when a reader takes pleasure in exercising his creative faculties. 
 
To Iser, the reader’s horizon of expectations is in constant flux, not just before and after the reading 
is completed, but during the process itself.  The reader synthesises their expectation of the text with 
the words on the page (112).  In fact, it is not only the case that our expectations of the text to follow 
will delineate how we will read it, but also that how we have read the text that will cause us to re-
assess our expectations.  In this way, ‘reading does not merely flow forward, but […] recalled 
segments also have a retroactive effect, with the present transforming the past’ (115).  To re-read, by 
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extension, is to read a transformed version of the text given a new set of expectations.  Thus, re-
reading is a transformational act very much akin to the act of re-writing: in both cases a text is 
overwritten with an updated version.  Reading cannot in that sense be easily distinguished from 
authorship.  If such a distinction does exist, it is based on the fact that authorship establishes certain 
rules of the game that reading can play along to as it sees fit.  As Iser puts it, ‘Reading is an activity 
that is guided by the text; this must be processed by the reader, who is then, in turn, affected by what 
he has processed’ (163).  As such, a phenomenology of reading is in no way mutually exclusive with 
the author’s capacity to delineate possible meanings in the text.   
 
Stanley Fish in his 1970 essay ‘Meaning as Event’ explored the relevance of the author’s intended 
meaning to interpretation. He highlights cases ‘where the work includes a statement of intention, […] 
which because it establishes an expectation on the part of a reader becomes a part of his experience’ 
(Fish 1970: 147).  So in his view, when the author’s intention is stated, it becomes a relevant factor 
in how a text ought to be interpreted, or more precisely, it inevitably factors into the reader’s 
experience of the text.  In that sense, Cervantes’s prologue to the Quijote is paradoxical for its 
insistence that the reader ought to read without concern for what the author had in mind!  Any reader-
centric analysis of the Quijote will always be in line with the stated authorial intention in the prologue 
to the first volume of that work.  This, as I will demonstrate shortly, complicates the discussion as to 
how far Unamuno and Borges present acceptable readings of Cervantes’s novel. 
 
In 1980 Fish specifically explored the question as to what constitutes an acceptable reading of a text.  
There he cited the example of Raine’s and Hirsch’s respective readings of Blake’s ‘The Tyger’, in 
which the same verses are held up as evidence for two competing interpretations.  As Fish states:  
 
Clearly they cannot both be right, but just as clearly there is no basis for deciding between 
them.  One cannot appeal to the text, because the text has become an extension of the universe 
that divides them; and in fact, the text as it is variously characterised is a consequence of the 
interpretation for which it is supposedly evidence. (Fish 1980: 340) 
 
As I will outline in the specific chapter on Borges and Pierre Menard, this is precisely the intellectual 
quandary at the heart of that famous tale on rewriting.  When the same text can beget such 
incompatible readings, how can one arbitrate between these poles?  The answer cannot lie in the text 
itself, given that reading is generally a process marked by confirmation bias.  In other words, the text 
is often used in order to align with the attitudes present in the reader before the act of reading began.  
Or as Fish explains, ‘in the light of an already assumed interpretation, the word [‘forests’, in this case] 
will be seen to obviously have one meaning or another’ (340).  Reading in Fish’s view is a process of 
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conforming a text to pre-existing assumptions.  The reader requires of the text that it align with their 
expectations, and uses it as a post-hoc justification of their original standpoint. 
 
Fish argues with success that a text lends itself to a vast multitude of acceptable readings, though I 
do not agree with him that an infinite set of possible readings is impossible: 
 
while ‘The Tyger’ is obviously open to more than one interpretation, it is not open to an 
infinite number of interpretations. There may be disagreements as to whether the tiger is good 
or evil, or whether the speaker is Blake or a persona, and so on, but no one is suggesting that 
the poem is an allegory of the digestive processes or that it predicts the Second World War, 
and its limited plurality is simply a testimony to the capacity of a great work of art to generate 
multiple readings. (341-342) 
 
I believe that the strictures of genre and form do not exclude an infinity of valid readings.  A reading 
might need to meet certain criteria in order to be considered acceptable, but those criteria do not 
preclude an infinity of possible readings.  The infinite set of multiples of three by definition excludes 
the numbers two and four.  Genre and form can rule out certain readings while still permitting an 
infinite number of others.  What differentiates one of these acceptable readings from an unacceptable 
one cannot be found within the text itself, according to Fish: ‘if, as I have argued, the text is always 
a function of interpretation, then the text cannot be the location of the core of agreement by means of 
which we reject interpretations’ (342). 
 
There must, however, be something present in the text that excludes certain readings.  The various 
approaches to the Quijote, from the comedic to the romantic, are only as adventurous as that text will 
allow.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, to uphold the masterpiece as a work of science fiction.  
Even Unamuno and Borges, at their most daring, still read the Quijote in keeping with the rules of 
Cervantes’s game, as I shall demonstrate later in this thesis.  There also must be some core agreement 
on how the text should be approached in order for discourse to be possible.  A text determines its own 
method of reading.  But that method might leave room for infinite recreations of the text.  In other 
words, a text provides the strictures by which a possibly infinite set of acceptable readings might take 
place.   
 
However, it is hard to specifically place those strictures in the text itself.  Fish argues that an 
acceptable reading is in and of itself a canonical idea, and that as the literary canon continues to 
update itself, so does the total number of readings that have become acceptable: 
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the canons of acceptability can change. Moreover, that change is not random but orderly and, 
to some extent, predictable. A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some 
relationship of opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things 
that aren't done) from which it can emerge into respectability. (349) 
 
According to Fish, reading is considered acceptable in as far as it is the product of a defined and 
accepted practice of reading.  This implies that the acceptability of a reading does not rest on 
universally identifiable aspects within the text, but a performative routine that intellectual consensus 
considers permissible.  I argue in the final chapter that Unamuno and Borges attempt to update the 
interpretive routines by which the Quijote can or ought to be read.  Unamuno’s Vida de don Quijote 
y Sancho appears to aim at dismantling interpretive routines per se, in order to inaugurate a sort of 
textual idealism where the validity of an interpretation is a matter of human will.  That, paradoxically, 
is an interpretive routine like any other.  l also argue that Unamuno’s anarchistic reading of the 
Quijote might be considered ethically unacceptable.  In Borges’s case, interpretation must take into 
account the historical moment both at the moment of writing and the moment of reception.  I will 
also put forth in the final chapter that the narrator’s reading of Pierre Menard’s Quijote, taking into 
account its 1939 publication is just as, if not even more ethically unacceptable. 
 
II.3 The author as reader 
 
The death of the author was finally announced in 1967.  Barthes’s famous essay was daring for its 
disregard for the author at the moment of reception, as ‘writing is the destruction of every voice, 
every point of origin.  Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, 
the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing’ (Barthes 
1987: 142).  Significantly, the author is by nature absent at the moment of reading, to such an extent 
that the act of reading cannot be a dialogical process, but a personal one, where meaning is projected 
onto the text by the reader, and not discovered in tandem with the author: 
 
Mallarmé was doubtless the first to see and to foresee in its full extent the necessity to 
substitute language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to be its owner.  
For him, for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author; to write is, through a 
prerequisite impersonality […] to reach that point where only language acts, ‘performs’, and 
not ‘me’. (143) 
 
The author is a mere occupant of a temporal moment at which writing takes place.  This is neither 
here nor there as far as reading is concerned.  The language of narrative is detached from a speaking 
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subject, unlike in spoken or essayistic discourse.  This presents the reader with an effectively 
anarchistic power to read the text ad libitum.  That is in direct violation of the rights of what he terms 
the Author-God: 
 
We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the 
‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, 
none of them original, blend and clash.  The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the 
innumerable centres of culture. (146) 
 
In other words, a text is not just the product of an author, but a synthesis of given forms, norms and 
genres that exist independently of that author.  In that sense ‘His [the author’s] only power is to mix 
writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as to never rest on any one of them’ (146). 
The argument that the author mediates existing culture is crucial to Unamuno’s non-intentionalist 
reading of the Quijote.  In fact, Unamuno’s invective against Cervantes relegates him from the author 
to what Barthes calls the scriptor: 
 
Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, 
impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know 
no halt: life never does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, 
an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred. (147) 
 
Unamuno’s take on Cervantes is the very image of the Barthesian scriptor.  There can be no Quijote 
without the pre-existing tradition of chivalric literature; no Cervantes without Ariosto, no Ariosto 
without the Arthurian legend, and so backwards.  Each new text is the product of a relationship to an 
earlier text: hence the authorial moment is deferred retrospectively through the history of literary 
production.  The Quijote is authored by the major literary works that preceded it, and in Unamuno’s 
view, by the intra-historic Spanish spirit, just as much as by Cervantes himself.   
 
Barthes’s idea of reception is the logical extreme of reader-centrism:  
 
The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without 
any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination.  Yet this 
destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, 
psychology; he is simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by 
which the written text is constituted. (148) 
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Unamuno and Borges align to different extents with the statement that ‘the birth of the reader must 
be at the cost of the death of the Author.’  The reader in Unamuno’s Quijote is the only relevant factor 
in what a text says.  And the success of each reading relies on the force of human will with which it 
is defended in public discourse.  In Borges’s, the original author is not to be disregarded.  While 
reading is the process by which the meaning of a text reaches its completion, this relies on a synthesis 
between what the author and reader are mutually capable of conceiving of in their given places and 
times.  And the intervening period between the moment of writing and moment of reading can 
produce a new reading superior to that of the original author. 
 
Two years after Barthes killed the author, Foucault took it upon himself to identify the body.  His 
1969 ‘Qu’est-ce q’un auteur?’ aimed to more fully explore the disappearance or death of the author 
as Barthes had proclaimed it.   According to Foucault, the disappearance of the author may not leave 
a simple hermeneutic void.  The author must be replaced by some other guiding principle.  This was 
problematic for Foucault to the extent that he considered an anti-authorial reading just as theological 
as an authorial one; the author’s authority had merely been transferred to the reader.   
 
To disregard the author as a relevant factor in interpretation is to reduce a work to the level of a text, 
to relegate it back from an oeuvre to mere écriture.  How can one read a work as a mere piece of 
writing without referring back to the conditions under which the text was written, and therefore, 
reinstating the author?  Foucault asks: ‘In granting a primordial status to writing, do we not, in effect, 
simply reinscribe in transcendental terms the theological affirmation of its sacred origin or a critical 
belief in its creative nature?’ (120).  There is no possible reading of a literary work that can wholly 
disregard the fact that it has been authored.  This is particularly germane to Borges, as I will show in 
the fourth chapter.  One of many relevant factors in how the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del 
Quijote’ interprets his contemporary’s verbatim copy of the original is the identity of the authors of 
the two versions: sufficient to bifurcate the same text into two different works. 
 
The author can be, for example, one of the key links between distinct literary works, and unite them 
into a broader corpus.  In that sense, the author’s name stands as a metonym for their body of work.  
If it turned out, for example, that Shakespeare had had many of his major works ghostwritten, the 
force of his name would change, along with many of the literary relationships that readers have 
discovered bearing his name (122).  Moreover, the author’s name is a method by which readers 
distinguish texts from works: 
 
the name of an author is a variable that accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of 
others: a private letter may have a signatory, but it does not have an author; a contract can 
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have an underwriter, but not an author; and similarly, an anonymous poster attached to a wall 
may have a writer, but he cannot be an author.  In this sense the function of an author is to 
characterise the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society. 
(124) 
 
Borges and Unamuno view the cult of the author’s personality very differently.  Borges’s attribution 
of certain texts to apocryphal authors (a favourite pastime of the residents of Tlön) is in keeping with 
this idea of Foucault’s: the function of Pierre Menard as the ostensible author of a new Quijote is to 
update the discourses in which the Quijote can be seen to operate.  Unamuno also clearly recognises 
that the author’s name generally characterises the discourse around the text.  For that reason he takes 
against Cervantes, the malicious historian whose masterpiece was a fluke.  His reader-centric, 
idealistic interpretation of the Quijote makes the text the function by which the author is judged, and 
not vice versa.  The right of the author to characterise the operation of certain discourses within a 
society is one he would rather attribute to the reader.   
 
Foucault cites Freud, Marx and Aristotle as three authors whose body of work has opened up entirely 
new methods of discourse.  Literary authors, as receivers of old methods of discourse, are also capable 
of producing new ones: ‘one could say that Ann Radcliffe did not simply write The Mysteries of 
Udolpho and a few other novels, but also made possible the appearance of Gothic Romances at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.  To this extent, her function as an author exceeds the limit of her 
work’ (131).  Cervantes is also one such author.  The stepfather of don Quijote has created a self-
defeating discursive method of reading.  The apparent intervention of a third party during the writing 
of the novel to overcome a case of writer’s block, the author-narrator’s own refusal to acknowledge 
himself as the sole creator of the narrative,6 the constant deferral of authorship from an unreliable 
narrator, to a morisco translator, to a dishonest Arabic author: all of this allows Cervantes to create a 
text in such a way so as to deny that he created it at all.  As such his approach is both discursive and 
literary.  Cervantes created a text which enables, and actively encourages, a reader-centric approach 
to texts.  Literature and discourse in that case cannot be easily extricated.  In that sense, Cervantes is 
an author who updates discursive norms.  For without Cervantes’s narrative experiments which 
diminish the author’s role in the reader’s interpretation of the work, there might never have been a 
Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, or a ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.   
                                               
6 As Anthony Close notes: ‘Authors of medieval prose romances, and their Spanish successors, 
wanted to invest fiction with something like the solemn authority of reliably attested history; 
Cervantes’s invention of Benengeli aims largely to expose and debunk that ambiguous and (for the 
vulgar) misleading impression’ (Close 1990: 15-16). 
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Foucault, much like Jauß, argues that the new methods that great authors can produce can help shed 
further light on their works on a second reading: ‘a reexamination of the books of Freud or Marx can 
transform our understanding of psychoanalysis or Marxism’ (136).  New discourses allow new 
readers to return to old texts and discover something unprecedented within them.  For all of Borges’s 
and Unamuno’s posturing against the authority of Cervantes over his own text, they remain firmly 
within the discursive field that he inaugurated.  At most, both present new readers with updated 
methods for reading Cervantes’s original.  Those methods, however, are provided specifically by the 
aspects of the Quijote they tally with. 
 
II.4 The role of intention in literary meaning 
 
In the time since Unamuno and Borges produced their non-intentionalist readings of the Quijote, the 
relevance of the author’s intention in interpretation has been the subject of much critical theory.  An 
exhaustive chronicle of those texts is far beyond the scope of this thesis.  I will however comment on 
the development of theory related to intentionalism, including the work two contemporary theorists 
who have furthered our understanding of the reader-centric method.   
 
Intentionalism entered the theoretical lexicon when Wimsatt and Beardsley published their article 
‘The Intentional Fallacy’ in 1946.  This was the first major discussion of intentionalist approaches to 
reading in contemporary theory, and it held as its main thesis that ‘the design or intention of the author 
is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art’ 
(Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946: 468).  Simply, the premise of ‘intention’, ‘corresponds to what he [the 
author] intended in a formula which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance […] Intention is 
design or plan in the author’s mind.  Intention has obvious affinities for the author’s attitude toward 
his work, the way he felt, what made him write’ (469 - emphasis in original).  This is the definition 
of intention that I intend to work with throughout this thesis: a design or plan with which the author 
specifically planned to produce a text.  They attempted to replace this popular approach to literature 
with a more reader-centric method, arguing that ‘The poem belongs to the public.  It is embodied in 
language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the human being, an object of public 
knowledge’ (470).  
 
Unamuno’s readings treat the literary work as an aesthetic object onto which he can project a kind of 
literary idealism.  Criticism fails, in Unamuno, when it becomes a case study in what an author had 
desired when writing.  Similarly, Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that criticism ought not to work as a 
sort of ‘author psychology’ (477).  It must not conflate itself with a narrative of the author’s life, or 
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an investigation into the author’s mental state.  As they put it, ‘There is a difference between internal 
and external evidence for the meaning of the poem’ (477).  Paradoxically, the internal meaning of the 
text is publicly available to a reader in the way that the external meaning is not.  External meaning 
‘is private or idiosyncratic; not a part of the work as a linguistic fact: it consists of revelations […] 
about how or why the poet wrote the poem’ (477-478).  As such the literary work is not a trove of 
authorial intentions.  Intentions are effectively a biographical detail.  As we will see later, biography, 
while external to the text, is for Borges one of the most relevant factors in interpretation. 
 
‘The Intentional Fallacy’ proposes that the author’s horizon of expectations, as Jauß later put it, is not 
informative to reading.  What an author had read, what literary circles they participated in, are extra-
textual information that must be excluded from the reader’s response.  They take for example 
Coleridge’s ‘Kubla Khan’, noting that Bartram’s Travels contains much of the vocabulary that can 
help a reader to make sense of Coleridge’s poetry: 
 
But it would seem to pertain little to the poem to know that Coleridge had read Bartram.  
There is a gross body of life, of sensory and mental experience, which lies behind and in some 
sense causes every poem, but can never be and need not be known in the verbal and hence 
intellectual composition which is the poem.  For all the objects of our manifold experience, 
especially for the intellectual objects, for every unity, there is an action of the mind which 
cuts off roots, melts away context — or indeed we should never have objects or ideas or 
anything to talk about. (480) 
 
The narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ strongly disagrees with this position.  The author’s possible 
knowledge before and at the moment of writing is wholly pertinent.  In fact what the author hopes 
for — to write the Quijote — is taken into account by the narrator.  More relevant still is the cultural 
knowledge available to Pierre Menard given the extant linguistic codes in his time and place, and the 
enormous contrast between the nature of his work at that of his literary contemporaries. In my specific 
chapter on ‘Pierre Menard’ I will show how Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay can help to critique that 
narrator’s reading of Menard’s version of the Quijote, given that this narrator exists 
contemporaneously with Menard, at a point in which his friend’s intentions, knowledge and 
experiences are all available to him.   
 
That said, the notion that relationships between authors cannot inform texts ought to be held up to 
scrutiny.  Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that when a reader identifies similarities between two authors’ 
works, it is not useful to inquire as to whether the allusion is deliberate.  ‘Our point is that such an 
answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem […] it would not be a critical 
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inquiry.  Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way.  Critical inquiries are not settled 
by consulting the oracle’ (487).  Whether an author deliberately alluded to the work of another may 
or may not be informative to the reader.  It is however a mistake to think that critical inquiry ought 
to be settled at all.  Placing texts next to each other to explore their comparisons and contrasts is one 
way to initiate and not close a critical inquiry.  When Cervantes’s version of the Quijote is placed 
alongside Menard’s, the French author’s act of allusion yields a potentially never-ending inquiry into 
how or if one ought to read original meaning into a repeated text. 
 
‘The Intentional Fallacy’ has given rise to more pages of theory than there is space to discuss here.  I 
will now examine two recent investigations into intentionalism in art, beginning with Paisley 
Livingston’s 2005 Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study, which provides a comprehensive 
philosophical overview of the relevance of intention in reading. It helps to answer the question as to 
how far the author’s intention can inform our view of literature.  As Livingston shows, intention is 
an imprecise philosophical category.  It is therefore difficult to discuss its relevance to hermeneutics.  
Though there are useful possible answers to that quandary: ‘As a meaningful attitude, an intention 
represents some targeted situation or state of affairs as well as some means to that end. The content 
of an intention is schematic, requiring specification and adjustment at the time of action’ (8). 
 
To put that differently, intention is an end to which the author must have the means.  It does not have 
to be a specific plan, but a broad sense of some telos achievable by the author.  In the fifth chapter I 
will show in more detail how Pierre Menard’s impossible rewriting of the Quijote violates this 
understanding of intention.  Menard intends the impossible.  How, then, can his stated intention to 
produce a verbatim duplicate of that text be read from the perspective of intentionalism?  Perhaps 
Borges explores a model of intention that does not correspond to applicable literary models that 
currently exist.   
 
Though perhaps an author’s intention extends to what readings they may be able to anticipate: 
 
One objection to the view that intentional action entails intending is based on unintended side‐
effects. For example, in writing a poem, it probably was not Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's 
intention to exacerbate Karl‐Philip Moritz's powerful feelings of artistic inferiority, but it may 
be thought that as he in fact anticipated such an outcome. (13-14) 
 
Remember that there is a stated intention in the introduction to the Quijote that the text should be 
read according to the interests of individual readers.  Unamuno and Borges both read according to 
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those interests.  Perhaps the Quijote is a text with the peculiar feature of only ever being read 
according to the author’s intention, even when those readings purport to be anti-intentionalist. 
 
Livingston is largely defensive of the intentionalist method.  He argues that intentionalism has not 
satisfactorily been replaced by a superior method, and therefore that intentions still have some 
explanatory value (30).  He even argues that intentionalism is not hampered by the unavailability of 
the author’s thoughts: 
 
Intentionalist enquiry need not rest upon the dogmatic acceptance of an a priori proof; nor 
must we assume that everything about our behaviour can be explained along intentionalist 
lines; even less does it imply that we must know for sure what went on in Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge's mind as he wrote ‘Kubla Khan’. (30) 
 
I do not agree that intentionalist enquiry avoids that difficulty.  If intention is informative, then not 
knowing what Coleridge had in mind at the point of writing ‘Kubla Khan’ renders certain readings 
unavailable to the reader.  Intentionalism imposes a finite number of permissible readings, many of 
which we cannot access without knowledge of the state of mind of authors of years long past.  This, 
though, does not per se justify non-intentionalism as a valid method.  The disappearance of previously 
available readings does not automatically validate any new reading constructed to fill that gap.  
Unamuno provides a useful insight into why non-intentionalism might be a valid method in light of 
the unavailability of the author’s thoughts.  As both author and critic of his own works, many of those 
on the Quijote, he shows both that literature is a matter of public property, and that the author is not 
a deity, but a human being whose ideas, interests and intentions transform over the course of time.  
As such, those provide an unsatisfactory framework for the reader to interpret the literary work. 
 
A further problem for intentionalism is that an artist’s stated intention might not represent what they 
really intended: ‘As anti-intentionalists helpfully remind us, artists' reports on their intentions and 
actions are not always sincere, and when they are, still may not be true’ (32).  Can it be, then, that 
Cervantes’s intention to provide each reader with a story that would satisfy their individual tastes was 
not really his intention at all?  What frameworks exist outside of the text to allow that discussion to 
take place?  Pierre Menard’s claim that he intends to write an original duplicate of the Quijote as 
opposed to simply creating a collage of excerpts from Cervantes’s version requires a leap of faith 
from the reader.  Later I will discuss how Menard’s non-intentionalist reading of the Quijote relies 
paradoxically on an intentionalist reader in order to be meaningful.   
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Livingston also finds Foucault’s idea of the author function highly problematic.  He believes that the 
author cannot be relegated to a projection of the reader: 
 
Ascertaining facts about actual, empirical authorship need not, then, be part of an operation 
designed to support individualist myths; it can, on the contrary, lead to a better understanding 
of the complex social network within which an author has been active, and thereby contribute 
to the debunking of mystifications surrounding the relevant ‘author‐function (69) 
 
This idea is posited in Borges’s great thought experiment, ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  The 
relevant factor that makes Menard’s version superior to that of Cervantes is not something that exists 
within the text, but the contexts in which the works were produced.  Later I will explain in more detail 
how the literary work is always effectively rewritten, as the circumstances in which it is written 
synthesise with those in which it is read.    
 
Helpfully, Livingston tackles Pierre Menard in a chapter specifically dedicated to ‘The Intentions of 
Monsieur Pierre Menard’.  He agrees with the Borgesian distinction between a text and a work.  The 
texts, he explains are ‘type-identical’ whereas the works ‘have divergent artistic or aesthetic 
properties’ (114).  In a mirror-image of Borges’s argument, Livingston adds that two texts can be the 
same work even if not type-identical: ‘Editors frequently correct misspellings when establishing texts, 
and it is common to assume that textual equivalence is maintained in spite of various sorts of 
syntactical variations’ (115).  
 
On that basis, he speculates on some of the possible variations of the symbolist poem mentioned 
towards the start of Menard’s bibliography.  First, he suggests that the original contained 
typographical errors, thereby justifying the term variaciones as the narrator refers to them.  This 
would, unlike Menard’s rewriting of the Quijote, present us with a single work written in two 
typographically different texts (128).  I find this argument problematic for the reason that the narrator 
refers to these variations as individual obras.  That is recognised by Livingston, who offers the 
following alternative view: 
 
Another option for our imaginative theoretical explication of the Menard story is to set aside 
the possibility that Menard's sonnet owed its two‐part appearance to the sorts of epistemic 
conditions which keep the critical‐editorial industries up and running. Menard, we would then 
surmise, provided La Conque's editor with a definitive authorial manuscript that was then 
reliably set in type and printed. Menard in turn carefully read and corrected proofs, the result 
being that on both occasions what was printed in the literary periodical corresponded 
   33 
character‐by‐character, point‐by‐point, to the author's settled choices. The variations, then, 
have nothing to do with some effort to replicate the linguistic features of a lost primary token. 
(128) 
 
That is, Menard may have submitted two verbally identical texts whose conditions of creation were 
distinct enough to provide two distinct works.  Should a reader of La Conque note two versions with 
striking similarities but some significant distinctions,  
 
a reader quickly reasons from the artistic differences between the poems to their strict non-
identity.  On the basis of the observed similarities and common authorial affiliation, such a 
reader might conclude that the second sonnet is a version of the first, a closely related yet 
distinct literary work, in which case there are two texts and two works. (129) 
 
One might wonder in such a case how two works produced by two typographically different texts 
constitute variations of each other, unless each work is not simply a variation on every other.  That 
is, what categories do readers choose to identify two texts with each other, while considering them 
unrelated to others.  A reader might choose the author as a convenient model by which a text is 
considered a version of another one: typographically similar texts with a common authorial affiliation, 
as Livingston puts it, can be considered versions of each other.  Borges, as I will show in the fifth 
chapter, deconstructs this approach.  Menard’s and Cervantes’s versions of the Quijote are 
typographically equal but intellectually unique; they exist as versions of each other without having 
an author in common.   
Livingston also offers interesting qualifications on Borges’s approach to tradition as he discusses 
most famously in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’, in which each text is simply a reiteration and small 
distortion of some previous one: 
 
The Borgesian emphasis on the idea that the object of interpretation is not just a work, but 
relations between works and groups of works, could seem to have some rather disastrous 
consequences if taken to the extreme. If every work can only be a version of some anterior 
work, then how did literary creation ever get started? (133) 
 
This reading of Borges is too linear.  There might be other, more appropriate ways to describe the 
notion of tradition in Borges, perhaps as fragments of all possible works as in the Library of Babel, 
or as Ilan Stavans recently put it, as part of a Universal Mind (Stavans 2015: 105).  One might even 
think of literary tradition as a garden of forking paths, one in which different literary traditions 
constantly diverge and converge over time. Such a model does not rely on a single point of origin.  
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As such the question as to how literary creation ever got started relies on a false dichotomy.  As we’ve 
seen, Cervantes could never have written the Quijote as we know it without Ariosto.  But that is also 
true of the Chanson de Roland and La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes.  The fallacy lies in assuming that 
a text is only a version of one previous text.  This is something that Borges never claimed, not even 
in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ where the works of Kafka are the product of various traditions.  Borges 
claims to be able to ‘reconocer su voz, o sus hábitos, en textos de diversas literaturas y de diversas 
épocas’ (Borges 1974: 279).  Those include the writings of Zeno, Browning and Kierkegaard.  In that 
sense these various strands of literary and intellectual thought have distilled into the writing of Kafka.  
Borges’s approach to literary tradition is a complex interaction of diverse strands that distil into 
different texts throughout time.   
 
It’s also important to note, as Livingston does, that this model need not discard the author from 
consideration.  Tradition is authored: it does not author.  While tradition has a formative relationship 
to texts, the author is the active conduit of that tradition.  As Livingston puts it, ‘Menard, like other 
writers, wrote works and fragments of literature, not just texts in an endless hypertext, and we can 
take them as objects of appreciation by attempting to reconstruct the projects and contexts in which 
these writings were situated’ (134).  As such we cannot consider literary creation as an act of platonic 
discovery of some form outside human experience.  There is a creative talent at work in the author, 
to whom literary tradition makes itself available without becoming the driving force in the act of 
creation.  Borges makes this explicit in ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, as Menard and Cervantes 
are two nodes in a complex system of diverging and converging literary paths.  An author is both a 
passive recipient of an enormous number of literary ideas, as well as the active innovator of new ones.  
In that sense, the author’s context within the historic moment can inform our reading of the text, 
because it can demonstrate what new understandings an author has contributed to literary thought.  
This is the purpose of Borges’s thought experiment in ‘Pierre Menard’: to uncover what new ideas 
might be contributed by an author who reiterates the product of a previous literary tradition. 
 
Livingston also contributes significantly to our understanding of intentionalist and non-intentionalist 
readings, and separates these respectively into various taxonomies.  This will be of great interest later 
on as I discuss what sort of non-intentionalist readers Unamuno and Borges are, and whether they 
can be described as non-intentionalist authors at all.  The most obvious sort of intentionalism is termed 
absolute intentionalism: the belief that the author’s intention and the meaning of the literary work are 
synonymous (139).  There are, however, more nuanced instances of intentionalism.  Fictionalist 
intentionalism is practised by a reader who accepts that a text is written through a series of decisions, 
though who paradoxically does not consider it to have been written by a real, historical author (140). 
By contrast, textualist intentionalism holds that a text is always the product of an historical author 
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whose precise intentions are always present and therefore discoverable in the text.  Most interestingly 
is the case of conditionalist intentionalism: ‘A conditionalist intentionalism recommends conjectures 
as to meanings the author “could have intended”, where the possibilia in question are appealing ones 
in worlds close to the actual artist’s’ (140-141).  I will argue in the fifth chapter that this is the theory 
of reading practised by the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  That narrator’s reading 
relies on a leap of faith that Menard’s Quijote is not a mere plagiarism, and his preference for the 
later version is based on the assumption that Cervantes could not have intended the same meanings 
that Menard ostensibly has.   
 
By contrast, what Livingston refers to as absolute anti-intentionalism is quite close to what Unamuno 
practises: ‘absolute anti‐intentionalism holds that authorial intentions are never decisive or 
determinant with regard to a work's meanings, and that the former are in some sense irrelevant to the 
interpreter's tasks’ (141).  Livingston considers a drawback of that anti-intentionalist approach to be 
the fact that intentions obviously have a role to play in the creation of a text (142).  When Unamuno 
argues throughout his literary career that whatever an author may have meant is irrelevant to him as 
a reader, he practises absolute anti-intentionalism.  This relies fundamentally on presenting the author 
as a mere conduit of a given narrative, precisely as he does in Vida de don Quijote y Sancho.  
Unamuno is therefore not ignorant of the drawbacks of his own method, and as I will show, his 
invectives against Cervantes serve only as a defence of his own absolute anti-intentionalist readings. 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the different shades of intentionalism and anti-
intentionalism.  Rather I aim to broadly position Borges and Unamuno within the wider discussion 
on such readings.  Livingston in fact argues that anti-intentionalism, which I believe broadly 
characterises Unamuno’s approach to reading, has complicated discourse on reading: 
 
The anti‐intentionalist's best argument takes the form of a dilemma: either the artist's 
intentions are successfully realized in the text or structure produced by the artist, in which 
case the interpreter need not refer to them; or the artist's intentions are not successfully 
realized in the artefact or performance (taken in conjunction with other, non‐intentional 
features of the context), in which case reference to them is insufficient to justify a related 
claim about the work's meanings. As far as I can see, absolute intentionalists lack a convincing 
response to this argument. (146-147) 
 
I believe that Unamuno more closely follows the latter line of argument: that the author’s intention is 
an irrelevant factor in reading, because the text might imperfectly represent what the author wished 
to achieve.  Moreover, when Unamuno claims to have discovered the author’s implicit intention, he 
often uses his disagreement with these intentions as his interpretive crutch.  So even the argument 
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that Unamuno comfortably fits into the category of absolute anti-intentionalism must be qualified, as 
not only does he express the fact that he takes no interest in an author’s intention when he reads, but 
his posturing against what a malicious author such as Cervantes might have been attempting provides 
much of the weight behind his interpretation of the Quijote.   
 
Livingston appears also to suggest that the rhetorical question at the end of ‘Pierre Menard’ as to how 
the Imitatio Christi might be read differently if it were attributed to James Joyce, is an example of 
fictionalist intentionalism in which a real text is attributed to some projection of an author figure: ‘In 
spite of the recommendations made by the narrator at the end of Borges's “Pierre Menard, Author of 
the Quixote”, we do not construct an authorial persona responsible for both Winter Light and some 
lurid Hollywood production’ (168). Borges does not construct such a persona.  Rather, he is interested 
in how a text might be different if it were attributed to others, as to in how far the identity of the 
author might be a relevant factor in reading.  One way of course to test this theory is to in fact read 
the Imitatio Christi as if Joyce had written it.  That would not constitute the construction of an author, 
but of a corpus of work whose common thread was the historical author. 
 
Finally, Livingston identifies a possible reason for which anti-intentionalist readings can be so 
seductive:  
 
How can we ever know for sure what happened in the complex process whereby a text is 
created? Lacking such knowledge, we may be loath to take the risk of making assertions about 
the actual author's thoughts. Instead, we choose to project that form of authorship that best 
suits the text at hand and whatever evidence we happen to have regarding its context of 
creation. (168) 
 
The unavailability of the author’s thoughts at the moment of creation might persuade a reader to adopt 
an anti-intentionalist view.  As Unamuno’s volte-face from cervantismo to quijotismo also shows, 
authors’ intentions change over time.  How can a reader rely on those intentions when they might no 
longer be shared by the author?  Livingston’s best solution to the problem is that good reading might 
somehow re-constitute the circumstances of authorship.  This leaves room though for an objection: 
how can we therefore identify a good reading when those circumstances are unavailable to the reader?  
This question will help to scrutinise the claim that Menard’s version is superior to Cervantes’s 
because of the differences in those authors’ circumstances. 
 
Sherri Irvin’s 2006 article, ‘Authors, Intentions, and Literary Meaning’ responds to Livingston’s 
sympathetic view towards aspects of intentionalism.  It is unequivocal in its position that the author 
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has only a limited influence over the meaning of the text.  As Irvin argues, the meaning of a text is to 
a large extent fixed by the words on the page, whose definitions cannot be decided by the author but 
are mutually agreed on by a linguistic community.  So, ‘Word meanings are constrained by linguistic 
conventions, and idiosyncratic intentions can’t simply make the word “broccoli” mean “cauliflower”’ 
(Irvin 2006: 114). 
 
In Irvin’s view, an author is bound by constantly updating linguistic conventions.  Texts do not have 
a monolithic meaning impervious to the change of linguistic meaning in any given community: ‘even 
the same string of words in English may have a different meaning depending on the era in which it 
was generated, since conventions related to word meaning shift over time’ (144).  That argument will 
of course be acutely familiar to anyone who has read ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  As language 
changes, the words on the page have the potential to change meaning altogether.  This process cannot 
be stemmed by an author.   
 
Irvin also proposes a number of varieties of intentionalism.  It is not the purpose of the thesis to 
discuss all of these, but to hone in on some relevant examples.  The most obvious is strict anti-
intentionalism, or ‘conventionalism’ as Irvin terms it.  This holds that in order to understand a work, 
we need only consider it in light of the relevant linguistic conventions at the moment of writing.  
When an idea in a work is ambiguous, a reader might consider it a simple condition of the text, or 
simply appeal to a reading that would provide the text with the greatest aesthetic value (121).  This 
aligns quite closely with Unamuno’s quasi-idealist readings of the Quijote.  Unamuno programs 
himself to read the text from the most charitable, romantic point of view.  Perhaps we can consider 
Unamuno that kind of conventionalist reader.   
 
Irvin also helps nuance Menard’s placement in his linguistic community: 
 
Another possibility would be to say that the relevant conventions are determined by the 
author’s own linguistic community.  But an author may belong to more than one linguistic 
community; and, in any case, this proposal reintroduces an appeal to the author that 
conventionalism, especially in its more extreme versions, is designed to eschew. (121) 
 
‘Pierre Menard’ explores the role of competing linguistic conventions in reading.  Menard belongs to 
more than one linguistic and cultural community.  Under whose linguistic jurisdiction is the 
appropriate reading of the text set — that of 17th Century Spain, or 20th Century France?  Linguistic 
convention in that circumstance cannot be the guiding principle by which reading is validated.  I do 
not, however, believe that ‘Pierre Menard’ appeals to the author in a way conventionalism aims to 
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reject.  The author in that story is taken into account only in so far as to determine what the author’s 
horizon of expectations might permit him or her to conceive.  In that sense, conventionalism does not 
mutually cancel with an appeal to the author, provided that we appeal to the circumstances external 
to the author above the thoughts internal to him or her. 
 
The model of reading which Irvin identifies and which most closely resembles that practised by the 
narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’, is what she terms ‘hypothetical intentionalism’.  Her description of this 
method could easily have been written in reference to the Borges story: 
 
To understand a work appropriately, perhaps we must see it as the product of an author: a 
particular human being in a certain socio-historical context, who writes with a certain style, 
tends to use words in certain ways, brings certain background knowledge and experiences to 
bear, and has written a body of works which may inform one another. (122) 
 
The argument in ‘Pierre Menard’ is based on the existence of an author whose socio-historical context 
creates a horizon of expectations in the reader.  Irvin considers this to be a kind of ‘sophisticated 
conventionalism’ (125) where publicly accessible information about the author’s life is informative 
to what the text might have meant.  The narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ is a sophisticated conventionalist 
in that sense.  Menard’s perceived incompetence in the linguistic and cultural mores of 17th Century 
Spain heightens his contemporary’s appreciation of the rewritten Quijote, given that it was penned 
by an author with a horizon of expectations which ought to have prohibited his writing a work so 
formally similar to a work of 17th Century Spanish parody. 
 
II.5 Texts and Palimpsests 
 
Gérard Genette’s 1982 ‘Palimpsests: Literature in the second degree’ investigates the relationship 
between texts and their rewritings, or as he terms it, hypotexts and their hypertexts.  Genette 
subscribes to a view that all literature is a hypertext of some previous hypotext: ‘there is no literary 
work that does not evoke (to some extent and according to how it is read) some other literary work, 
and in that sense all works are hypertextual.  But like George Orwell’s “equals,” some works are 
more so than others’ (Genette 1997: 9).  Genette views literature as a series of ever diverging and re-
converging paths, as Borges may have.  In fact, much of Genette’s early discussion turns directly to 
Borges’s investigations into the relationship between transformations and imitations of texts, and 
sides with the argument expounded in ‘Pierre Menard’ that excising a text from its original context 
and repositioning it in another prevents accusations of plagiarism: 
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The most elegant parody, since it is the most economical, is then merely a quote deflected 
from its meaning or simply from its context, or demoted from its serious status […] Jorge 
Luis Borges succeeded in demonstrating with the imaginary example of Pierre Menard that 
the mere displacement of context turns even the most literal rewriting into a creation. (16-17) 
 
Borges demonstrates this in Pierre Menard, according to Genette, because the comparison between 
two typographically equal texts that cannot be held as the same work renders the hypertext original 
by way of its relation to the hypotext.  Citing Chapelain décoiffé, a conscious parody of Le Cid, 
Genette argues that ‘One could, of course, read Chapelain décoiffé without knowing Le Cid; but one 
cannot perceive and appreciate the function of the one without having the other work in mind or hand’ 
(18-19).  This is the case of Menard’s rewriting of the Quijote.  One cannot fully appreciate the 
richness of Menard’s words without some reference to the comparative poverty of Cervantes’s.  Yet 
this argument can and must be extended to Cervantes’s work: it cannot exist, and cannot fully be 
understood, without some knowledge of the chivalric novels which the work so joyfully lampoons.  
So we cannot understand a text without reference to some previous hypertext, which itself is always 
a hypotext of another previous hypertext.  There must exist some meaning in the text that precedes 
both the author and the reader.  Moreover, searching for such a meaning is futile.  From the fact that 
a hypertext is also always a hypotext we can extrapolate that the desire to understand an item of 
literature requires understanding all of literature and the relations between that unimaginable number 
of literary works.   
Genette argues that Menard’s Quijote is a transformation of Cervantes’s, and not a mere imitation of 
it.  What separates the two categories is the degree of artistic endeavour required to recreate a given 
original.  To recreate a Velázquez painting indistinguishable from the original would be a staggering 
artistic achievement.  A simple copying of the Quijote word for word is not.  The validity of Menard’s 
version relies heavily on its having been the product of serious intellectual effort.  Though, Menard’s 
Quijote does not in fact correspond to any of the categories of transformation or imitation that Genette 
proposes.  A parody is a playful transformation, a travesty is a satirical transformation, a transposition 
(say, updating a piece of literature to suit a modern audience) a serious transformation.  A pastiche is 
a playful imitation, a caricature a satirical imitation, and a forgery is a serious imitation (28).  None 
of these adequately describe Menard’s Quijote.  It is, we’re asked to believe, not a forgery.  It cannot 
parody nor travesty the work without altering it textually.  To some extent it could be considered a 
transposition, given that its attribution to a modern author modernises its meaning, though Menard 
has done nothing to actually aid the comprehension of a contemporary reader.  Menard expressly 
imitates the style of Cervantes's work, yet he creates a serious and thought-provoking work of 
literature, so we must rule out pastiche and caricature.  And given that he is able to put his name to a 
work he has arrived at through honest means, it cannot be a forgery either.  So Menard’s version 
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exists somewhere between the transformational and imitative poles of Genette’s system.  It can safely 
be referred to as a rewriting, but the nature of its rewriting appears to escape real categorisation. 
 
Unamuno’s Vida de don Quijote y Sancho can be categorised much more easily: ‘Between the 
satirical and serious divisions, I see the polemical; that is the spirit in which Miguel de Unamuno 
transposes Don Quixote’ (29).  Unamuno’s rewritings of Cervantes generally lie between a satirical 
and serious transposition: he updates the form of the text, using contemporary Spanish and 
introducing an essayistic thread, as well as the meaning, in line with the more romantic approach to 
the work which I will discuss in the following chapter.  I would add that Vida also bears strong 
undercurrents of forgery.  Unamuno deliberately takes credit for, or at least tries to outdo the work of 
the original author.  His point of departure is the premise that he might be able to tell the story of the 
life of Quijote and Sancho as it ought to have been told.  So, while we might disagree, as I do, that 
the relationship between imitation and transformation is clear cut (30), Genette is correct not to 
exclude the possibility of ‘mixed practices’ (30).  Borges and Menard absolutely mix practices of 
rewriting.  Borges, though, does so in a way that defies straightforward definitions.   
 
The Rimbaud affair is the mirror-image of Menard’s situation.  La chasse spirituelle was published 
posthumously in 1949, and attributed to the French author.  Its poor quality relative to Rimbaud’s 
wider oeuvre fed the narrative, still widely accepted, that it was written by apocryphal authors, 
because ‘what they wrote was absolutely unworthy of Rimbaud’ (160).  The similarity between this 
apocryphal version and Menard’s rewriting is striking: 
 
their pastiche was at first presented as an authentic text; that was enough to alter its readers’ 
expectations and to subvert the criteria for its appreciation.  With the possible exception of a 
mimetic genius […] the reader’s expectations for a successful pastiche are a far cry from those 
brought to the reading of an authentic text, or a text presented as such: i.e., an apocryphal one. 
(160) 
 
The reader’s expectations of the text are informed by the name of the author.  A reader might 
anticipate a great work of French literature if they believe in good faith that it was penned by 
Rimbaud.  Borges’s title, ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ functions similarly.  It alerts the reader 
to expect a different version of the Quijote, a more authentic one.  Menard has to be considered an 
author for a comparison to take place that does not hold that his Quijote is some cheap imitation of 
Cervantes’s.  This might also explain why Borges invents a fictional author instead of attributing the 
text to an existing one.  It allows the reader to consider Menard’s version without any expectations 
that would be given by a body of pre-existing literature.   
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Menard as an invented, apocryphal author, is able to explore the relationship between authorship and 
reception: 
 
In writing a rigorously literal Don Quixote from his own inspiration, Menard allegorizes the 
act of reading considered as, or disguised into, an act of writing.  Conversely, when Borges 
attributes to others the invention of his tales, he presents his writing as reading.  Needless to 
say, these two approaches are complementary; they mesh into a unifying metaphor of the 
complex and ambiguous relationships between writing and reading: relationships […] that are 
quite evidently the very soul of hypertextual activity. (252-253) 
 
In other words, Menard’s reading of it is productive of a new Quijote.  When Borges says that others 
are responsible for his own stories, he presents himself as a reader of that which he himself has 
written.  Here, the reader approaches the text with so few expectations of Menard’s work, that the 
paltry evidence pertaining to his time, place and cultural milieu and a brief overview of his 
publications are the only intellectual crutches the implicit reader has to interpret the text.  The 
narrator-as-reader settles on an interpretation which relies on those specific factors.  The external 
reader is hence invited to consider the factors they take into account when interpreting a text, 
including to what extent an author might be relevant.  If we discover that the author’s time and place 
limit the possible meanings we allow his text to convey, then we must also accept that this is a mere 
projection of the reader.  Appealing to the author as a guiding principle in interpretation therefore 
strengthens the case for the creative role of reading.   
 
Helpfully, Genette collates Menard’s and Unamuno’s rewritings of the Quijote: 
 
Contrary to Pierre Menard, who was reproducing Don Quixote from within, as it were, and 
who could thus naively and even unconsciously repeat it word for word, Unamuno was 
rewriting his Don Quixote while constantly eyeing Cervantes’ text, which could but stifle his 
own narrative impulse.  In fact, Unamuno could only remind his readers, in one way or 
another, of what they all knew had happened to Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.  The rest, his 
chief contribution even in quantitative terms, can be said to fall under the heading of 
commentary. (318) 
 
This comparison conveys some key assumptions worth unpicking.  First, the notion that Unamuno’s 
narrative impulse has been totally stifled is not wholly fair.  As Unamuno explains in Cómo se hace 
una novela, the best way to write a novel is to write about how a novel is written.  It is possible for a 
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text to exist between the two poles of narrative and commentary.  Narrative can also play an 
interpretive role.  The various essayistic diversions of Vida serve a narrative purpose: they reframe 
the story, producing a narrative of a selfless knight of faith in whose example one should strive to 
live.  In fact the narrative also changes from a novelistic mode to a moralising, often evangelical one.   
 
In fairness, Genette recognises that Vida develops a ‘problematic relationship […] between a 
conditioned narrative and a free commentary’ (318).  However, ‘the very possibility of that 
dissociation points to an essential aspect of the work, which is that the transformational intent has 
been brought to bear not on the events but on their significance’ (318-319).  I see a false dichotomy 
here.  The significance of the events is a factor their narration.  The way an event is narrated in fact 
must always assume the significance of the event.  There is no telling a story without some framing 
principle that conveys the perceived wider sense of the events.  Unamuno’s search for an original 
significance in the narrated events cannot be straightforwardly excised from narration.  Is the Quijote 
the story of a madman who could not distinguish fact from fantasy, or that of a romantic hero who 
obeys a moral standard far higher than anyone around him?   
 
Narrative must always have the significance of the event as a guiding principle.  No example in Vida 
conveys this point more clearly than that of the lion in 2, XVII.  While Cervantes’s version is that the 
lion was uninterested in Quijote’s presence, Unamuno’s is that the lion was humbled before the 
courage of the brave knight, and he presents this view as if it were what actually happened.  Whether 
the lion lay down out of apathy or fear is a matter of narrative and not commentary.  The events and 
their significance run so closely together in Unamuno’s Vida that unpicking them seems almost 
impossible.   
 
In Vida, Unamuno proposes that authors do not always create, but often act as mere conduits of 
narratives that exist somewhere in space, as if they were a painter transposing a landscape onto 
canvas.  As such, the text creates the author in that it promotes the scribe to a privileged status in the 
cultural consciousness.  Genette scrutinises this in Unamuno, asking: ‘Might we read this as an 
invitation to apply Unamuno’s hypothesis to himself and see him — shades of the Borgesian vertigo 
— as a Quixotic invention?’ (322).  Yes, we might.  Unamuno as the author of this rewriting is subject 
to precisely the same logic.  He happily pens a text which he admits contains characters not of his 
own invention.  The implication that a text can impose itself on the author takes Unamuno strikingly 
close to considering literary works as fragments of one great universal library.   
 
Genette reads into Unamuo’s Vida a number of significances from symbolic to evangelical.  The 
molinos represent the evils of the industrial age; Dulcinea the endless pursuit of glory; the generic 
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shift from chivalric to pastoral indicates a Spanish people, now without an empire, who must turn to 
agriculture; and Quijote’s renunciation of knight-errantry is an inter-textual reference to Calderón’s 
Segismundo.  On the evangelical side, the mozas del partido reflect the redemption of Mary 
Magdalene (322-323).  In order to read those sorts of spiritual meanings into the work, Unamuno 
treats the text as if it were a Gospel, conveyed poorly by a human who has had the work dictated to 
them.  Unamuno accuses Cervantes of missing the significance of a story given him by an inscrutable 
higher force.  Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote as an apocryphal Gospel helps a reader to discover 
more symbolic meaning in a text that could not possibly have been written by Cervantes.  This, in 
fact, ties Unamuno’s rewriting quite closely to Menard’s.  Unamuno practises what Menard’s narrator 
preaches: he attributes the true authorship of the text to someone else, and explores the possible 
readings that this could permit. 
 
Genette also notes that the generic constraints of the original Quijote also constrain Unamuno’s 
reevaluation of the text: 
 
Primary revaluation, the revaluation of the hero and his deeds, which we have abundantly 
observed in Unamuno, cannot of course consist in investing that hero with a prominence that 
is his already in the hypotext.  It consists, much rather, in heightening his merit or his symbolic 
value.  Unamuno’s Don Quixote does nothing more and nothing else than Cervantes’, but 
what he does ceases to be — or to be described as — the ridiculous behaviour of a dotty 
hidalgo and becomes the emblematic saga of a hero of Spain and Christendom. (350) 
 
As such, when Unamuno invests the hidalgo with the significance of a Spanish saint, he can only do 
so because the eponym was imbued with no such significance in the original work.  In that sense, 
even when Unamuno transforms don Quijote from an armour-wearing fantasist into the emblematic 
practitioner of idealism and altruism, his authorial hands are tied.  To meaningfully read new 
significance into the original work, he could not simply produce another story about a knight-errant.  
The generic shift from comedic novel to exemplary Gospel takes place because a somewhat rewritten 
comedy might add little novelty to the work.  Unamuno, like all rewriters, is in that sense positioned 
beneath the author of his hypotext in an authorial hierarchy.  This, despite all of his posturing against 
Cervantes’s ability as a writer and his claim to having produced the original narrative at all. 
 
Genette is aware of the complexity involved in categorising Menard’s Quijote in his own system.  
‘Pierre Menard’s Don Quixote is not a copy of Cervantes,’ he explains, ‘as we know, but rather a 
minimal transformation, or a maximal imitation, produced by the canonical means of pastiche: the 
acquiring of a perfect competence through absolute identification (to be Miguel de Cervantes)’ (393).  
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Menard’s version is a minimal transformation to the fullest extent: no textual replacements are made, 
rather, the most major change to Cervantes’s original is the omission of the vast majority of the source 
material.  In that sense one can justify calling Menard’s Quijote a transformation of Cervantes’s.  
Paradoxically it can equally be referred to as an imitation in that it deliberately apes the style and 
content of Cervantes’s Quijote.  It is simultaneously a transformation and an imitation, and ultimately 
neither.   
 
Genette permits himself a daring final thought on Menard.  Where the narrator muses that attributing 
texts such as the Imitatio Christi to Joyce might have a renovating effect on the text, Genette wonders 
what might happen were we to collate two texts that have no relation to each other.  Why not, for 
example, consider Ulysses a copy of the Imitation of Christ?  ‘Such a relation might well be as 
relevant as the more accepted one […] between Ulysses and the Odyssey’ (393).  I am not persuaded 
that this is very different to the point Borges raises.  An author is a metonym for a body of work.  To 
attribute a text to another author is to consider it in light of another series of different literary works.  
So in both cases a text is displaced from a given context and replaced into another literary context.  
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III. Approaches to Cervantes 
It is important not simply to situate Unamuno and Borges in a context of literary theory on reading, 
but also within the wealth of criticism that has been produced regarding the Quijote ever since its 
publication.  In this chapter I will situate Unamuno and Borges within a broader historiography of 
Cervantes reception across Europe and Latin America.  Showing that Unamuno and Borges are 
products of their cultural and historical circumstances will help to clarify what these two authors have 
to offer the trans-national discussion on Cervantes’s magnum opus. 
 
III.1 Don Quijote as a work of comedic fiction 
 
Canavaggio’s 2006 ‘Don Quijote: Del libro al mito’ chronicles much of the response to the Quijote 
in the years following its publication, and provides insights into how changing conceptual 
frameworks have changed the meaning that readers have found within it.  The most prevalent 
response of a 17th Century reader to Cervantes’s text is laughter in the face of an obviously burlesque 
fiction.  Many of the century’s major reworkings of the Quijote cast the eponymous hero in a 
grotesque light.  A version of Calderón’s Los disparates de Don Quijote de la Mancha presented 
Quijote as a womaniser trying to woo a transvestite, and this version took hold significantly in France 
where Pichou and de Bouscal transposed the work to the stage (Canavaggio 2006: 75-76).  In 
Canavaggio’s words: ‘Sea en España, en Inglaterra o en Francia, Don Quijote fue percibido en el 
siglo XVII como un personaje cómico: en los juicios sobre él; en las representaciones que se dieron, 
coreográficas o plásticas; en las aventuras, en fin, de los que en él se inspiran’ (88).  We will see 
shortly how later intellectual currents convert don Quijote from a hapless figure of ridicule into an 
admirable hero, readying the ground for Unamuno’s evangelical co-opting of the hidalgo into his 
pseudo-biblical narrative.   
 
The sense that the Quijote is a work of comedy has survived into the modern era.  Anthony Close 
argued in 1978 that for all of the nationalist or romantic representations of the novel, it is 
fundamentally a burlesque fiction.  Close put forth that the Romantic approach, which I will discuss 
later, was characterised by a belief that don Quijote is in fact a hero, that his status as such is granted 
by modern sensibilities, and that the novel is a symbol of Spain’s history and the nature of the human 
spirit (Close 1978: 1).  Close distrusts that approach, which underlies the whole of Unamuno’s Vida 
de Don Quijote y Sancho.  Lofty readings of the Quijote are seductive because, as Close puts it, 
‘Comic fiction, such as the picaresque novel and Don Quixote, had to contend with the prejudice that 
it was frivolous, or still worse, dangerous to morals […] So Don Quixote was neglected in 
intellectually weighty speculation about literature’ (9).  
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Close is one of a number of contemporary critics who deny that the Quijote has an inherent meaning 
beyond comedy:  
 
A work is burlesque if, in order to ridicule another literary work or genre or style, it uses some 
ludicrous combination of baseness and nobility — by employing a grand style for an 
incongruous subject […] or by attributing base language or sentiments to supposedly noble 
characters […] or by adopting an aggressively banal style for a grand subject […] Don Quixote 
is burlesque for all these reasons together. (19)  
 
Close even argues that digressions on Cide Hamete Benengeli and the ‘sacredness of historical truth’ 
are part of the burlesque in that they make a mockery of the ‘pseudo-historicity of chivalric romances’ 
(22).  
 
Intentionalist critics implicitly position themselves against the work that Unamuno and Borges carry 
out in relation to the Quijote.  They would accuse both authors of requiring that the Quijote do more 
than it is capable of.  Similarly, Peter Russell’s 1969 ‘Don Quixote as a Funny Book’ argues that the 
text ought to be read as Cervantes outlines in his prologue.  He disagrees with the tendency to see in 
the text a synthesis of national mores: ‘that, of course, makes it rather difficult to entertain the 
possibility that Cervantes simply wanted to give his readers something to laugh at’ (313).  Russell 
fails to adequately explain why this implicit intention is the sole guiding principle for reading the 
Quijote. What is to stop readers from seeing in the title character aspects of themselves or their own 
cultures, as Unamuno so vocally does?  There is surely more at play than the ridiculous tale of a man 
who believes his world to be that of chivalric knights.  The narrative conceit has implications that 
cannot be relegated to a cheap burlesque device: the protagonist’s inability to distinguish between 
reality and fiction is reflected in a novel whose position between those two poles is constantly in flux.   
 
Critics like Russell put forth that the meaning of the Quijote was fixed when Cervantes set out to 
write a comedy:  
 
for some two centuries after 1605, Don Quixote seemed to its readers to be a funny book […] 
But what of Cervantes?  Did his contemporaries all fail to get his point, or was his intention 
what they took it to be?  There is certainly no evidence in those chapters in Part II where the 
success of Part I is discussed to suggest that Cervantes thought his readers had misunderstood 
him. (319) 
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Russell conflates understanding an author with understanding a text, arguing that the only permissible 
response to the novel is laughter.  Unamuno agrees that Cervantes’s intention is to make its reader 
laugh, though this is precisely the motivation for his accusing Cervantes of being a malicious 
historian; to mock an idealist who aims only to improve the world for those around him is ethically 
unacceptable.  Hence one of the weaknesses of intentionalism: it assumes that understanding is equal 
to agreement.  Unamuno is aware that there are sections in the work he is supposed to laugh at.  But 
laughter might blind a reader to the text’s deeper philosophical implications.   
 
It is plausible for burlesque and satire to be the vehicle of bigger ideals.  For example, when a reader 
takes a sympathetic view of Quijote’s mishaps: 
 
That kind of sympathy […] also stems from attitudes developed by European romanticism.  
People in earlier ages judged men rather by the results of their actions than by the 
respectability of their intentions, and even if we leave aside the crucial question of Don 
Quijote’s madness, they can hardly have shared the romantics’ sympathy with the knight 
simply because he wanted to put the world to rights, though he made such a hash of it. (324) 
 
The tragicomic freeing of and beating by the galeotes doesn’t escape moralistic readings, as Unamuno 
shows in Vida. I therefore find the claim that Cervantes intended the work to be solely a work of 
humour to be irrelevant when comedic moments within the text lend themselves to explorations of 
ethical questions.  Unamuno, incidentally, does not judge don Quijote by the results of his actions — 
given that he broadly speaking exacerbates situations he wishes to resolve — but by the intentions.  
The paradox that Unamuno is a non-intentionalist reader yet remains an intentionalist ethicist will be 
explored in the following chapter.  One reason that Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of the Quijote 
are so daring is that they depart radically from this kind of understanding of the work:  
 
A careful scrutiny of the text of both parts of Don Quixote seems to me to provide, then, no 
grounds for suggesting that Cervantes himself thought of his book — except, of course, for 
those sections in which the knight and his squire are temporarily put on one side — as anything 
other than a funny book. (324) 
 
A joke is not funny because the teller believes it to be, but because it conforms to the listener’s sense 
of humour.  A reader who scarcely raises a smile cannot be required to refer to the Quijote as a funny 
book in order to be credited with having understood it.  Russell falls into this either way in claiming 
that ‘one can only make critical sense of the whole book, from whatever critical angle one chooses to 
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approach it, by going back to Cervantes’ declared intentions and to the assumptions of his age which 
went with them’ (325).  
 
Intentionalist critics who see a purely burlesque work in the Quijote presume that their interpretation 
aligns wholly with Cervantes’s intention regarding the work, as well as the way 17th Century 
Spaniards as one homogenous intellectual mass might have treated the text. They prohibit readers 
like Borges and Unamuno from deriving more than just humour from it.  Russell even makes the 
dubious claim that: ‘It cannot be claimed that Cervantes […] contributes anything original to the 
general history of ideas’ (Russell 1985, 105).  Yet Unamuno sees in the text a national philosophy, 
the zenith of the intra-historic Spanish spirit.  Pierre Menard’s rewriting acknowledges the 
unseriousness of some of don Quijote’s philosophical digressions as they might have been received 
in 17th Century Spain.  But a reader in Menard’s day must not ignore the relationship of those 
digressions to the development of the history of ideas since 1615.  Ultimately, Unamuno and Borges 
forbid the text a purely humorous reading.  In it they identify a tabula rasa, or as Bell-Villada puts it, 
a ‘“Rorschach blot” of art criticism, a work in which readers see what they want to see or what history 
conditions them to see’ (Bell-Villada 1999: 134). 
 
III.2 The Romantic Approach to Don Quijote 
 
The 17th and 20th Century trend to view the Quijote as a comedy has been interspersed by a number 
of radical rethinkings of the work. In particular the German Romantics, who ‘tended to disregard the 
comic aspects of Cervantes’ prose in favour of a more philosophical-symbolic interpretation,’ (Martín 
2002: 162) initiated don Quijote’s transformation from ill-fated knight to a figure of virtue.  German 
translations of the work in 1682 and 1734 proposed that Quijote may well have taken leave of his 
senses, but that this could convey important moral lessons (Canavaggio 2006: 140).  Swiss essayist 
Johann Bodmer wrote in 1741 that the contradictions in Quijote’s character embodied the chivalric 
spirit as well as his well-read perspicacity.  Wilhelm Schlegel, the first German Romantic, was the 
recipient of these ideas in the late 18th Century.  For Schlegel, the novel’s plot revolves around the 
conflict between the real world and the ideal world; between poetry (embodied by the caballero) and 
prose (embodied by Sancho) (Canavaggio 2006: 143).  He was among the first to argue that the 
Quijote had taken on a universal validity, which Unamuno channels when he puts forth in 1905 that 
don Quijote’s universality lies in his Spanishness.   
 
Schelling argued in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art that Quijote is simultaneously ridiculous 
and admirable.  The conflict between these two poles has elevated him to a universal, mythological 
status (143).  Contemporary Ludwicg Tieck believed that Quijote is mad not because he wishes to 
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live in the world of chivalric knights, but because his methods for applying the lessons of his reading 
in the real world are so absurd.  So, a reader ought to follow Quixotic ideals if not practices (145-
146).  This will sound familiar to readers of Unamuno.  The notion that don Quijote is the embodiment 
of a Spanish philosophy of idealism can at least be traced back to the work of Romantics like Tieck.  
In fact, don Quijote’s ostensible universality is surely in the background of Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, 
autor del Quijote’, which implies that a Frenchman’s version of a Spanish masterpiece can be superior 
to a Spaniard’s.  Many of the key tenets of Unamuno’s and Borges’s versions of the Quijote at least 
are reflected in the work of the earlier German Romantics.   
 
I am indebted to Close’s masterful work on the Romantics.  To them, the work embodied the conflict 
between the prosaic elements of the world and romantic representations of them.  As Close puts it, 
‘The consecration of Cervantes’s novel as a Romantic work came with Schelling’s interpretation of 
it, according to which Cervantes is a philosopher-poet treating through the symbolism of the hero’s 
adventures the universal struggle of the Ideal and the Real’ (Close 1978: 35).  Schelling’s statement 
that ‘Das Thema [des Don Quichotte] im Ganzen ist das Reale im Kampf mit dem Idealen’ (‘The 
major theme is the conflict between the real and the ieeal) is the point of departure for the Romantic 
approach to Don Quijote (35). That could not more perfectly express the conflicts at the heart of 
Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of don Quijote.  Unamuno’s texts on the Quijote cite the 
protagonist’s idealistic worldview; his rejection of prosaic reality in favour of an ideal he can impose 
on the world.  Nowhere does Unamuno express this more vocally than his invective against the 
neologism baciyelmo in Vida 1: XLV.  ‘Pierre Menard’ shows that the text is not a thing-in-itself, 
rather an experience whose significance can only be determined by the perspective of each viewer.  
The prosaic reality of the words on the page therefore exists in a conflict with the poetic reality of 
how they are read.  It is also probably no coincidence in this respect that Borges chose a Frenchman: 
‘After 1836, the Romantic view is firmly established in France, and becomes a commonplace of 
encyclopaedias and most literary histories’ (46).  Menard’s rewritten Quijote is different to 
Cervantes’s if the reader subscribes to a romantic view of the conflict between prosaic and poetic 
realities; an idea prevalent in his native France one hundred years before he writes.  A more 
comprehensive view of how Unamuno and Borges relate to the Romantic movement would be the 
subject of further scholarship.  For now, suffice it to demonstrate that Unamuno and Borges, in their 
rewritings of the Quijote, do not depart drastically from key tenets of a literary movement that 
predated them by at least a century. 
 
It is ironic that the Romantic view of don Quijote took hold least readily in Spain (Close 1978: 48).  
Close offers possible explanations for the delayed onset of Romanticism in Spain: 
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Was it because of the existence in Spain, if one may quote an Unamunesque concept against 
Unamuno, of a popular ‘intrahistoric’ conception of Quixote and Sancho as figures of fun?  
[…] Whatever the reason or combination of them, no significant piece of Romantic criticism 
of Don Quixote was published there, to my knowledge, before 1856.  Then Fernando de Castro 
brought out his abridged El Quijote para todos (Madrid, 1856), with a prologue which 
incorporated a number of ideas of Romantic derivation mixed with some traditional opinions.  
The first substantial Romantic interpretation is Díaz de Benjumea’s series of articles in La 
América, which appeared from 8 August to 24 December 1859. (48) 
 
Unamuno’s view of the Quijote, for all of its insistence on the text’s Spanishness, might fit quite 
comfortably into a more trans-national approach to the work that took hold in the 18th and 19th 
Centuries.  Taking the Quijote as a symbol of Spanish decline as Unamuno does in his late 19th 
Century commentaries on the Quijote, is nothing new. It was the subject of a 1782 article in the de 
Morvilliers’s Encyclopédie méthodique that Spain’s national decline (notably, before the loss of any 
of Spain’s Latin American colonies) was symbolised in the novel. William Temple’s 1690 
Miscellanea even argued that Cervantes was responsible for such a decline, as the Quijote had caused 
Spain to become ashamed of its honour, precipitating the fall of the Habsburgs (Canavaggio 2006: 
108).  Unamuno’s early writings on Cervantes, before a major shift between cervantismo and 
quijotismo in the early 20th Century, do not so much blame Cervantes for Spain’s decline, but Spanish 
readers for seeing a moral exemplum in a madman, ahead of the practical Alonso Quijano.  
 
Nor is it a novelty, as Unamuno begins to in 1902, to see Quijote’s madness as a form of wisdom 
unavailable to a reader obsessed with reason.  José Cadalso’s 1789 Cartas marruecas made precisely 
that point: ‘lo que se lee es una serie de extravagancias de un loco […] pero lo que hay debajo de esta 
apariencia es, en mi concepto, un conjunto de materias profundas e importantes’ (Cadalso 1966: 131). 
It is not my intention to show that Unamuno definitively read or directly communicates with authors 
such as Cadalso, or even Tieck and Schlegel who uphold don Quijote as some kind of moral bastion, 
rather to demonstrate that Unamuno, part of a generation who could not read the novel ‘in abstraction 
from “the problem of Spain”’ (Close 1978: 140) weaves a variety of strands into his writing on don 
Quijote: from German and French Romanticism to a national and trans-national discussion on 





III.3 The Quijote in Spain and Argentina 
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Close dedicates much attention to Unamuno’s bibliography on the Quijote.  He correctly identifies a 
volte-face in Unamuno’s reading, from taking Alonso Quijano’s renunciation of knight-errantry on 
his deathbed as a model in En torno al casticismo in 1895, to his exultation of don Quijote most 
completely expressed ten years later in Vida de don Quijote y Sancho (Close 1978: 143-144).  In 
Close’s words, ‘Spain’s destiny will be to bring materialistic modern Europe to its religious senses, 
preaching “la filosofía de Dulcinea, la de no morir, la de creer, la de crear la verdad”’ (144).  Though, 
in calling quijotismo ‘Todo un método, toda una epistemología, toda una estética, toda una lógica, 
toda una ética, toda una religión, toda una esperanza en lo absurdo racional’ (Unamuno 1980: 325) 
in the epilogue to Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, Close accuses Unamuno of misreading.  He 
argues that the invention of Cide Hamete Benengeli bears no philosophical relevance, and that 
Unamuno has simply missed the irony (146). As I will argue in the next chapter, the ‘found-
manuscript’ device allows Unamuno to make two key arguments:  One, that the text ought to be read 
as a gospel, with all the associated moralistic implications; two, that such a reading requires a non-
intentionalist approach.  When Unamuno reads the Quijote as a tract on Spanish philosophy, he reads 
into the text.  Appreciating the narrator’s humorous deferrals of his authority does not mutually 
exclude with Unamuno’s wish to see more in the Quijote than Cervantes originally put there.  Thus, 
one could (anachronistically) call Unamuno’s approach quasi-Borgesian.  As well as attributing the 
text to Benengeli ahead of Cervantes (as Borges attributes it to Menard), Unamuno attributes it a new 
intellectual framework that had not been formalised when Cervantes penned the Quijote.  Close, in 
fact, identifies that framework: 
 
He [Unamuno] believes that there is a higher epistemological principle than common-sense 
— that of the creative will which needs the existence of this or that object of belief because 
its very life depends on it.  By reference to that principle, he assigns Don Quixote and St 
Ignatius to the same plane of timeless, live substantive reality.  That is, the intra-historic 
Spanish spirit. (146) 
 
Criticisms that readers such as Borges and Unamuno have misunderstood don Quijote by seeing more 
than a box of narrative tricks seem unfounded.  Perhaps both writers recognised those tricks at first 
reading, but returned to the novel to test its capacity to demonstrate new concepts.  Common to both 
is an aesthetics of reading in which the individual is the creative influence.  Unamuno generally takes 
advantage of that creative freedom to further arguments he puts forth in En torno al casticismo related 
to the intra-historic Spanish spirit, and Spain’s crisis and rebirth.  Borges, also calling Cervantes’s 
bluff on the existence of Benengeli, profits from this device in his later works on the Quijote, which 
present more of a philosophy of existence than an aesthetics of reading.  Thus, a key difference 
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between intentionalist and non-intentionalist readers of the Quijote.  Intentionalist readings tend to 
encase the Quijote within the frameworks of narrative gimmicks and self-effacing jokes.7 Non-
intentionalist readings often open up the text to philosophical investigation, and to borrow Russell’s 
term, examine what the text can offer to the general history of ideas.   
 
While much has been written on the relationship of European intellectuals to the major trends of 
thinking on the Spanish national text,8 Borges reads from a more peripheral perspective.  Certainly, 
Unamuno exists in a literary and historic circumstance in which the Quijote becomes the target of 
much nationalistic attention.  Borges’s constant return to the Quijote is not surprising in an Argentine 
avant-garde writer often considered to be europeizante. Sarmiento’s Facundo, a text Borges was 
intimately familiar with, was written in the culturally and politically isolated Argentina of Rosas 
(King 1986: 7).  Sarmiento, of course, viewed the Rosas government as the logical end untamed 
gauchesque barbarism.9  His presidency fomented the kind of isolationist nationalism that caused 
europeizantes to be condemned as anti-Argentine well into the 20th Century10.  The paper La Nación 
was known to condemn the import of literary trends from abroad.  It’s against this backdrop that the 
Florida group founded Prisma — a magazine with an ultraist manifesto, aping ongoing European 
literary fashions — in which Borges first published in 1925 (King 1986: 22-24).  Victoria Ocampo’s 
obsession with all things European was fundamental in the foundation of the magazine Sur, which 
attempted to use literary models to defend Argentine liberalism during The Infamous Decade, and 
                                               
7 Resina is also wary of their approach: ‘Scholars like P.E. Russell, Anthony Close, and their 
followers, have claimed exclusive interpretive legitimacy for a hypothetical authorial intention 
projected from these critics’ analysis of Cervantes’s works in terms of Renaissance and post-
Renaissance works on poetics, references to literary works from the same period, and the reception 
of the Quixote as reconstructed from seventeenth-and-eighteenth-century sources’ (Resina 1996: 
219). 
8 The novel is also, as Bayliss demonstrates, a more convenient metonym for Spanish national for the 
’98 group: ‘In the aftermath of the so-called Crisis of 1898 recognized that its colonial wealth, power, 
and glory had waned and receded into history; it found clear parallels with Don Quixote, himself an 
older member of a waning social institution bent on reviving a lost Golden Age’ (Bayliss 2007: 385). 
9 For this reason Borges looked to Sarmiento as a modernising influence on Argentine identity: ‘En 
el juicio de Borges sobre Sarmiento, la argentinidad ha encontrado su fórmula: la ausencia de límites 
frente a la cultura occidental y a sus traducciones de oriente’ (Sarlo 1988: 43). 
10 Carlos Ibarguren condemned Argentine liberals for betraying their country to European capitalism 
in the 1930s, for example. That anti-European rhetoric coincided in Argentine nationalists with a love 
for strong, criollo leaders that was once expressed by Martín Fierro himself (Shumway 1991: 294). 
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which was on the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War (32).  Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’ was 
written in the context of his literary generation’s burgeoning interest in European literature, as well 
as an explicit concern with the rise of fascism in Europe when ‘Pierre Menard’ is published in Sur in 
May 1939.  In the final chapter I will detail how this political and literary context conveys itself 
through the narrative voice of that story. 
 
Before Borges arrives at the Quijote in the 1920s, there are very few major Latin American 
commentaries on which to draw.  Unlike in Unamuno’s case, Borges does not participate in an 
ongoing discourse of reclaiming the Quijote out of political, cultural or philosophical concerns.  
Ruben Darío’s Letanías de Nuestro Señor Don Quijote of 1905 exalts a ‘rey de los hidalgos’ who 
‘nadie ha podido vencer todavía’, thus fitting very comfortably into the Romantic trend outlined 
above.  It might have fed into some of Borges’s later writing on the Quijote, which shift their focus 
from the relationship between Cervantes and the reader, to the relationship between Cervantes and 
his protagonist.  Challenges to Cervantes’s authority were already part of the Latin American 
bibliography before Borges created Pierre Menard.  Ecuadorian Juan Montalvo’s 1895 Capítulos que 
se le olvidaron a Cervantes intersperses new chapters, omitted by Cervantes, at some indeterminate 
point during Quijote’s third sally.  The title suggests that Cervantes is far from the perfect author — 
an idea that Borges takes further when denying that Cervantes is the author at all11.  It is unclear 
whether Darío and Montalvo directly influenced Borges’s Cervantine texts, even if they do bear traces 
of his two Latin American literary predecessors. 
 
Literary discourse on the Quijote is much more sparse in Borges’s milieu than in Unamuno’s.  Perhaps 
this is why he spent so much of his early career justifying the presence of Peninsular writers on 
Argentine bookshelves.  Quevedo, Góngora and Manrique are each the subject of essays in Borges’s 
1928 El idioma de los argentinos.  ‘Pierre Menard’ could be read as a means to introduce the Quijote 
into Argentine literary debates.  Meanwhile, Unamuno’s obsession with the novel situates him 
comfortably within the literary and political debates of his time.  Joaquín Costa’s Estudios jurídicos 
y políticos began this trend in 1883, presenting the protagonist as an archetypal Spaniard in whose 
                                               
11 In fact, the introduction to a 2004 edition of Capítulos is at pains to distance Menard’s work from 
Montalvo’s: ‘Capítulos que se le olvidaron a Cervantes.  Se adelantó a Pierre Menard, y no escribió 
el Quijote sin copiarlo, sino que sustituyó a Cervantes y redactó lo que le faltaba a su magna obra.  
Para ello, siguió los mismos métodos que el personaje de Borges: conocer bien el español, asimilar 
la fe católica, tener un buen acopio de materiales caballerescos y tradicionales hispánicas […] Y lo 
más importante: seguir siendo Juan Montalvo (como sugirió Pierre Menard, alternativa mucho más 
estimulante y difícil que ser Cervantes) y llegar al Quijote’ (Montalvo 2004: 15). 
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example lay the foundations of the regeneration of civil society.  Ganivet’s 1896 Idearium español 
promoted a eugenicist message where Spain, in its enviable commitment to Christian justice, was 
duty-bound to ‘dominate’ and ‘educate’ the primitive nations of the world (Ganivet 1915: 26).  The 
archetype of that Christian justice, where no man should bear witness against another if the 
punishment does not fit the crime, is embodied in Cervantes’s libro inmortal which separated ‘la 
justicia española de la justicia vulgar de los Códigos y Tribunales: la primera la encarnó en Don 
Quijote y la segunda en Sancho Panza’ (68).  Ganivet presents Quijote as the moral rectitude that has 
been forgotten by the contemporary legal system bound by ‘códigos y tribunales sanchopancescos’ 
(38).  Incidentally, the Quijote chapter that Ganivet cites — 1: XXII, where don Quijote frees the 
galeotes on the premise that no man should be another’s executioner — is of major interest to 
Unamuno and Borges.  Unamuno disagrees with Ganivet in Vida that don Quijote’s words do not 
embody any significant philosophical ideal (Unamuno 2005: 252).  Borges’s 1946 ‘Nuestro pobre 
individualismo’ feels that the chapter symbolises an affinity — intellectual, cultural, and literary — 
between the Argentine and the Spaniard (Borges 2013: 194).  
 
When Ganivet calls Cervantes ‘el más grande de todos los conquistadores’ (Ganivet 1915: 79) it 
becomes obvious that Unamuno’s later distaste for cervantismo does not correspond to his cultural 
milieu.  Though the early Unamuno — the anti-Europeanising cervantista — would have found much 
to praise in Ganivet’s upholding of Sancho Panza as a symbol of the pragmatism necessary to a 
successful nation, one which does not stretch itself beyond its capabilities (Ganivet 1915: 172).  In 
fact, Ganivet believes that national regeneration lies in the abandonment of colonialism and the 
exportation of the best of Spanish culture to the rest of the world.12  Spain’s new place in the world 
will be won in letters, and not arms.  Quijote’s postprandial speech underlies much of the 98 
Generation’s rhetoric on Spain’s post-colonial future, as Cascardi explains: ‘part of what Don Quijote 
offers is a response to the eclipse of heroic values by revitalising a form of rhetoric that makes the 
case for the value of heroic action (armas) over an approach to the world that would rely on books 
(letras)’ (Cascardi 2012: 79).  Ganivet’s racially-problematic proposals on exporting Spanish culture 
to civilise the cultural savages of Africa (an idea expressed both in his Idearium español and reiterated 
in correspondence with Unamuno published in El porvenir de España) could be read as a re-
appropriation, or rethinking of the binary between arms and letters as don Quijote proposes it. 
 
Azorín’s La ruta de don Quijote, a re-narration of the novel from a first-person perspective, was also 
published on the tercentenary of Don Quijote’s publication.  Many of its key ideas will be familiar to 
                                               
12 ‘Si España quiere recuperar su puesto, ha de esforzarse para restablecer su propio prestigio 
intelectual, y luego para llevarlo a América e implantarlo sin aspiraciones utilitarias’ (122). 
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readers of Unamuno: a return to the Siglo de Oro in order to revive a Spain whose fortunes cultural 
and political were beginning to dwindle.  The narrative ‘yo’ (always under examination in Unamuno’s 
literature) has in Azorín’s work a cultural implication.  As Minardi points out: 
 
Ese yo, unido a las constantes preguntas retóricas que desafían al lector, marca la búsqueda 
de identidad en el trayecto. De esta manera, la primera pregunta retórica que se formula está 
ligada a la reflexión acerca de la rutina de la ciudad en oposición a la libertad de acción en los 
pueblos ‘La vida, ¿es una repetición monótona, inexorable, de las mismas cosas con distintas 
apariencias? Yo estoy en mi cuarto; el cuarto es diminuto; tiene tres o cuatro pasos en 
cuadro; hay en él una mesa pequeña, un lavabo, una cómoda, una cama…’ (Minardi 2010) 
 
Spain must discover itself as much as Quijote does, and find within itself the traditional, provincial 
values of a pueblo.  Unamuno and Azorín thus take a similar approach in searching for the eternal 
tradition that underpins the work.  In longing for a return to a pastoral society, Azorín closely aligns 
himself with Unamuno’s statement in 1898 that Spain ought to ‘morir como nación y vivir como 
pueblo’ (Unamuno 1967: 1195). 
 
José Ortega y Gasset’s Meditaciones del Quijote of 1914 also appropriate the novel in order to 
propose a model for the modernisation of Spain.13 Praising the hidalgo for his ability to view the 
world through a series of abstract frameworks,14 Ortega identifies don Quijote as an intellectual 
example to follow; someone able to respond spontaneously to the world free of preconceptions.  
Quijote’s Weltanschauung teaches its reader to identify more in the text than just the character.  
Reading beyond the character into the world Cervantes creates can give us ‘una noción más amplia y 
clara del estilo cervantino, de quien es el hidalgo manchego sólo una condensación particular’ (45). 
As such, Ortega y Gasset complicates the binary of cervantismo and quijotismo that Unamuno has 
been working in since 1905.  Ortega responds that perhaps the greatness of one does not exclude the 
                                               
13 According to Close, it ‘was motivated by the tacit urge to salvage from the seemingly hidebound 
culture of Counter-Reformation Spain an outlook and set of values prophetic of a new Spain destined 
to emancipate itself from the traditions of the old’ (Close 1990: 2). 
14 ‘En comparación con lo inmediato, con nuestra vida espontánea, todo lo que hemos aprendido 
parece abstracto, genérico, esquemático.  No sólo lo parece: lo es.  El martillo es la abstracción de 
cada uno de sus martillazos’ (Ortega y Gasset 1921: 33). 
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greatness of the other, and to look beyond Quijote for one moment reveals a particular Spanish style 
that was most perfectly put to paper by Cervantes.15  
 
The Quijote to Ortega stands alone among a Spanish literary tradition that ought to be abandoned: 
 
No, no podemos seguir la tradición; todo lo contrario: tenemos que ir contra la tradición, más 
allá de la tradición […] En un grande, doloroso incendio habríamos de quemar la inerte 
apariencia tradicional, la España que ha sido, y luego, entre las cenizas bien cribadas, 
hallaremos como una gema iridiscente la España que pudo ser. (120) 
 
In this aspect, Ortega distances himself from Unamuno.  Both before and after 1914, Unamuno called 
for his reader not to discover an authorial style in the Quijote, but a philosophical exemplum, to return 
to the text and find exactly that eternal tradition whose existence he proposed in En torno al 
casticismo, and whose discovery was hindered by the deficiencies of Cervantes’s prose.  Though 
Unamuno and Ortega share a suspicion of bourgeois materialism (Close 1978: 181), as well as a 
belief that the Quijote expresses something meaningful about Spanish culture, it is hard not to see the 
former as an anomaly in the contemporary discourse of his cultural milieu for his intense vituperations 














                                               
15 ‘En Cervantes esta potencia de visualidad es literalmente incomparable: llega a tal punto que no 
necesita proponerse la descripción de una cosa para que entre los giros de la narración se deslicen sus 
propios puros colores, su sonido, su íntegra corporeidad.  Con razón exclamaba Flaubert aludiendo 
al “Quijote”: Comme on voit ces routes d’Espagne qui ne sont nulle part décrites!’ (89-90). 
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IV. Unamuno, reader of Cervantes 
In this chapter I will examine Unamuno’s writings dealing specifically with Cervantes’s Quijote.  I 
will extrapolate some key aesthetic principles on reading to later show how these communicate with 
Borges’s approaches to the Quijote, and to position both in a wider tradition of theoretical approaches 
to reading that goes back at least to Cervantes.   
 
Authoritative chronologies of all of Unamuno’s works on Cervantes have already been produced: 
Jesús Maestro’s 1990 ʻMiguel de Cervantes, Miguel de Unamuno: el Quijote desde la experiencia de 
la estética de la recepción de 1898ʼ examines the circumstances which led Unamuno to write more 
than thirty works specifically on the Quijote.  I am indebted to his chronology, and his reading of 
Unamuno’s texts through Hans-Robert Jauß’s reception theory. I will engage with Maestro’s 
theoretical approach at various points throughout this chapter.  Luis Andrés Marcos’s 2005 ʻEl lector 
unamuniano como clave filosóficoʼ also examines the Cervantine echoes in Unamuno’s Vida de don 
Quijote y Sancho from the perspective of Wolfgang Iser’s reader-centric literary theory. This 
chapter’s chief contribution will be to condense some of these literary theories in order to identify an 
overarching approach to reading in Unamuno.   
 
I am not the first to attempt this: Charles Alex Longhurst argued in ʻLa Tradición Hermenéutica En 
La Narrativa Unamunianaʼ that many of Unamuno’s narratives are interpretations of pre-existing 
works, and therefore are a kind of hermeneutics in practice (Longhurst 2009: 349).  Longhurst situates 
Unamuno in a hermeneutic tradition, arguing that Unamuno’s involvement of his reader: 
 
es la base de todas las teorías que desarrollan a lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo XX 
críticos tan conocidos como Wolfgang Iser, Hans Robert Jauß, Roland Barthes, Jacques 
Derrida, Umberto Eco, Stanley Fish, Jonathan Culler y varios otros que, ya sea bajo la etiqueta 
de teoría de la recepción o bajo alguna otra de posterior invento, colocan al lector en el centro 
mismo del proceso de significación. (350) 
 
Where Longhurst traces a relationship between Unamuno and Gadamer’s hermeneutic principles,16 
my analysis will limit itself to reception theorists including Iser, Jauß and Fish.  Longhurst recently 
pointed to the viability and need for a study relating Unamuno to reader-response theory (Longhurst 
2014: 88).  I agree with him that ʻ Unamuno se empapó de una tradición de pensamiento hermenéutico 
                                               
16 ʻUnamuno, then following the German hermeneutic tradition, associates literary texts with 
interpretation, and interpretation with an active, participatory reading.  Interpretation is synonymous 
with creation, it is a creative act requiring an effort of the imaginationʼ (Longhurst 2014: 83). 
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que resulta ser la misma que ha llegado hasta nuestros días en la obra de los teóricos de las ciencias 
humanasʼ (2009: 350-351), and in this chapter I will show how Unamuno’s views anticipate much of 
the modern approaches now known as reception theory, in order to open that new pathway into 
studying Unamuno’s texts. 
 
I will limit my discussion to a series of major Unamuno works with a spoken engagement with 
Cervantes, including En torno al casticismo, Vida de don Quijote y Sancho and Del sentimiento 
trágico de la vida.  This is not to ignore that other scholars have identified Cervantine traces in many 
of Unamuno’s significant fictions, particularly Niebla.  Carlos Blanco Aguinaga argued in 1964 that 
the confrontation between Pérez and Unamuno is obviously derived from the Quijote (Aguinaga 
1964: 205).  Since then, critics such as Willard King (1967),17 James Gunn (1980), Bénédicte 
Vauthier (1999), Thomas Franz (2007) and J.A.G. Ardila (2010) have explored the similarities 
between Unamuno’s major fictions and Cervantes’s.  Paul Olson’s study of the chiastic mode of 
Unamuno’s major fictions even turns its attention to the influence of Cervantes, noting that 
ʻUnamuno’s ultimate model for a work [Niebla] in which the narrative is mediated by a series of 
authors, editors and translators enclosed within another, was the Quixote’ (Olson 1984: 161).  Ardila 
encapsulated this trend in 2010 with his statement that ʻLos más de los recursos narratológicos de los 
que Unamuno se sirve proceden del Quijoteʼ (Ardila 2010: 366).  Ardila and Biggane’s recent work, 
ʻQuixotic Unamuno: Cervantes in Unamuno’s thought and Fictionʼ also notes significant traces of 
Cervantes in Unamuno’s fictions, how Unamuno’s Quijote began as a symbol of the problems of 
Spanish history, and ended in Del sentimiento trágico de la vida as the embodiment of the conflict 
between reason and faith in Spanish cultural life.  Diego Catalán’s ʻTres Unamunos ante un capítulo 
del Quijoteʼ separates Unamuno’s interpretation into three broad chronological periods: an early 
interest in don Quijote’s relevance to material issues in Spanish society; a post-1897 interest in 
Alonso Quijano as a symbol of national regeneration, and his post-1902 championing of don 
Quijote’s Herostratism.  I am aware of Unamuno’s changing approach to the Quijote across his career.  
I will not dedicate myself to an investigation of that development, but rather I will derive some ideas 
central to Unamuno’s aesthetics of reading from texts spanning all of those major stages.  
 
                                               
17 King for example argues that Augusto Pérez in Niebla is a spiritual and literary twin: ʻes un joven 
sin norte; las acciones previas a su aparición en la novela parecen carecer de interés; pero, como a 
Don Quijote, se le despierta el angustioso sentido de la existencia solo después de tropezar por 
casualidad con Eugenia Domingo del Arco, de la que se enamora inmediata y desesperadamente.  
Como Don Quijote, se forja una imagen ideal de Eugenia […] que llena de tal modo su mente, que 
cuando se cruza con ella en carne y hueso por la calle ni siquiera la reconoceʼ (King 1967: 227). 
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I am also aware of criticism that situates the vitalist, voluntarist statements in Vida de don Quijote y 
Sancho in philosophical models.  Sinclair’s 2001 ʻUncovering the Mindʼ provides a comprehensive 
commentary on Unamuno’s relationship to Nietzschean voluntarism, and Teobaldo Noriega (2005) 
investigates the role of Rivadeneira’s Vida del bienaventurado Padre Ignacio de Loyola (1583), and 
also collates the triumph of quixotic will with Nietzsche.  Sánchez-Barbudo (1950) argued that 
Unamuno’s Quijote is akin to Kierkegaard’s Abrahamic knight of faith, and more recently Jan Evans 
(2006, 2013) has submitted Vida to Kierkegaardian readings.  Roberts (1966) also makes note of 
Kierkegaard’s relevance to Unamuno’s Quijote, and even Terreros’s 2009 PhD thesis considers the 
philosophies of Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer one of the key unifying factors between Unamuno 
and Borges.  My aim is not to situate Unamuno’s vitalist, voluntarist statements in the works of 
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer or Kierkegaard, but to assess them from the perspective of some of the 
modern reader-response theorists.   
 
In my analysis of Vida de don Quijote y Sancho, I will focus primarily on those chapters which lend 
themselves to a comparison with Borges’s ʻPierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  I will highlight his 
rewritings of Menard’s chapters: IX, XXII and XXXVIII for the purposes of a later comparison.  
Other chapters, such as XLV in which the term baciyelmo is introduced, have been chosen specifically 
for their ability to communicate with the Borgesian idea that meaning is determined by the reader.  I 
could also not avoid mentioning Unamuno’s version of Chapter 2, II, which is also at the heart of 
Borges’s Magias parciales del Quijote, nor Unamuno’s traditionalist interpretation of the adventure 
at Montesinos which contrasts against Borges’s view of literary tradition as expressed in ʻKafka y 
sus precursoresʼ.  I will also examine the final chapter of Vida de don Quijote y Sancho to bring that 
contrast into even sharper relief.   
 
IV.1 The early Unamuno 
 
Unamuno’s first major engagement with the Quijote comes in a series of five essays which would 
come to be known as En torno al casticismo.  Despite a radical shift in his approach to the Spanish 
work from around 1902, from cervantismo to quijotismo, some of the key ideas expressed in these 
essays are still present in his writings on the Quijote until the mid-1930s.  Inasmuch as Unamuno 
continually amends his reading, he still constantly holds to some fundamental notions, including the 
hidalgo’s status as the epitome of an eternal Spanish tradition.   
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When Unamuno proposes his concept of intrahistoria18 in ʻLa tradición eternaʼ, he adopts a 
Spencerian view that history is not the product of great men, but instead that great men are the product 
of history.  This notion is one that Unamuno never abandons in relation to don Quijote as a 
protagonist.  I will explore how this theory is interesting from a narratological point of view, in that 
it shares interpretive authority over the text across the community in which it is written and read.   
 
Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote can also never be excised from his interest in (and later distaste 
for) Europeanisation.  As Rabaté recently argued, 
 
For Unamuno […] the country must open itself more to ʻcrossbreedingʼ with European ideas, 
cultures and practices in order to make progress; those casticistas who had historically 
attempted to seal off Spain from foreign currents such as the Reformation, or who promoted 
a chauvinistic account of Spanish intellectual and cultural achievements were, in effect, 
producing a pernicious inbreeding, leading to the decline of the country. (Rabaté 2016: 11) 
 
Moreover, Unamuno in his 1906 ʻSobre la europeizaciónʼ proposes that the future of Spain lies in a 
reciprocal relationship of cultural importing and exporting with the rest of Europe.  Spain must be 
willing to consider itself simultaneously Spanish and European, in order to Europeanise the country 
and ʻhispaniciseʼ the continent: 
 
la verdadera y honda europeización de España, es decir, nuestra digestión de aquella parte de 
espíritu europeo que pueda hacerse espíritu nuestro, no empezará hasta que no tratemos de 
imponernos en el orden espiritual a Europa, de hacerles tragar lo nuestro, lo genuinamente 
nuestro, a cambio de lo suyo, hasta que no tratemos de españolizar a Europa. (OC VII: 187) 
 
Don Quijote bridges the gap between Unamuno’s political and cultural beliefs and his 
phenomenology of reading.19  To wit, he argues that Europe and Spain carry their own antheses within 
                                               
18 The object of which is ʻthe anonymous people of the countryside, the lives of millions of ordinary 
people living silent, obscure livesʼ (Rabaté 2016: 16). 
19 I am not the first to note this.  Stephen Roberts’s ʻUnamuno’s Opposition to Primo de Rivera and 
his Sense of Mission (1923-24)ʼ showed that ʻAll of his [Unamuno’s] works can be seen as part of 
an attempt to express what it means to be Spanish, beyond the false definition of the traditionalists.  
La vida de Don Quijote y Sancho (1905) and Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1912) represent 
approximations to the reality of the ‘Spanish soul’ as Unamuno intuited the deeply religious and 
spiritual nature of the Spanish characterʼ (Roberts 1989: 85). 
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them in En torno al casticismo:20 
 
Desde hace algún tiempo se ha precipitado la europeización de España […] Y hasta Menéndez 
y Pelayo, ʻespañol incorregible que nunca ha acertado a pensar más que en castellanoʼ (así lo 
cree, por lo menos, cuando lo dice), que a los veintiún años, ʻsin conocer del mundo y de los 
hombres más que lo que dicen los librosʼ […] dedica lo mejor de su Historia de las ideas 
estéticas ʻen Españaʼ, su parte más sentida, a presentarnos la cultura europea contemporánea, 
sazonándola con una exposición aperitiva. (Unamuno 2014: 130-131) 
 
Pointing to a Spanish intellectual whose interest in national politics led him to a study of 
contemporary Europe, Unamuno shows that the two are mutually reconcilable: ʻTenemos tan 
deformado el cerebro, que no concebimos más que ser o amo o esclavo, o vencedor o vencido, 
empeñándonos en creer que la emancipación de éste es la ruina de aquélʼ (134).  This section of ʻLa 
tradición eternaʼ helps to explain Unamuno’s claim in Vida that don Quijote is the archetypal 
Spaniard and a universal hero.  His Spanishness does not cancel with his universality; Spain’s greatest 
philosophical export is a style of idealism honed on the fields of la Mancha and ready to be tested 
against the best philosophy that exists outside of Spain.21  
 
Unamuno’s reading is daring commensurately with the radicalness of the statements he makes on 
regeneration.  He considers the Quijote to be an example of classic literature that eschews 
geographical and temporal colour, an artistic tradition that extrapolates general principles from 
individual circumstances: 
                                               
20 Mermall’s explanation of the dialectic approach of En torno al casticismo is useful here: ʻBy 
confronting similar structures from different spheres, dialectic initiates the tension and 
interpenetration of contrary notions, so that each concept turns into its own inherent oppositeʼ 
(Mermall 1993: 285). 
21 Close made this point better than I: ʻit [the Quijote] is the perfect self-expression of a race — the 
Castilian — which in its art and culture tended to display narrowly exclusive habits of mind (either 
abstractly intellectual or sensuous but never both).  Here, the Castilian caste manifested itself in a 
form which transcended its limitations in a universal synthesis, at once eternally Spanish and 
universally human.  The novel incarnates the pure spring of eternal human realities which constitute 
the intrahistoric source of Spain’s successive castes and the substance enduring beneath historical 
changeʼ (Close 1972: 27).  Quijote’s Spanish intra-historicity allows him to tap the most profound 
potential of his humanity. Similarly, the novel has become a kind of universal text, which forms much 
of Borges’s later analysis. 
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A ese arte eterno pertenece nuestro Cervantes, que en el sublime final de su Don Quijote 
señala a nuestra España, a la de hoy, el camino de su regeneración en Alonso Quijano el 
Bueno; a ése pertenece, porque de puro español llegó a una como renuncia de su españolismo, 
llegó al espíritu universal, al hombre que duerme dentro de todos nosotros. (142) 
 
Unamuno reads into a 17th Century Golden Age text a moral for 19th and 20th Century Spanish 
politics, proposing a coded message on the future of Spain: that it must follow the example of Quijano, 
stop overreaching its own capabilities, and adopt a practical politics.  Rabaté also notes the curative 
power of Don Quijote in Spanish political life, arguing that Quijote in Unamuno is ʻinscribed within 
the broader discursive framework of psychoanalysis […] When Don Quixote died, his madness died 
with him, and the healthy strengths of Alonso Quijano el Bueno are a model for Spain’s regenerationʼ 
(Rabaté 2016: 15).  Quijano is an ideal Spaniard whose renunciation of the ways of knight-errantry 
offers a universal moral on political pragmatism.  At this stage, Unamuno’s lionising of Quijano is 
paired with a deep admiration for Cervantes.  Unamuno sides with the authorial-narratorial voice that 
ends the second volume of the Quijote, and its statement after Quijano’s death on the text’s purpose: 
 
pues no ha sido otro mi deseo que poner en aborrecimiento de los hombres las fingidas y 
disparatadas historias de los libros de caballerías, que por las de mi verdadero don Quijote 
van ya tropezando, y han de caer del todo, sin duda alguna.  Vale. (Cervantes 2010: 1332) 
 
Though Unamuno reads according to a new historical perspective, he does not stray far from the 
author-narrator’s stated intention.  Unamuno’s later homages to Quijote ahead of Quijano require a 
more radical, anti-authorial stance.22  It is testament to the power of the author that a text set on the 
plains of La Mancha could have universal significance. The novel’s passage from Spanish national 
text to a universal work is symbolic of Spain’s hopeful passage from a nación to a pueblo, as 
Unamuno expresses in ʻ¡Muera Don Quijote!ʼ in 1898: 
 
España, la caballeresca España histórica, tiene como Don Quijote que renacer en el eterno 
hidalgo Alonso el Bueno, en el pueblo español, que vive bajo la historia, ignorándola en su 
mayor parte por su fortuna.  La nación española —la nación, no el pueblo—, molida y 
                                               
22 Willard King showed in 1967 that Unamuno’s early essays interpret the story as a hero’s return to 
sanity, paying Cervantes due respect for a story well told.  King points to a contradiction between 
Unamuno’s later tributes to the figure of Quijote and his new-found disdain for Cervantes (King 
1967: 219). 
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quebrantada, ha de curar, si cura, como curó su héroe, para morir.  Sí, para morir como nación 
y vivir como pueblo. (OC VII: 1195) 
 
That is a political and aesthetic argument.  Spain must dismantle the machinery of nationhood and 
embrace the curative power of its own pueblo.  It must look for its Spanish essence, and universalise 
it. If what is Spanish is also universal, then we must accept the validity of cross-border ideas on 
aspects of Spanish culture.  It therefore divests Spain of its claim to sole interpretive authority over 
the Quijote. I will show later that an interest in supra-national interpretations of national texts also 
underlies Borges’s ʻPierre Menard, autor del Quijoteʼ.   
 
The connection between historical progress and literary tradition is strengthened in ʻ La casta histórica 
Castillaʼ.  The eternal Spanish tradition expresses itself in history and culture as an ever-changing yet 
never-changing spirit that moves inexorably throughout time.  Don Quijote is one iteration of that 
tradition, a recipient of what has gone before and an antecedent to what will come next.  In that sense, 
Spanish history and culture are in constant flux: ‘Nos queda por buscar algo del espíritu histórico 
castellano revelado sobre todo en nuestra lengua y en nuestra literatura clásica castiza, buscar qué es 
lo que tiene de eterno y qué de transitorio y qué debe quedar de él’ (163).  Aguinaga notes that paradox 
in El Unamuno contemplativo:  
 
La definición de tradición, en su primera parte, no podía ser más dinámica: es lo que está 
siempre en proceso de hacerse; en su segunda parte, sin embargo, cuando Unamuno indica 
que bajo lo que pasa hay algo que siempre queda, es ya un concepto estático, esencialista. 
(Aguinaga 1975: 66)  
 
Don Quijote is an example of that transitory and eternal culture.  The idealism he practises in Vida 
de don Quijote y Sancho is an eternally valid philosophy which adapts itself to cultural and political 
circumstances.  Spain’s international politics should be marked by a flux of cosmopolitanism and 
regionalism: ‘Conviene mostrar que el regionalismo y el cosmopolitismo son dos aspectos de una 
misma idea y los sostenes del verdadero patriotismo, que todo cuerpo se sostiene del juego de la 
presión externa con la tensión externa’ (163). 
 
The idea that each concept contains its own antithesis is explored further in 1905’s Vida.  The internal 
contradictions of the intra-historic system, in which history has both ever-lasting and always-
changing features, and in which Spain should take an increased interest in the culture within and 
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without its own borders23, are exemplified in the clash of prosaic and poetic worlds in don Quijote’s 
philosophy. 
 
Unamuno rejects all notions that the Quijote was written in a vacuum, and that instead it is causally 
related to literary antecedents and successors.  For example, Calderón’s protagonists, like 
Segismundo, live fully in the spirit of Alonso Quijano: 
 
en aquel relato eterno, en que, despojado del héroe, muere Alonso Quijano el Bueno en el 
esplendor inmortal de su bondad.  Este Alonso Quijano, que por sus virtudes y a pesar de sus 
locuras mereció el dictado de el Bueno, es el fondo eterno y permanente de los héroes de 
Calderón, que son los que mejor revelan la manifestación histórica, la meramente histórica 
de aquel pueblo. (170) 
 
Texts condense preceding literary tradition; Calderón’s La vida es sueño explores metaphysical 
questions proposed by the narrative tricks of Don Quijote de la Mancha.  When the works of Calderón 
and Cervantes are collated, the variables and the constants of the intra-historic spirit which has 
begotten them might be better understood.  Placing the Quijote in an endlessly proliferating culture 
implies that a work cannot be attributed to a single figure, but to a whole community.  As such, the 
intra-historic idea that culture is the product of a community spirit has much in common with the anti-
intentionalist approach to reading, in which the author can never explain the total meaning of a work, 
but in which an ever-changing community of readers across time will constantly discover new 
meanings within it.  For this reason, Marcos (2005: 95) argues that we must not ignore Unamuno’s 
statement towards the end that ʻEl lector sensato pondrá el método que falta y llenará los huecosʼ 
(269).  En torno al casticismo invites its reader to oust the author, as Unamuno takes to extremes in 
Vida.  Moreover, Jauß’s position that a text is not a monument but an orchestration of constantly-
updated readings seems to reflect Unamuno’s intra-historic view of literary culture. I contend that 
Unamuno builds his later discussion of don Quijote on the intra-historic system proposed in En torno 
al casticismo.  
 
                                               
23 John Butt notes that Unamuno’s romanticised version of the pueblo, the basis of the idea of 
intrahistoria, is heavily derived from the extant German concept of the Volksgeist/Volksgeschichte. 
and is therefore a Europeanising model derived from wider European thought (Butt 1972: 14). Pedro 
Ribas also situates Unamuno’s intrahistoria within Hegel’s Völkerpsychologie for the same reason 
(Ribas 2002: 127). 
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‘El espíritu castellanoʼ highlights why critics like Basdekis argue that Unamuno, for all of his later 
invectives against the author, always lionised Cervantes (Basdekis 1969: 180).  Cervantes is 
emblematic of the new Spain, one that lives within and outside of its borders.  Calderón, he argues, 
ʻes a quien «leemos con más fatiga» los españoles de hoy, mientras Cervantes vive eterna vida dentro 
y fuera de su puebloʼ (186 - emphasis in original).  The text is set across Spain but has found a 
readership around the world.  The Spanishness and universality of the text is symbolised, Unamuno 
suggests, in the relationship between Quijote and Sancho: ʻDon Quijote y Sancho caminan juntos, se 
ayudan, riñen, se quieren, pero no se funden.  Los extremos se tocan sin confundirseʼ (187).  The two 
clash yet beneficially co-exist.  Moreover, Quijote’s idealism is the philosophy Spain ought to adopt 
and bring to the outside world, just as ʻLa sistematización del honor, la caballería, es, como tantas 
sistematizaciones y pulimentos, de origen francés’ (209).  Spanish culture is an amalgam of internal 
and external influences.  When those influences condense into new cultural phenomena, they must 
exert an external influence on foreign culture.  As Unamuno stresses, ʻLos franceses nos dieron 
Rolando, como nosotros a ellos Gil Blasʼ (210).  In Vida, quijotismo becomes both a Spanish 
philosophy and a universal method for living, as well as the means by which Spain can participate in 
supra-national culture, bringing quixotic idealism into communication with European, pragmatic 
sanchopancismo.  These approaches are not foes.  As Vicén argues, ʻʼEl ʻpuebloʼ, lo perpetuamente 
ignorado bajo el brillo de los ʻhechos históricosʼ, ha de ser el plasma germinativo que fecundado por 
corrientes europeas, dará vida a una nueva Españaʼ (Vicén 1943: 222).   
 
Unamuno takes the Quijote as a political fable, with Segismundo’s statement that renown is key to 
eternal life at its heart.  ʻTras esto eterno se fue el vuelo del alma castellanaʼ (218), argues Unamuno 
in ʻDe mística y humanismoʼ, here taking Quijote’s unerring faith in his moral rectitude as an 
illustration of how the Castilian spirit is given to seeking fame.  Don Quijote’s ethics forego a 
materialist view, instead holding to a moral principle where the individual must suffer physical pain 
in the face of injustice: 
 
Cuando del buen Sancho perdonaba cuantos agravios le habían hecho y hubieran de hacer, 
Don Quijote, molido por los yangüeses, habría querido poder hablar un poco descansado y 
dar a entender a Panza el error en que estaba, adoctrinándole en cómo el que gobierna ha de 
tener ʻvalor para ofender y defenderse en cualquier acontecimientoʼ, doctrina caballeresca, 
levantadora de imperios, y «lo que ha levantado y levanta estos imperios de tierra es lo bestial 
que hay en los hombres.» (238-239) 
 
Sancho is too fearful of physical pain to battle the muleteers.  Unamuno laments this mistake, agreeing 
with don Quijote in violation of the satirical reading, that the courage to defend oneself is the greatest 
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moral standard.  Unamuno does not just rebuke Sancho, but also those readers who see in the Quijote 
a satire for obeying a cowardly rationale, an ethically-unsound obsession with material consequences 
rather than spiritual ideals.  
 
Unamuno’s early writing on the Quijote is ambivalent in its preference for either Quijote or Quijano, 
both becoming the moral exemplum of many of the arguments in En torno al casticismo.  Unamuno 
jarringly shifts from a pro-Quijote view to a pro-Quijano one within the same text: 
 
Hay que matar a Don Quijote para que resucite Alonso Quijano el Bueno, el discreto, el que 
hablaba a los cabreros del siglo de la paz […] «¡Verdaderamente se muere y verdaderamente 
está cuerdo Alonso Quijano el Bueno!».  El bachiller Sansón Carrasco, la razón raciocinante 
apoyada en el sentido histórico, creerá incorregible a Don Quijote y siempre para su solaz la 
graciosa locura de éste.  Así ha sido hasta hoy así tiene que seguir siendo, hoy como ayer y 
mañana como hoy. (244-245) 
 
Quijote is the ultimate pragmatist in the abandonment of an ideal he could no longer support in light 
of the irrefutable evidence of his defeat to a disguised Sansón Carrasco.  Paradoxically, that confirms 
Quijote’s worldview: he has become enlightened because he had the courage to impose his ideals 
onto his environment.   
 
A Sancho-like inability to impose an ideal onto the world, Unamuno explains, is one of the reasons 
for what ʻel marasmo actual de Españaʼ.  Sanchopancismo holds in a Spain stuck in the mire of 
common sense without a moral telos: 
 
¡Qué rozagante vive el sancho-pancismo anti-especulativo y anti-utopista!  ¡Qué estragos hace 
el sentido común, lo más anti-filosófico y anti-ideal que existe!  El sentido común declara 
loco en una sociedad en que sólo se emplea la simple vista, la vista común, a quien mira con 
microscopio o telescopio; el sentido común emplea argumentum ad risum para hacer ver la 
incongruencia de una opinión con nuestros hábitos mentales. (251) 
 
Unamuno denies the reading that the Quijote is simply the comic tale of a madman.  To consider don 
Quijote mad is philosophically illiterate and morally pusillanimous.  It requires conforming events to 
a pre-conceived view, rather than updating one’s view in light of events.  What Unamuno dislikes in 
Sancho, he comes to later exult in Quijote; his quest to make the world conform to his expectations.  
For now, the sanchopancista habit of rejecting the incongruence between his mind and the world is 
illustrative of the economic decline of Spain: 
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Vivimos en un país pobre, y donde no hay harina todo es mohína.  La pobreza económica 
explica nuestra anemia mental; las fuerzas más frescas y juveniles se agotan en establecerse, 
en la lucha por el destino.  Pocas verdades más hondas que la de que en la jerarquía de los 
fenómenos sociales los económicos son los primeros principios, los elementos. (255) 
 
Spain’s poverty and lack of national philosophical discourse are products of each other.24  Unamuno 
declares the Spanish crisis to be primarily an intellectual one, brought about by a ʻdesquite del viejo 
espíritu histórico nacional que reacciona contra la europeizaciónʼ (262).  Spain reaffirms its own 
intellectual frameworks by rejecting unfamiliar notions which exist outside, just as Sancho reaffirms 
his by rejecting Quijote’s chivalric worldview.  Spain’s future lies in an opening of its own intellectual 
borders, capturing the spirit without the practices of its colonial past: ʻFue grande el alma castellana 
cuando se abrió a los cuatro vientos y se derramó por el mundo; luego cerró sus valvas y aún no 
hemos despertadoʼ (263).  Quijote always symbolises the necessary search for a national ideal.  In a 
comment that he nuances in his 1906 ‘Sobre la europeización’, he argues that, ʻsólo abriendo las 
ventanas a vientos europeos, empapándonos en el ambiente continental, teniendo fe en que no 
perderemos nuestra personalidad al hacerlo, europeizándonos para hacer España y chapuzándonos en 
pueblo, regeneraremos esta estepa moralʼ (268).  The regeneration of Spanish moral, intellectual and 
political life relies on replacing Sancho-esque self-preservation with quixotic cosmopolitanism.  The 
Quijote could never have been written without the influence of literature in France and Italy, for 
example.  The greatness of Spanish letters is provided by its position in a tapestry of literary exchange.  
Unamuno closes ʻEl marasmo actual de Españaʼ, the final instalment of En torno al casticismo, 
stating that the intra-historic Spanish spirit awaits a saviour who can reawaken that golden-age 
cosmopolitanism.  It took less than ten years for Don Quijote himself to be anointed that saviour. 
 
IV.2 The turn of the century 
 
Between 1895 and 1905, Unamuno published multiple times on the Quijote, including an 1896 essay 
ʻEl caballero de la triste figuraʼ.  This essay proposes that don Quijote was a real historical figure in 
order to justify the argument that the fame of Quijote’s deeds granted him eternal life, pre-empting 
many of the assertions Unamuno makes in Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho.  It argues that Cide Hamete 
Benengeli is an imperfect biographer who ʻno calóʼ (OC I: 911) details of the hidalgo’s life.  
                                               
24 As Stephen Roberts argues: ʻ Unamuno understood that the absence of debate has a deadening effect 
upon the minds of a nation, and he also saw that Primo’s coup had had the aim and effect of removing 
criticism and conflict from public lifeʼ (Roberts 1989: 83). 
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Unamuno plays at taking literally the literary devices of the Quijote: the invention of Cide Hamete 
Benengeli as an historian whose version Cervantes edits25.  He works entirely within what Iser 
denotes ʻthe rules of the gameʼ when reading, abiding by many of the features of the text despite the 
tendency to read Benengeli’s role satirically.  Moreover, to argue that Benengeli has missed aspects 
of the Quijote suggests that the reader’s understanding of the text can outstrip the author’s, and that 
our experience of Don Quijote can tell us more about the hidalgo than the historian might have known.  
Paradoxically, the reader is permitted to conclude from the text, which cannot and does not say 
everything, everything that it cannot and does not say!  The Quijote presents itself as a biography, 
but provides little historiography, ascribing to conjecture the name of our hidalgo.  It lacks credibility 
as the narrative voice is shared.  As such, Unamuno’s non-intentionalist reading of the Quijote, which 
disregards any attempt at satire, still plays by Iser’s rules of the game.  Hence, I cannot agree with 
critics like Close, who argue that Unamuno misses the irony.26 That irony is present in Unamuno’s 
apparently ingenuous reading of Benengeli as an historical man, in a reductio ad absurdum which 
reinstates only that message that the reader might naturally have taken from the Quijote: that the 
stated intention of the author is not equal to the true meaning of the text.   
 
When Unamuno claims that different cultures produce particular readings of the Quijote:  
 
Hay un tipo diverso de Don Quijote para los diversos pueblos que más o menos le han 
comprendido.  Hay el francés, apuesto, de retorcidas y tiesas guías de bigote, no caído éste, 
sin mucho asomo de tristeza, más parecido al aragonés de Avellaneda que al castellano de 
Cervantes; hay el inglés, que se acerca mucho más al español, y al verdadero, por tanto […] 
si le cojieran [sic] todos ellos y se fundiesen en uno, como se hace con las fotografías 
compuestas, de manera tal que los ragos [sic] comunes se reforzaran dejando en penumbra a 
los diferenciales, neutralizados unos con otros, obtendríase un arquetipo empírico, como tal 
nebuloso y gráficamente abstracto, de donde poder sacar el pintor la verdadera figura de Don 
Quijote. (923) 
 
                                               
25 The attribution of the novel to a fictional author is a Cervantine technique common to Unamuno 
and Borges.  One could well argue that Cide Hamete Benengeli is Unamuno’s Pierre Menard. 
26 I align more with Rachel Schmidt, who recently argued that ʻTo assert Cide’s historicity, as well 
as that of Don Quixote, is a flagrant violation of all the narrative frames within which Cervantes has 
placed this fictional manuscript.   Such a violation is typical of Unamuno’s literary thought and 
creation, for from this transgression of boundaries he seeks to problematise authorship and readership 
as well as the status of fictionʼ (Schmidt 2011: 171). 
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Such a claim would have been interesting to Jauß, who argues that ʻmeaning only becomes 
progressively visible and definable in the subsequent changes of aesthetic experience, and 
dialogically so in the interaction between the literary work and the literary publicʼ (Jauß 1982: 64). 
That might provide the link between Unamuno’s desire for Spain to participate in a European political 
framework, and his aesthetics of reading.27  Unamuno rejects the assumption that the text can be 
understood in an absolute sense from a Spanish perspective.  No reader can conceive of the absolute 
meaning of a work, as they are bound by, in Jauß’s term, their horizon of expectations.28  I disagree 
with Ribas that the dialectical process of reading can create a utopian view of a text: ʻEn la dialéctica 
autor-lector que establece la teoría de la recepción cabe perfectamente la perspectiva utópica y crítica, 
si bien ésta no se basará ya sólo en la intención del autor, que el lector leería sin más, sino en que éste 
interviene activamente junto con el autorʼ (Ribas 2002: 78).  Reception theory forbids a utopian, ideal 
version of the text.  Don Quijote is not just a series of words put to paper, but a synthesis of all of the 
possible interpretations of those words.  No mind can have an absolute overview of all possible 
interpretations.  Borges demonstrates that impossibility in ʻEl Alephʼ, where the narrator’s capacity 
to make rational abstractions is dissolved when he conceives of the absolute.29  Were it possible to 
collate all of the possible readings of Don Quijote into a single explanatory text, then the reader would 
have reached the ‘true’ interpretation of it.  But such a text would be simultaneously impossible and 
useless.  For as long as there is a reader, there is an interpretation, and to catalogue all interpretations 
would be akin to constructing the Library of Babel.  Unamuno leads the reader to a conclusion they 
might have drawn from reading the Quijote: that there is no empirical principle by which to read.  He 
fills that gap with faith: ʻHay que pintarlo con la fe que crea lo que no vemos, creyendo firmemente 
                                               
27 I am not the first to notice this association.  Maestro identifies Unamuno as a precursor to Jauß: 
ʻSin saberlo, Unamuno se convierte así en un precursor de la Rezeptionsästhetik o estética de la 
recepción alemana, que no se manifestará con toda su plenitud y notoriedad hasta 1967ʼ (Maestro 
1990: 243). 
28 Maestro also discusses Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote in terms of Jauß’s theory on the 
Erwartungshorizont: ʻEn el caso del Quijote, su horizonte de expectativas está constituido por la 
suma de comportamientos, conocimientos e ideas estéticas preconcebidas que el texto cervantino 
encuentra en el momento de su aparición, durante los años 1605 y 1615, y merced a los cuales será 
valorado entre sus contemporáneosʼ (Maestro 1990: 245). 
29 I agree with La Rubia Prado on this point: ‘La apertura de la textualidad a la interpretación también 
significa un rechazo de Dios en el sentido teológico tradicional: no se nos puede imponer un 
significado verticalmente porque Unamuno descarta la posibilidad de que la escritura 
mecanicista/ovípara, en la que el poeta escribe con preconocimiento (con plan) como el Dios mismo 
monoteísta tradicional creó el universo, sea siquiera poesíaʼ (Prado 1999: 142). 
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que Don Quijote existe y vive y obra, como creían en la vida de los santos y ángeles que pintaban 
aquellos maravillosos primitivosʼ (924 - emphasis in original).  As Vida later shows, don Quijote’s 
readings assume that there is no objective truth outside of his own mind.  In that sense, quixotic 
idealism is the epitome of Unamuno’s aesthetics.  
 
IV.3 Unamuno after 1902 
 
Months before Vida de don Quijote y Sancho was published, Unamuno ʻSobre la lectura e 
interpretación del Quijoteʼ which anticipated his great rewriting of Cervantes’s work.  Notable is his 
turn from extolling the Spanish national spirit to bemoaning its decline:  
 
En pocas cosas se muestra más de relieve que en lo que con el Quijote ocurre en España la 
tristísima decadencia en nuestro espíritu nacional.  Se ha podido decir, con toda justicia, que 
no es España la nación en que más se conoce el Quijote, y puede añadirse que no es aquella 
en que mejor se le conoce […] Puede asegurarse que España es una de las naciones en que 
menos se lee el Quijote, y desde luego as aquella en que peor se lee. (OC I: 1227) 
 
Unamuno’s concern with a national spirit in decline never extricates itself from a concern with 
reading.  Unamuno defines a poor reader as one who searches for meaning rather creating it.  
Cervantistas who have robbed the text of its possible meanings: ʻlos críticos y comentadores que 
como nube de langostas han caído sobre nuestro desgraciado libro, dispuestos a tronchar y estropear 
las espigas y a no dejar más que la pajaʼ (1227-1228).  Unamuno’s task in rewriting the Quijote is to 
restore an intellectual curiosity to Spanish readers of the Quijote, one that has taken hold already in 
European literary traditions.   
 
Unamuno takes aim at intentionalist readers for their assumption that they know the author had in 
mind, and that this assumption forms a critical method:  
 
Y de cuando en cuando nos sale algún santón de la crítica sesuda y de cortos vuelos, 
diciéndonos que Cervantes ni quiso ni pudo querer decir lo que tal o cual simbolista le 
atribuye, sino que su propósito fué tan sólo el de desterrar la lectura de los libros de caballerías. 
 
Convenido que así fuese; pero ¿qué tiene que ver lo que Cervantes quisiera decir en su Quijote, 
si es que quiso decir algo, con lo que a los demás se nos ocurra ver en él?  ¿De cuándo acá es 
el autor de un libro el que ha de entenderlo mejor? (1230)  
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The interpretive authority over the Quijote is shared among those who share in the spirit from which 
Quijote was extracted:   
 
Desde que el Quijote apareció impreso y a la disposición de quien lo tomara en mano y lo 
leyese, el Quijote no es de Cervantes, sino de todos los que lo lean y lo sientan.  Cervantes 
sacó a Don Quijote del alma de su pueblo y del alma de la humanidad toda, y en su inmortal 
libro se lo devolvió a su pueblo y a toda la humanidad. (1230) 
 
When Cervantes derived don Quijote from the spirit of his pueblo, he found in the hidalgo the epitome 
of the Spanish cultural and political mindset on the lowest level.  Basdekis explains the link between 
the author and tradition as follows: 
 
Cervantes, through his immortal work, returns to his ʻpuebloʼ and all of humanity what he 
found there.  It is in this sense that he is an ʻinstrumentʼ of his ʻpueblo,ʼ a product of his 
tradition and culture who has synthesised that tradition and culture in a great work of art.  
Cervantes has created for all readers an open dialogue wherein the reader as co-author sees 
himself and his ʻintrahistoryʼ spread across a platform which is in turn a ʻpossibilityʼ for all 
future generations of men. (Basdekis 1969: 185) 
 
Cervantes provides his pueblo with a work of art with which they can communicate30.  It is the intra-
historic Spanish spirit distilled into literature.  And as long as Spanish readers are recipients of their 
own eternal tradition, which is itself a synthesis of internal and external cultural influences, the 
interpretive authority of the Quijote is shared equally among them.31  Unamuno expresses that in a 
highly poetic section: 
 
                                               
30 Vicén considers this a point of admiration for the author: ʻCervantes fué un genio, pero lo fué en 
un sentido concreto y determinado; no porque acertara a crear una figura imperecedera, sino porque 
supo encarnar en un momento preciso todo la esencia ideal de su puebloʼ (Vicén 1947: 198). 
31 Longhurst raises a similar point: ʻIf this is so, an author is not only expressing an own outlook and 
disposition but also those of the community within which that sense of identity was developed.  If 
our self-identity is as dependent on the external world of others as Unamuno makes out, it follows 
that Don Quixote or any other hero will embody much of that external prompting.  Don Quixote is 
the real representative, whereas the author is a mere instrumentʼ (Longhurst 2014: 37).  In other 
words, the author is a conduit of external cultural phenomena 
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Cervantes puso a Don Quijote en el mundo, y luego el mismo Don Quijote se ha cargado de 
vivir en él; y aunque el bueno de don Miguel creyó matarle y enterrarle e hizo levantar 
testimonio notarial de su muerte para que nadie ose resucitarlo y hacerle hacer nueva salida, 
el mismo Don Quijote se ha resucitado a sí mismo, por sí y ante sí, y anda por el mundo 
haciendo de las suyas […] Cervantes escribió su libro en la España de principios del siglo 
XVII y para la España de principios del siglo XVII, pero Don Quijote ha viajado por todos 
los pueblos de la tierra y durante los tres siglos que desde entonces van trascurridos.  Y como 
Don Quijote no podía ser en la Inglaterra del siglo XIX, pongo por caso, lo mismo que en la 
España del siglo XVII, se ha modificado y trasformado en ella, probando así su poderosa 
vitalidad y lo realísimo de su realidad ideal. (1231) 
 
Cervantes is the scriptor of that which the horizon of expectations of a 17th Century Spaniard allowed 
him to conceive.  There is an authoring responsibility outside of the author, which places interpretive 
freedom in the reader.32  Don Quijote is the point of departure for various possible readings of him, 
all of which are enabled and legitimised by the changing historical circumstances in which the text is 
received.  This aligns Unamuno with Jauß’s later argument that each successive historic generation 
enables new understandings as horizons of expectations are updated.  It also bridges the gap with 
Borges’s argument in ʻPierre Menardʼ that Menard’s version is superior as it is more difficult for 
someone of his particular historical circumstances to have conceived of the novel.  
 
Unamuno and Borges share a universalising view of the novel.  While Unamuno argues that the 
Quijote condenses all of the historical and literary influences in early 17th Century Spain, he is keen 
to see its interpretation become a matter of international discourse:  
 
Nunca he podido pasar con eso de que el Quijote sea intraductible; y aún hay más: y es que 
llego a creer que hasta gana traduciéndolo, y que si ha sido mejor sentido fuera de España que 
en ella misma, se debe en buena parte a que no ha podido empañar su belleza la preocupación 
del lenguaje. (1233) 
 
                                               
32 Ribas describes that freedom as such: ʻDon Quijote es personaje creado por Cervantes, pero una 
vez que éste lo entregó a los lectores, Don Quijote tiene ʻrealidadʼ independiente de quien lo creóʼ 
(Ribas 2002: 95). 
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Borges famously read the Quijote for the first time in English, before reading a Spanish version that 
he considered a poor translation of an English original.33  As such both subscribe to a reader-centric, 
cosmopolitan approach to reception for its potential to imbue texts with new possible meanings that 
could not have existed in the geographical-historical circumstances in which Cervantes published his 
work.  Hence a text’s possible meaning is far greater than the meaning that an author can devise.  As 
Unamuno puts it:  
 
Y no me cabe duda de que Cervantes es un caso típico de un escritor enormemente inferior a 
su obra, a su Quijote […] Llego a sospechar que Cervantes se murió sin haber calado todo el 
alcance de su Quijote, y acaso sin haberlo entendido a derechas.  Me parece que si Cervantes 
resucitara y leyese de nuevo su Quijote, lo entendería tan mal como lo entienden los masoretas 
cervantistas y se pondría del lado de éstos. (1233) 
 
When reading is free of a unifying principle other than the view of the reader, it is difficult to argue 
for the existence of misreadings.  Though to Unamuno, the only unacceptable reading of a text is an 
author-centric one.  The battle between quijotismo and cervantismo in Unamuno’s writing can 
generally be described as a battle between the opposing methods of reader-centrism and 
intentionalism.34 I agree with Basdekis’s distinction between quijotismo as an emphasis on the literary 
content and cervantismo as an emphasis on the authorial meaning.  As he argues:  
 
‘Cervantismoʼ […] means the myopic focusing on the battle of Lepanto, on a possible illicit 
episode, on financial irregularities, on life in a seventeenth-century jail, etc […] It is an 
exercise in paleontology performed to the detriment of reader, literary work and even to the 
detriment of the author. (Basdekis 1969: 183) 
 
Calling cervantismo a sort of paleontology recalls the contention of the non-intentionalists that an 
author’s meaning cannot reliably be reconstructed.  Quijotismo avoids this difficulty: ʻAnd 
ʻquijotismoʼ means that the author politely steps aside and allows future generations of critics, 
                                               
33 Fernando Iwasaki Cauti has also noted this affinity: ʻNo me propongo negar que la primera lectura 
borgeana del Quijote fuera en inglés, pero el primero que aseguró que el Quijote mejoraría con una 
buena traducción fue Unamunoʼ (Cauti 2005). 
34 Though Gemma Roberts argues persuasively that quijotismo stands for a philosophy of idealism: 
ʻEl quijotismo permite imperar sobre el mundo objetivo, permite adaptarlo y crearlo de acuerdo con 
nuestro ideal, de acuerdo con nuestros deseos más íntimos y anhelos más profundosʼ (Roberts 1966: 
22). 
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readers, authors to search in his pages for the looking glass which will reveal them to themselves, 
which will put relief in their “tradición eterna”ʼ (Basdekis 1969 :182).  Self-identification with the 
text is a possible meaning that an author cannot intend.  It is the task of the quijotistas to identify such 
meanings.  Closing this essay, Unamuno asks: ʻ¿Lucirán en España mejores días para Don Quijote y 
Sancho?  ¿Serán mejor comprendidos?  Es de esperarlo, sobre todo si los quijotistas nos proponemos 
quijotescamente derrotar a los cervantistas’ (1237).  Vida de don Quijote y Sancho presents 
Unamuno’s final assault on the intentionalism of the cervantistas. 
 
IV.4 Vida de don Quijote y Sancho 
 
Contemporary editions of Vida de don Quijote y Sancho exemplify Unamuno’s dual status as reader 
and author.  The 1905 edition passed without authorial note, until a prologue was added to a second 
edition published in Salamanca in 1913.  An addendum to the prologue was provided in 1928, with a 
notional third section released in 1930 to assure the reader that the author had nothing more to add.  
Post-1913 editions of Vida feature arguably the most significant authorial comment in Unamuno’s 
writings on the Quijote.  Unamuno opted to publish Vida after his essay ʻSobre la lectura e 
interpretación del Quijoteʼ as the former is simply an explanation of the system set out in the latter: 
 
Lo que se reduce a asentar que dejando a eruditos, críticos e historiadores la meritoria y 
utilísima tarea de investigar lo que el Quijote pudo significar en su tiempo y en el ámbito en 
que se produjo y lo que Cervantes quiso en él expresar y expresó, debe quedarnos a otros libre 
el tomar su obra inmortal como algo eterno, fuera de época y aun de país, y exponer lo que su 
lectura nos sugiere. (Unamuno 2011: 133) 
 
Ironically referring to the task of critics to reconstruct the intentions of Cervantes as utilísima, he 
proposes a new approach: one which sees meaning as determined by the circumstances of reading.  
We are free to examine how meaning has changed by the force of historical progress far outside of 
the spatio-temporal coordinates of a 17th Century Spanish reader.  Unamuno condenses various 
theories that would be expressed later in the 20th Century, including Iser’s statement that reading 
texts as if they held meaning only as intended by the author is outdated, and Jauß’s contention that 
the ever-changing historical moment provides new horizons of expectations that validate readings 
departing from those that would have been accepted at the moment of writing.  Borges’s ʻPierre 
Menardʼ also examines how the Quijote might be read from a modern, international perspective, 
though it allows for communication between the author’s horizon of expectations and the reader’s.  
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The quality of Menard’s rewriting is relative to the poverty of Cervantes’s, whereas Unamuno sees 
little interpretive use for Cervantes’s version.35   
 
Unamuno takes a radical stance against the author that would be permitted by Iser’s and Jauß’s later 
theoretical work.  The clash between cervantismo and quijotismo is an early expression of the conflict 
between what we would later call intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, as Unamuno seems to 
express here: 
 
No creo deber repetir que me siento más quijotista que cervantista y que pretendo libertar al 
Quijote del mismo Cervantes, permitiéndome alguna vez hasta discrepar de la manera como 
Cervantes entendió y trató a sus dos héroes, sobre todo a Sancho.  Sancho se le imponía a 
Cervantes, a pesar suyo. (134) 
 
Reception theory permits us to dispute the meaningfulness of an author’s stated intention. Vida 
achieves this.  The statement that Sancho imposed himself on his creator is evidence of Unamuno’s 
reader-centrism.36  The novel’s authorship must be credited to a broader, international literary 
tradition.  Literature is one of the many ways in which the intra-historic spirit expresses itself.  
Recipients of that spirit have an interpretive authority equal to the author.  Hence Sancho imposed 
himself on the author; Cervantes could not have authored his story were it not for the chivalric form 
that enabled him.  To Unamuno, the text appears to the author as a landscape might appear to a painter.  
So his railing against Cervantes is an extreme vocalisation of an aesthetics of readership.  New 
horizons of expectations can provide a meaning in the work distinct from that which the author 
intended.  Historical circumstances outside the text provide a reading that bears few traces of the 
satirical, burlesque interpretation that would have been most accepted in 17th Century Spain. 
 
                                               
35 For that reason, Gemma Roberts argues that: ʻNo intenta Unamuno realizar en su Vida de don 
Quijote y Sancho labor de erudición cervantina y mucho menos de crítica literaria […] Es decir, su 
propósito es extraer la verdadera filosofía del Quijote contraponiéndola a las usuales interpretaciones 
profesorales.  Trata, precisamente, de sacar a don Quijote de la cátedra literaria para introducirlo de 
lleno en la vida.  Ciertamente, la filosofía que él deriva de la figura el héroe cervantino es, en parte, 
el producto de su propia interpretación de la vida del propio carácter de su pensamiento, que 
pudiéramos definir, con sus mismas palabras como un ʻquijotismo filosóficoʼ (Roberts 1966: 17). 
36 It is, I must add, reminiscent of the clash between Unamuno and Augusto in Niebla, as Ardila and 
Biggane recently pointed out (Ardila & Biggane 2016: 200). 
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In a second prologue in 1928, Unamuno apologises for typographical errors in previous editions 
caused by ʻprecipitaciones de improvisadorʼ (135).  Calling himself an improviser instead of an 
author could hardly express Unamuno’s suspicion of authorial authority more clearly.  This prologue 
also shows Unamuno taking Cervantes literally in a reductio ad absurdum of intentionalism: 
 
En el prólogo del Quijote —que, como casi todos los prólogos (incluso éste) no son apenas 
sino mera literatura—, Cervantes nos revela que encontró el relato de la hazañosa vida del 
Caballero de la Triste Figura en unos papeles arábigos de un Cide Hamete Benengeli, 
profunda revelación con la que el bueno […] Cervantes nos revela lo que podríamos llamar 
la objetividad, la existencia […] de Don Quijote y Sancho y su coro entero fuera de la ficción 
del novelista y sobre ella.  Por mi parte, creo que el tal Cide Hamete Benengeli no era árabe, 
sino judío y judío marroquí, y que tampoco fingió la historia. (136) 
 
Unamuno probably did not see Benengeli as anything other than a literary trick.  Rather, in taking 
Cervantes literally, he guides his reader in the pitfalls of reading naively, and explores the rich 
meaning that an anti-intentionalist reading can create.37  
 
Modern editions of Vida also feature the essay ʻEl sepulcro de Don Quijoteʼ published in La España 
Moderna in 1906.  It defines don Quijote’s agonismo as an idealist worldview that accepts that ʻEl 
verdadero porvenir es hoy.  ¿Qué será de nosotros mañana?  ¡No hay mañana!  ¿Qué es de nosotros 
hoy, ahora?  Esta es la única cuestiónʼ (141).  Historical advancement must be made by agonistas 
like don Quijote who wish to make a material impact here and now.  That ideological movement has 
don Quijote as its figurehead: ʻCreo que se puede intentar la santa cruzada de ir a rescatar el sepulcro 
del Caballero de la Locura del poder de los hidalgos de la Razónʼ (142).  Don Quijote teaches the 
value of existing over simply being, of seeing the world in an irrational way so as to change it 
according to the will.   
 
Quijotismo’s greatest moral teaching is stoicism towards ridicule.  Ridicule is the weapon of erudite 
bachilleres who guard the sepulchre of a ʻCaballero que hizo reír a todo el mundo, pero que nunca 
soltó un chiste.  Tenía el alma demasiado grande para parir chistesʼ (143).  Fear of ridicule stifles 
intellectual progress. If we abandon that fear as Quijote did, we will promote a reader-centric 
discourse of free ideological exchange.  Ridicule is a circular argument born of common sense in 
                                               
37 As Molinero argues, ʻUnamuno ha tenido que pasar por la ocurrencia cervantina del autor fingido; 
esto es, ha tenido que enmascararse literariamente de cervantista para posicionarse poéticamente 
como quijotistaʼ (Molinero 1999: 111). 
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order to justify the application of common sense.  The satirical reading of don Quijote is based on a 
positivist logic which is affirmed cyclically. The romantic approach, by its nature irrational, 
empowers the reader to trust their own interpretation and to bring it into public discourse.  So, says 
Unamuno, 
 
Sigue a la estrella.  Y haz como el Caballero: endereza el entuerto que se te ponga delante.  
Ahora lo de ahora y aquí lo de aquí.  ¡Poneos en marcha! […] ¡Luchar! ¡Luchar!, y ¿cómo?  
¿Cómo?  Tropezáis con uno que miente?, gritarle a la cara: ¡mentira!, y ¡adelante!  ¿Tropezáis 
con uno que roba? gritarle: ¡ladrón!, y ¡adelante!… (146-147) 
 
The reader’s own mind is the source of categorial imperatives.  This is the stuff of modernising 
political discourse:  
 
Mira, amigo, si quieres cumplir tu misión y servir a tu patria, es preciso que te hagas odioso 
a los muchachos sensibles que no ven el universo sino a través de los ojos de su novia.  O algo 
peor aún.  Que tus palabras sean estridentes y agrias a sus oídos […] Echa del escuadrón a 
todos los danzantes de la jeringa […] Son a la vez estetas y perezistas y lopecistas o 
rodriguezistas. (148)  
 
Unamuno’s political, cultural and aesthetic views share a methodology. An interpretive approach 
described by reception theorists bridges the gap between those disciplines. Serving one’s nation 
entails a scepticism of given literary interpretations and political ideologies: ʻSi quieres, mi buen 
amigo, llenar tu vocación debidamente, desconfía del arte, desconfía de la ciencia, por lo menos de 
eso que llaman arte y ciencia y no son sino mezquinos remedos del arte y de la ciencia verdaderos.  
Que te baste tu fe. Tu fe será tu arte, tu fe será tu cienciaʼ (150). Art, science, politics: all must be 
viewed exclusively through the eyes of the individual, and each view must be defended with unerring 
faith.  
 
The irony of Unamuno’s treatment of don Quijote as an historical figure is evident from the first 
chapter.  In an aping of Cervantes’s pseudo-admission as to the unreliability of the record on Alonso 
Quijano, Unamuno offers a similar admission, with an unlikely solution: ʻNada abemos [sic] del 
nacimiento de Don Quijote, nada de su infancia y juventud, ni de cómo se fraguara el ánimo del 
Caballero de la Feʼ (157).  He calls Cervantes’s bluff on the historicity of the account to illustrate the 
success of the narrative conceit: forewarning against reading objectivity into a text.  He takes the 
feigned historical record to its logical extreme, ostensibly criticising those who see don Quijote as a 
mere fiction.  How could anyone ascribe Quijote’s existence to Cervantes when ʻtan esparcida cuanto 
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nefanda creencia de que Don Quijote no es sino ente ficticio y fantástico, como si fuera hacedero a 
humana fantasía el parir tan estupenda figuraʼ? (158).  From there, he makes the dubious claim that 
Quijote ʻera de los linajes que son y no fueron.  Su linaje empieza en élʼ (158).  Here I believe that 
Unamuno argues an extreme case in order to state its opposite.  A lacuna in the historical record does 
not imply that don Quijote is free of all lineage.  Rather that lacuna is a condition of his literary 
heritage: it is a travesty of the pseudo-historical nature of the chivalric novels that Cervantes so 
lampoons.  The Quijote is the meeting point of various cultural and historical trends that are not the 
work of one author.  It must be read as a fiction which does not prescribe its own meaning.  Unamuno 
demonstrates the extent to which a reader must engage scepticism when reading by playing the 
extreme form of an unsceptical reader.   
 
This seems to be at work when Unamuno embarks on a pseudo-biblical reading of the novel.  For 
what hermeneutic principle exists for a reader to separate the truth of the Gospel from the truth of the 
novel?  Unamuno’s messianic statements on don Quijote highlight the ingenuousness that readers of 
any work must abandon: ʻPor nuestro bien lo perdió [el juicio]; para dejarnos eterno ejemplo de 
generosidad espiritual.  Con juicio, ¿hubiera sido tan heroico?  Hizo en aras de su pueblo el más 
grande sacrificio: el de su juicioʼ (163).  This claim is an imbroglio of competing readings.  
Unamuno’s feigned naivety reduces to the absurd the kind of reader the Quijote seems to take aim at.  
But Quijote’s reading of chivalric novels as if they were historical record is the basis of his heroism.  
His heroic madness is a product of the necessary scepticism of given modes of reading.  The inherent 
contradictoriness of the argument is a condition for its success: the only valid interpretation is arrived 
at sceptically.   
 
Radical scepticism towards given models of thinking promotes the reader to a quixotic agonista.  
Quijote's abandonment of reason is an act of self-sacrifice that a reader must emulate.  When we no 
longer fear ridicule, but work to realise our worldview, then we might leave a lasting impact on the 
world that will grant us metaphysical longevity. This is precisely what Quijote achieved: 
 
Y su honra ¿qué era?  ¿Qué era eso de la honra de que andaba entonces tan llena nuestra 
España?  ¿Qué sino un ensancharse en espacio y prolongarse en tiempo la personalidad?  
¿Qué es sino darnos a la tradición para vivir en ella y así no morir del todo? (164, emphasis 
in original) 
 
To live without making some impact on the world is to practically not exist.  To be a quixotic agonista 
bridges the gap between estar and existir, and brings into being the best of all possible worlds.  
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Unamuno demonstrates the potential to extrapolate political, cultural and philosophical morals from 
fictional works when the majority reading is abandoned.  
 
Chapters VIII and IX of the first volume of the Quijote, where the narrative device of Cide Hamete 
Benengeli is introduced, finds its narrative entirely overwritten by a reader whose horizon of 
expectations renders it completely foreign.  The comedic narrative of the eighth chapter, in which 
don Quijote tilts at windmills under the illusion that they are giants, is practically omitted: ʻY Don 
Quijote los tomó [los molinos] por desaforados gigantes, y sin hacer caso de Sancho encomendóse 
de todo corazón a su señora Dulcinea y arremetió a ellos, dando otra vez con su cuerpo en la tierraʼ 
(199).  Reducing the narrative to a framework strips it of its comic impact, and tells it from an 
apparently impartial perspective before interpreting it as a symbolic parable on industrialization.38  
This is the technique by which Unamuno excises the text from the horizon of expectations of a Golden 
Age reader and reinserts it into that of a reader in early 20th Century Spain.  Critic María Ochoa 
Penroz in fact labels the work a kind of novela-ensayo, a kind of textual baciyelmo (Ochoa Penroz 
1997: 65).  This can be observed here:  
 
Tenía razón el Caballero: el miedo y sólo el miedo le hacía a Sancho y nos hace a los demás 
simples mortales ver molinos de viento en los desaforados gigantes que siembran mal por la 
tierra […] Hoy no se nos aparecen ya como molinos, sino como locomotoras, dínamos, 
turbinas, buques de vapor, automóviles, telégrafos con hilos o sino ellos, ametralladoras y 
herramientas e ovariotomía, pero conspiran al mismo daño. (199) 
 
The anachronistic references to post Industrial Revolution phenomena directly reflect the extent to 
which readers’ horizons of expectations have changed since the publication of the Quijote.  Unamuno 
sees in the symbols of modern industrialisation exactly the same giants that appeared to Quijote in 
what is now a primitive technology.39  Hence a caveat: there remains a shared possible reading across 
                                               
38 Ardila & Biggane see a historiographical significance here: ʻThe legacy of 1898, and the rise of 
other nations’ imperial and economic might haunts the pages of the Vida, and the text is, in part, a 
defiant nationalist credo in the wake of defeat, pitting will, faith and spiritual superiority against 
technological and military might.  It also contains bitter criticism of Spain’s civic and political life: 
the Restoration monarchical regime, for Unamuno a regime with little credibility, is compared with 
maese Pedro’s puppet show, and a Don Quixote was needed to destroy it’ (Ardila & Biggane 2016: 
202). 
39 Prado argues that Vida is a manifesto on the role of poetry in human lives.  He suggests that 
Unamuno prefers the poetic view of don Quijote to the material view of Sancho: ʻ‘aunque en primera 
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various horizons of expectations.  This is the eternal tradition of En torno al casticismo set to narrative 
commentary.  Unamuno identifies the fleeting phenomena in the material world, as well as the 
spiritual reality they convey.  No matter whether windmills are replaced with automobiles or 
telegraph poles, we must never be afraid to see in them what we wish to see.   
 
Sancho is an intentionalist reader of the world.  He declares that the giants are in fact windmills by 
showing how a windmill works: ʻ—Mire vuestra merced —respondió Sancho— que aquellos que allí 
se parecen no son gigantes, sino molinos de viento, y lo que en ellos parecen brazos son las aspas, 
que, volteadas del viento,  hacen andar la piedra del molinoʼ (Cervantes 2010: 100).  For don Quijote, 
the intended function of an object has no role in determining its essence: ʻ—Bien parece —respondió 
don Quijote— que no estás cursado en esto de las aventuras: ellos son gigantes; y si tienes miedo, 
quítate de ahí, y ponte en oración en el espacio que yo voy a entrar con ellos en fiera y desigual 
batallaʼ (100).  Fear is the sanchopanzine hermeneutic principle.  It delineates things in the world 
according to a prescribed purpose.  That principle blinds its adherents to the potential meanings in 
the world: ‘El miedo y sólo el miedo sanchopancesco nos inspira el culto y veneración al vapor y a 
la electricidad; el miedo y sólo el miedo sanchopancesco nos hace caer de hinojos ante los desaforados 
gigantes de la mecánica y la química implorando de ellos misericordiaʼ (Unamuno 2011: 200). 
 
Fear prevents Sancho from exercising his imaginative faculties to the extent that don Quijote does so.  
Sancho sees windmills because they have been built to fulfil that purpose.  This is irrelevant to don 
Quijote, to whom the intended purpose of things does not define them.  Similarly, the intended 
purpose of a text is not the meaning of a text.40  Unamuno advanced this argument explicitly in a 
1917 essay, ʻLa traza cervantescaʼ, stating that: 
 
por mi parte me metí a comentar el Quijote […] no pretendí desentrañar lo que Cervantes 
quiso decir en él, cosa que me tiene sin cuidado, sino lo que yo en él veo y no lo que me 
sugiere.  No me interesa lo que los autores quieren decir, sino lo que dicen o mejor lo que me 
                                               
instancia Don Quijote, un mito genuinamente español — y, por ello, diría Unamuno genuinamente 
universal — se presente como modelo a seguir frente a una crisis española, en realidad su alcance 
ético es mucho mayor: Don Quijote y el quijotismo son una alternativa de vida frente a los nada 
poéticos valores, imperativos y corolarios de la modernidad’ (Prado 1999: 120-121). 
40 Antonio Muñoz Molina drew a succinct connection between Quijote’s interpretation of texts and 
his approach to the world: ‘Mistaking a novel for a book of History is no less of a catastrophe than 
mistaking windmills for giants, or peasant women for princesses’ (Muñoz Molina 2010: 24). 
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dicen.  Ni admito las segundas intenciones en la literatura.  Y en cuanto a la vida del literato, 
sólo me interesa mientras aclaro su obra.  En rigor su vida es su obra. (OC VII: 1226) 
 
Unamuno cares not what the author meant, but what the author allows him to think.  This nuances 
our understanding of Unamuno’s non-intentionalism.  An author is not irrelevant.  It is that an author 
communicates certain things to each reader dialogically.41  Unamuno’s apparently ambivalent view 
of the author — relevant in one sense, irrelevant in another — is upheld by Iser’s The Act of Reading, 
and its contention that an author sets out the rules of the interpretive game: ʻReading is an activity 
that is guided by the text: this must be processed by the reader, who is then, in turn, affected by what 
he has processed’ (Iser 1987: 163).  A text sets out rules by which it ought to be interpreted, though 
this does not forbid infinite possible readings that still play by those rules.42  Authored texts and 
manufactured objects promote certain ʻreadingsʼ.  Some aspect of the windmills allows don Quijote 
to see them as giants: their height, the reach of their arms, and so on.  Unamuno’s Quijote therefore 
practises a version of anti-intentionalist readings of the word and the world.  He does not violate the 
rules of the game when he sees windmills as giants.43  Nor, as we will see shortly, when he sees a 
legendary helmet in a barber’s basin.   
 
Unamuno’s awareness that he plays by Cervantes’s rules is evident in the ninth chapter, one which 
Pierre Menard later rewrites.  As Quijote and the Biscayan charge at each other, he interjects, aware 
that his version of the story is subsidiary to Cervantes’s: ʻ¡Oh espectáculo de largos en largos siglos 
sólo visto, el de la lucha de dos Quijotes: el manchego y el vizcaíno, el del páramo y el de las verdes 
                                               
41 As Ribas puts it, ʻLa novela, como ejemplo supremo de la creación literaria, se analiza hoy como 
interacción o dialéctica entre autor y lector.  Desde esta perspectiva, no hay una interpretación, sino 
varias, ya que distintos lectores pueden leer contenidos distintos o al menos relativamente distintosʼ 
(Ribas 2002: 77). 
42 Though in an essay on the interaction between text and reader in Spanish literature, Iser denies that 
reading is a dialogic process, given that a dialogue and a reading are governed by different internal 
laws thanks to the absence of the author at the moment of reception (Iser 1982: 227).  This aligns Iser 
with the New Critics’ insistence that there is only text, and serves to critique Unamuno’s diaological 
model of reading. The fact that the reader cannot enquire as to the author’s meaning, according to 
Iser, prohibits reading from functioning as dialogue.   
43 In fact, Gemma Roberts argues that ʻno podemos aquí identificar este fenómeno con el idealismo, 
porque esos gigantes no son el producto de la conciencia sino de la voluntadʼ (Roberts 1966: 22).  I 
would argue that Quijote’s philosophy has a complex relationship to idealism. It accepts the objective 
nature of the world, but sees no meaning in the world other than that willed by his mind. 
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montañas!  [Hay que releerlo como nos lo relata Cervantesʼ (206).  He cannot provide a definitive 
version, but an individual interpretation.  This might explain the fragmentary nature of the rewriting, 
which omits key narrative details.  The dubious justifications for the narrative lacunas might persuade 
a reader to return to the original and determine their relevance for themselves.44  Unamuno requires 
his reader to question the validity of every narrative voice, including his own.   
 
His narrative voice makes the kind of brindis patriótico that Pierre Menard appears to disapprove of.  
Unamuno feels an individual connection to the vizcaíno in the tale, and intersperses the narrative with 
the statement that the Basques have no historical antecedent: ʻ¡Pues nosotros los vascos no datamos!  
Y no, no datamos los vascos.  Los vascos sabemos quiénes somos y quiénes queremos ser.  Ya ves, 
Don Quijote, que es un vasco el que ha ido a buscarte a tu Mancha y te arremete porque le regateaste 
lo de ser caballeroʼ (207).  Unamuno relegates the narrative beneath a commentary on the Basque 
Country’s role in Spanish culture.  It proves Borges’s later point that the Quijote has become an 
opportunity for patriotic self-congratulations.  It also connects to theories of reader-response.  
Unamuno reads according to the Jaußian model, where a text is ʻan orchestration that strikes ever 
new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it 
to a contemporary existenceʼ (Jauß 1982: 21).  Unamuno’s regionally-aware reading of the Quijote 
states the case for that model where personal resonances are valid interpretations. 
 
Chapter XXII, famous for the meeting with Ginés de Pasamonte, is an important point of comparison 
with Borges considering its place in Menard’s version.  Unamuno eschews a narratological 
investigation of that famous conversation with Ginés, and rather focuses on Quijote’s freeing of the 
galley slaves.  He criticises his contemporary Ganivet for his symbolic reading of don Quijote in 
Idearium español (152).  Unamuno does not look at don Quijote from a legalistic perspective like 
Ganivet, who sees don Quijote as the embodiment of moral rectitude underlying judiciary decision-
making.  He does not read Quijote’s character as if he had an essential, symbolic purpose.  He cares 
only for the subjective meaning he can find in the character, just as Quijote projects a vision of giants 
onto some distant windmills:  
                                               
44 Ochoa Penroz also considers this an important aspect of Unamuno’s Vida: ʻMuy importante en 
Vida es la omnipresencia y relieve del lector implícito.  Unamuno apela constantemente a él.  Don 
Miguel no es un autor que se esconda tras la máscara de un supuesto narrador ficticio, ni que cumpla 
la función de un mero copista.  Su papel nos recuerda más bien al Unamuno autor de Niebla, que 
dialoga con Augusto Pérez, su personaje’ (Ochoa Penroz 1997: 70).  The human aspect of Unamuno’s 
narrative voice empowers the implicit reader to challenge Unamuno in the same way that Augusto 
Pérez does so. 
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No es que Cervantes quisiera encarnar en Don Quijote la justicia española, sino que lo 
encontró así en la vida del Caballero y no tuvo otro remedio sino narrárnoslo tal y como 
sucedió, aun sin alcanzársele todo su alcance. Ni aun vio siquiera el íntimo contraste que surge 
del hecho de que fuese Don Quijote el castigador de los mercaderes toledanos, del vizcaíno y 
de tantos otros más, el mismo que negaba a otros derecho a castigar. (252)  
 
Cervantes is not the source of meaning, rather he narrates the symbolic meaning he found in the 
character.  This was a task beyond Cervantes, an author Unamuno continues to label a malicioso 
historiador.  Unamuno accuses Cervantes of identifying symbolism in his literary creation but failing 
to notice the inconsistency in his own record.  Unamuno attempts to redefine Quijote’s sense of justice 
given Cervantes’s failure to persuade his reader of it fully: 
 
niego que los libertara movido en realidad, y allá en sus adentros, por semejante 
consideración.  Y si así fuera, ¿con qué razón y derecho castigaba él, Don Quijote, como 
castigaba, sabiendo que escaparían los más del rigor de su brazo?  ¿Por qué castigaba Don 
Quijote, si no hay castigo humano que sea absolutamente justo? (253 - emphasis in original) 
 
Unamuno’s answer is to present Quijote’s justice as inscrutable: ʻMi fe en Don Quijote me enseña 
que tal fue su íntimo sentimiento, y si no nos lo revela Cervantes es porque no estaba capacitado para 
penetrar en élʼ (256).  Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote is itself quixotic.  Don Quijote assimilates 
contradictory outlooks to his own, assuming that others have failed to understand a phenomenon 
beyond their reason.  We see a non-intentionalist note in a chapter that thematises the limitations of 
authors in Ginés de Pasamonte’s inability to write a complete account of his own life.  Unamuno’s 
comment on Cervantes’s incapacity to convey Quijote’s true guiding principles reflects Pasamonte’s 
inevitable failure to write an authoritative life story.  Moreover, his defence of quixotic justice is 
justified according to a quixotic logic.  Hence his essayistic diversions on the Quijote still abide by 
the governing rules of the text.  
 
The thirty-eighth chapter, where don Quijote delivers his postprandial speech on arms and letters, is 
also key to the comparison between Borges’s and Unamuno’s rewritings.  It is fundamental to the 
narrator’s analysis of Menard’s version, yet in Unamuno’s rewriting it is wholly ignored: ʻCon el 
buen suceso de los encuentros de la venta aumentaron los burladores de Don Quijote, a los que 
enderezó éste su discurso de las letras y las armas.  Y como no lo dirijió [sic] a cabreros, lo pasaremos 
por alto’ (294).  One of the most significant aspects of ʻPierre Menardʼ is one of the least significant 
of Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho.  A single sentence seems inadequate reason to omit the narrative.  
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Perhaps Unamuno recuses his authority the same way that the author of ʻPierre Menardʼ does.  A 
reader may return to Cervantes’s Quijote and read the speech for themselves.  So Unamuno’s 
rewriting is not an over-writing: we are led to re-read a text and question its relevance.  This is not 
the first chapter Unamuno overlooks: Chapter VI is omitted on the basis of the distinction between 
books and life.  Throughout the rest of the text his quixotic philosophy relies on a radical self-
sufficiency.  A reader must decide whether aspects of the original narrative truly are unworthy of 
their attention, lest they fall into the trap of sanchopanzine ingenuousness.  Prado explains this 
particular omission as follows: 
 
Para él sólo es arte lo que es vital, lo que engendra vida — que para él es la definición misma 
de la poesía y de la verdad — lo que trata de recrear la totalidad ética que la modernidad 
destruye.  De ahí que el escrutinio de la librería de Don Quijote por parte del cura y el barbero, 
Unamuno lo pase sin otro comentario en su Vida más que la advertencia de que el capítulo 
ʻtrata de libros y no de vida.  Pasémoslo por altoʼ; esto es: el capítulo en sí mismo es 
representativo de la suerte de libro que no genera vida porque consiste, precisamente, en la 
quema — en nombre de la razón y el sentido común mecánicos — de los libros que han dado 
vida a Don Quijote en nombre de la razón mecánica. (Prado 1999: 123) 
 
True art is life-giving, and calls its reader into action.  Unamuno’s omissions fulfil that aim.  A 
narrative where books are ironically burned in the name of reason becomes a narrative which awakens 
the reader into a productive role.45  His omissions are consistent with his wish to awaken the reader 
from an interpretive stupor as expressed in ʻ Mi religiónʼ,46 and recall Cervantes’s provocative address 
to his idle reader.  Iser’s ʻLa Interacción Texto-Autorʼ argues that narrative omissions are: 
 
lo que estimula al lector a suplir los blancos con sus propias proyecciones.  El lector resulta 
atraído hacia los acontecimientos haciéndolo proveer lo que se quiere decir a partir de lo que 
                                               
45 As Longhurst puts it, ʻA text has to become in some sense a cognitive activity, both for authors and 
for readers.  Just as writing was for Unamuno a kind of reading, so for Unamuno’s readers reading is 
a kind of writing.  By becoming his readers they are discovering themselves in the same way that 
they discover themselves via othersʼ (Longhurst 2014: 104). 
46 Ochoa Penroz also argues that they strip the narrative back to a case-study of the character: 
ʻTambién elude el capítulo del cautivo, y en general, todos los que no tienen relación directa con el 
quehacer de don Quijote como figura mesiánica.  Unamuno no piensa que estas novelas intercaladas 
son tan ajenas a la historia central, como la del ʻCurioso impertinenteʼ, que le resulta francamente 
insoportable’ (Ochoa-Penroz 1997: 79). 
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no se dice.  Lo dicho sólo parece adquirir significación en tanto refiere a las omisiones; es por 
medio de implicaciones y no a través de afirmaciones que se da forma y peso al significado. 
(Iser 1982: 228-229) 
 
This fittingly describes the lacunas that Unamuno inserts into the Quijote.  When Unamuno excises 
chapters which deal with art and not life, or where a famous speech is unworthy of our attention as it 
was not delivered to a group of cabreros, the reader must assess those choices.  The lacunas in Vida 
are produced in such a way that they require the reader to fill them in the way Iser identifies.  So just 
as the Quijote does not prescribe its own reading, neither does Unamuno’s Vida prescribe a reading 
either of the original or of the copy.  The technique of omission forbids the reader the idle role that 
Cervantes so vocally deplored. 
 
Iser describes what form that active role must take: 
 
Si el blanco es en gran medida responsable por las actividades descritas, entonces 
participación significa que el lector no está simplemente llamado a internalizar las posiciones 
dadas en el texto, sino que él es inducido a hacerlas actuar una sobre otra, haciéndolas 
transformarse mutuamente como resultado de lo cual el objeto estético comienza a emerger. 
(236-237) 
 
An absence in a text — say, for example, an absence of any commentary on Quijote’s chapter on 
arms and letters — allows the reader to re-position what is said in the text according to the way they 
interpret the absence.  If for example one reads Unamuno’s Cervantine omissions as a reinstatement 
of Cervantes’s authority, or a deconstruction of his own, one is sure to read the rest of Unamuno’s 
work through that lens, to emphasise given aspects over others, to arrive at an overall interpretation 
of the work as guided by their interpretation of what is missing.  From a reader-response point of 
view, the aspects of the quixotic narrative which Unamuno ignores become one of the most significant 
aspects of the text’s interpretation. 
 
Unamuno’s argument that we must read with no other guiding principle than our own viewpoint is 
explored in his rewritten versions of chapters XLIV and XLV, when the barber finds Quijote and 
Sancho in an inn and demands the return of his basin.  A comparison between Cervantes’s and 
Unamuno’s versions helps here: 
 
‘en aquel mesmo punto entró en la venta el barbero a quien don Quijote quitó el yelmo de 
Mambrinoʼ (Cervantes 2010: 572) 
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‘A poco de esto entró en la venta el barbero del yelmo de Mambrino y la tramó con Sanchoʼ 
(Unamuno 2011: 300) 
 
Unamuno’s version makes more explicit the narrator’s position that the object is indeed a helmet, as 
Cervantes’s version is focalised purely through Quijote’s perspective.  Unamuno never scrutinises 
the claim that it is a helmet and not a basin because Quijote’s faith is enough to render his view 
acceptable: ʻMentó el barbero la bacía y entonces se interpuso Don Quijote y mandó traerla y juró 
que era el yelmo y lo puso a la consideración de los allí presentes.  ¡Sublime fe que afirmó en voz 
alta, bacía en la mano, y a la vista de todos, que era yelmo!ʼ (301).  Quijote projects a purpose onto 
an object with such force that Unamuno is in no place to contradict him.  This is the model of 
Unamuno’s preferred kind of open public discourse, where the best possible world will arise if we 
defend our worldview to the full extent of our faith in it.47  Quijote’s perception of the object makes 
it so, in an act of Schopenhauerian will.  Though, as Gemma Roberts points out, this is not a denial 
of objectivity in and of itself: 
 
El quijotismo de Unamuno no da lugar en ningún momento a un perspectivismo subjetivo 
según el cual cada uno ve las cosas de acuerdo con su posición o punto de vista.  Al hablar de 
la fe en Unamuno, insistimos, no se trata de renunciar la objetividad, sino de vencerla.  Se 
trata precisamente de fundamentar un nuevo objetivismo basado en la voluntad, aunque el 
objeto así obtenido sólo tenga sentido dentro de la subjetividad.  La estructura esencial de 
nuestra existencia hace que nos remitamos siempre a otra cosa, al exterior, pero el poder de 
nuestra voluntad puede realmente crear ese mundo objetivo sobre el cual nos transcendemos 
haciéndolo concordar con nuestro más preciado ideal. (Roberts 1966: 21)  
 
For the same reason, Unamuno later argues that reason has to be the weapon of choice for a 
regenerated Spain.  Unamuno does not deny objectivity.  Rather he wishes to supersede it with a new 
form of reason derived from the will of the individual.  Though the will can only project a meaning 
                                               
47 As Prado argues, ʻEn Unamuno el universo como totalidad de lo que existe es una lucha de fuerzas 
enfrentadas creativa y generosamente.  Cuando una fuerza se afirma e impone sobre otras, la primera 
está afirmando en Unamuno lo mejor de sí misma que comparte con las fuerzas derrotadas de las que 
absorbe sus propiedades también.  Toda batalla lo es en Unamuno de renovación y es intrínsecamente 
orgánica porque conduce a la unidad, cualquiera que sea el resultado’ (Prado 1999: 152-153).  This 
is a perfect summary of Unamuno’s meliorism: a clash of viewpoints will inevitably synthesise the 
best of both into a new and better one.  
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onto an object that is permitted by objective features in that object.  The form of the ʻbasinʼ allows 
Quijote to see it as a legendary helmet.  So, the objective features of objects and texts paradoxically 
allow for subjective views of them.  The windmills and the basin encapsulate the difficulty in 
Unamuno’s assault on objectivity.  Quijote overwrites the view of the world which categorises things 
according to functions.  However, the objective features of those things rule what kind of subjective 
views are possible.  In other words, aspects of texts or objects that we agree on are the source of 
disagreement about what a text means or what an object is.  Sancho and Quijote both see long 
protrusions from the top of enormous structures in the distance.  But where Sancho sees the blades of 
a windmill, Quijote sees the arms of a giant.  This recalls Fish’s discussion of Raine’s and Hirsch’s 
interpretation of a Blake poem, which take the same words as evidence for two incompatible 
viewpoints.  Note how Fish could just as easily be referring to Quijote and Sancho: 
 
Clearly they cannot both be right, but just as clearly there is no basis for deciding between 
them.  One cannot appeal to the text, because the text has become an extension of the universe 
that divides them; and in fact, the text as it is variously characterised is a consequence of the 
interpretation for which it is supposedly evidence. (Fish 1980: 340) 
 
Sancho and Quijote conform objects in the world to a subjective viewpoint.  And just as the text 
cannot be the source of disagreement between two interpretations, features of the object that Sancho 
sees as a basin cannot be used to deny don Quijote’s view that it is in fact a helmet.  This anticipates 
Borges. In ʻPierre Menardʼ, the fact that two versions of a text are objectively identical is itself the 
source of subjective disagreement on the text’s meaning.   
 
In Cervantes’s version, Sancho provides a compromise, referring to it as a baciyelmo.  Unamuno 
considers this compromise impermissible.  The nature of truth, he explains in chapter XLV, is 
relative.  Truth only exists when there is unwavering human belief in it: ʻes el valor descarado de 
afirmar en voz alta y a la vista de todos y de defender con la propia vida la afirmación, lo que crea 
las verdades todas.  Las cosas son tanto más verdaderas cuanto más creídas, y no es la inteligencia, 
sino la voluntad, la que las imponeʼ (302).  One might call Unamuno a true Tlönian, one who believes 
in a world where truth only exists as a production of the human mind.  Unamuno renounces Sancho’s 
neologism, baciyelmo:  
 
¿Baciyelmo?  ¿Baciyelmo, Sancho?  ¡No hemos de ofenderte que esto de llamarle baciyelmo 
fue una de tus socarronerías, no!; es la marcha de tu fe.  No podías pasar de lo que tus ojos 
te enseñaban, mostrándote como bacía la prenda de la disputa, a lo que la fe en tu amo te 
enseñaba, mostrándotela como yelmo, sin agarrarte a eso del biciyelmo [sic].  En esto sois 
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muchos los Sanchos, y habéis inventado lo de que en el medio está la virtud.  No, amigo 
Sancho, no; no hay baciyelmo que valga.  Es yelmo o es bacía, según quien de él se sirva, o 
mejor dicho, es bacía y es yelmo a la vez porque hace a los dos trances.  Sin quitarle ni 
añadirle nada puede y debe ser yelmo y bacía, todo él yelmo y toda ella bacía; pero lo que 
no puede ni debe ser, por mucho que se le quite o se le añada, es baciyelmo. (303) 
 
Unamuno claims that the object is a basin and a helmet, yet contests the use of the word baciyelmo 
to describe it.  The term baciyelmo captures the polysemy of the object, its multiple meanings 
according to different contexts and points of view.  The contradiction in the term also captures that 
contradiction in Unamuno’s view of it, that it cannot be either the helmet or the basin, but that it must 
simultaneously be both.   
 
The neologism also suggests, by bringing together two contradictory statements, that the number of 
identities the object can sustain is greater than two.  It could be an infinite number between two poles.  
I contend that reading, as the reader-response theorists would have theorised it, can be exemplified 
in the Unamunian baciyelmo (a term he rejects, but one that still serves him well).  Reading wills into 
existence a meaning, and projects it onto an object.  Quijote and the barber project purposes onto the 
object to bring it into their own horizon of expectations.  They produce different interpretations of 
the object that are still permitted by its form, just as readings must be in keeping with the form of the 
text.  Quijote sees giants in windmills and a helmet in a basin because the form of those objects makes 
his reading of those acceptable.  Quijote’s idealism explores reader-centrist interpretations through a 
narrative medium.  To Unamuno, the only method by which to arbitrate between these different 
interpretations — and to answer Stanley Fish’s question as to what constitutes acceptable reading — 
relies on the will with which each interpretation is defended.   
 
Fish shows that we cannot decide what constitutes an acceptable reading of the text by referring to 
the text itself, and Unamuno’s hermeneutic principle for making such a decision relies on a threat of 
force that makes his reader-centrist model ethically dubious.  When a brawl erupts over the purpose 
of the object, the might of Quijote’s arm is an intellectual arbiter: ʻEn pocas aventuras se nos aparece 
Don Quijote más grande que en ésta en que impone su fe a los que se burlan de ella y los lleva a 
defenderla a puñetazos y a coces y a sufrir por ellaʼ (304).  The commonsensical view is of a basin.  
This cannot be undone by reason, so it must be defeated by violence.   Hence the most ethically 
unacceptable comment in Unamuno’s rewriting of the Quijote.  His view that a violence is the best 
arbiter between ideas reaches an apex with infelicitous resonances: 
 
Sí, es lo que necesitamos: una guerra civil.  Es menester afirmar que deben ser y son yelmos 
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las bacías y que se arme sobre ello pendencia como la que se armó en la venta.  Una nueva 
guerra civil, con unas o con otras armas […] Lo repito: nuestra patria no tendrá agricultura, 
ni industria, ni comercio, ni habrá aquí caminos que llevan a parte a donde merezca irse 
mientras no descubramos nuestro cristianismo, el quijotesco.  No tendremos vida exterior, 
poderosa y espléndida y gloriosa y fuerte mientras no encendamos en el corazón de nuestro 
pueblo el fuego de las eternas inquietudes.  No se puede ser rico viviendo de mentira, y la 
mentira es el pan nuestro de cada día para nuestro espíritu. (307) 
 
It is unclear whether Unamuno means a civil war in the material sense.48  Though such resonances 
are now unavoidable given the breakout of the Civil War thirty-one years after Unamuno published 
his work.  Perhaps the weapons Unamuno refers to are intellectual ones.  But what if a reader were 
to disregard the question as to Unamuno’s intended meaning?  That is Unamuno’s preferred reader, 
as he makes explicit comments on his preference for non-intentionalist readings in Del sentimiento 
trágico de la vida (1912) and ʻLa traza cervantescaʼ (1917).  He runs the risk of persuading the reader 
of the necessity of a civil war in the literal sense, which would abide by the rules of his work given 
that Unamuno does not forbid that interpretation.49  Unamuno violates the cervantine principle put 
forth in the prologue to the 1614 Novelas ejemplares: ‘Una cosa me atreveré a decirte: que, si por 
algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún mal 
deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la mano con que las escribí, que sacarlas en públicoʼ 
(Cervantes 2005: 135).  Cervantes would sooner cut off his hand than incite his reader to ill; Unamuno 
                                               
48 Jon Juaristi does not think so, arguing that ʻPara Unamuno, la guerra civil significa al menos dos 
cosas: es una guerra entre civiles (es decir, sin militares) y la irrupción de los intrahistóricos en la 
historia para rectificar o culminar revoluciones que los políticos ponen en marcha y no aciertan a 
concluirʼ (Juaristi 2015: 285). 
49 For this very reason, Clintoc has, perhaps unkindly, referred to Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote 
as ʻproto-fascistʼ, arguing that: ʻUnamuno’s identifying stance in respect to Cervantes’s Don Quixote 
hence acquires its ideological lopsidedness since he sees in Don Quixote not only a symbol of 
ʻcastizaʼ Spanish philosophy (as Weltanschauung) but also a symbol of national regeneration.  He 
will, therefore, contribute, even if in the absence of his actual awareness, to the crystallization of a 
ʻproto-Fascistʼ Spanish ideology, an imaginative-representational catalyst for the future success of 
Franco’s totalitarian regimeʼ (Clintoc 2005: 20), adding that to Unamuno ʻanything is justifiable in 
the name of a lofty ideal, thus preparing the Spanish collective unconscious for the advent of fascism, 
which, as Unamuno remarked of Don Quixote, is entitled to be beyond lawsʼ (22).  I will comment 
on the danger of legitimising totalitarianism in the sixth chapter. 
   90 
meanwhile is all too happy to do so.50  This will form my criticism of Unamuno’s method of reading 
Cervantes later on, and part of my proposal that an unacceptable reading is not text-oriented but 
world-oriented.  In other words, acceptable readings are decided ethically.  A comparison with 
Borges’s ʻPierre Menard, autor del Quijoteʼ will assist us in that aim.   
 
The early chapters of the second volume of Unamuno’s rewriting justify my connection between 
quixotic idealism and anti-intentionalist, reader-centric interpretations. In Chapter II, Unamuno 
explores the relationship between don Quijote and Sancho, who ʻse sonsacaban y distraían y se 
llevaban mutuamente por los andurriales del mundoʼ (329).  This relationship is a form of idealism 
where both are created by the other: 
 
Lo más grande y más consolador de la vida que en común hicieron es el no poderse concebir 
al uno sin el otro, y que muy lejos de ser dos cabos opuestos, como hay quien mal supone, 
fueron y son, no ya las dos mitades de una naranja, sino un mismo ser visto por dos lados.  
Sancho mantenía vivo el sanchopancismo de Don Quijote y éste quijotizaba a Sancho, 
sacándole a flor de alma su entraña quijotesca. (330) 
 
Their self projections synthesise with their counterpart’s image of them, such that they become a 
version of themselves pertaining only to the other.  That recalls Unamuno’s claim in the prologue to 
the Tres novelas ejemplares that there are in any given discussion three individuals: the true self, the 
self’s self, and the other’s self; as well as the narrator’s insistence that he wishes only to tell the story 
of his Don Sandalio in the eponymous, epistolary novel.  Unamuno reads Quijote’s statement that 
ʻjuntos salimos, juntos fuimos y juntos peregrinamosʼ (330) through that lens.  Just as the reader and 
author create each other in Cómo se hace una novela, Quijote and Sancho create each other in Vida 
de don Quijote y Sancho.  That is the link between don Quijote’s idealism and Unamuno’s method of 
reading.  Both synthesise the meaning that we project onto a person, text or thing with the meaning 
that they themselves project.  Hence don Quijote’s philosophy is a kind of reader-response theory 
applied to a diegetic world.   
 
                                               
50 He also proposes an intentionalist ethics contrasted against intentionalist readings.  Addressing 
Quijote, he says: ʻDijiste bien; tenías bríos para dar tú solo cuatrocientos palos a cuatrocientos 
cuadrilleros que se te pusieran delante, o por lo menos para intentarlo, que en intento está el valorʼ 
(310).  The text is read according to a consequentialist method; actions are read according to 
intentionalist ethics.  This ambivalence in Unamuno’s reading is difficult to reconcile.   
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When Unamuno turns his attentions to the adventure at Montesinos, he reads through the lens of 
literary tradition that arose after the novel was published, practising the later method that Borges set 
out in his ʻKafka y sus precursoresʼ.  He presents the cave as an example of the eternal Spanish 
tradition that he outlined in En torno al casticismo.  The cave — a permanent fixture on the Spanish 
landscape — symbolises to Unamuno an ever-present, inherent aspect of Spanish nature that is also 
surrounded by fleeting Spanish culture.  Culture becomes the ephemeral expression of an historical 
constant.  Quijote’s descent into and return from the Cave of Montesinos symbolises that constant: 
 
Si te empeñas en empozarte y hundirte en la sima de la tradición de tu pueblo para 
escudriñarla y desentrañar sus entrañas, escarbándola y zahondándola hasta dar con su 
hondón, se te echarán al rostro los grandísimos cuervos y grajos que anidan en su boca y 
buscan entre las breñas de ella abrigo […] Y antes de hundirse y empozarse uno en esa sima 
de las verdaderas creencias y tradiciones del pueblo […] tiene que derribar y cortar las 
malezas que cubren su entrada.  Cuando lo hagáis os dirán que queréis cegar la cueva y 
taparla a los moradores de ella; os llamarán malos hijos y descastados y cuanto se les ocurra.  
Haced oídos sordos a graznidos tales. (372-373) 
 
Quijote’s companions can only doubt his account a priori.  This ironically empowers his account.  
The unreliable narrator’s saving grace is that he recounts an experience which others cannot have 
shared.  We must adopt that quixotic philosophy: trust in the meaning that our minds find in the world 
around us wholeheartedly, and disregard those who have sought no meaning in it.   
 
Unamuno instructs the reader to re-read the original Quijote through an original lens.  This is an idea 
common to both Borges and Unamuno: that the deliberate adoption of a horizon of expectations can 
find a kind a permissible meaning in the text, whether it be an attribution of the same text to a different 
author, or a shift of the mode of reading from the satirical to the spiritual: 
 
Invito al lector a que relea, en el capítulo XXIII de la segunda parte, el relato de las asombrosas 
visiones de Don Quijote, y juzgando, como debe juzgarse, por el contento y deleite que de su 
lectura reciba, me diga luego si no son más fidedignas que otras no menos asombrosas con 
que dicen que Dios regaló a siervos suyos, soñadores en la profunda cueva encantada del 
éxtasis, Y [sic] no sirve sino creer a Don Quijote, que siendo hombre incapaz de mentir, afirmó 
que lo por él contado lo vio por sus propios ojos y lo tocó con sus mismas manos, y esto baste 
y aun sobre. (374) 
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The reader is instructed to re-read the Quijote according to a different horizon of expectations, to 
entertain the thought that the novel might instead be a Gospel.  How could a reader believe 
unquestioningly the veracity of visions that appeared to characters in the Bible, but a priori refute that 
of Quijote’s visions in the novel?  If we read the fiction from the same Christian perspective we might 
be committed to crediting Quijote’s visions.  Does that not require that we see Don Quijote as exactly 
the kind of person whose reports deserve to be taken as gospel?  If not, then we must revise the 
horizon of expectations by which we read.  When Unamuno tells his reader to revisit the novel 
according to a religious instead of a narrative framework, we realise that the hermeneutic approach 
to a text is formative of its meaning.  The doubtfulness of Quijote’s accounts, the credulity of his 
reading, his inability to separate fantasy from reality, all implicitly warn against reading without 
scepticism.  The Quijote portrays such readings as intellectually dubious.  Vida portrays them as the 
only acceptable model of reading.  
 
The final chapter of Vida exemplifies ʻPierre Menard’sʼ argument that the same text read in different 
era will engender different meanings.  When Quijote renounces the ways of knight-errantry and dubs 
himself Alonso Quijano, Unamuno does not take this as a defeat for chivalric novels, as the narrator 
of Cervantes’s version puts it, but argues that Quijote has arrived at the same conclusion as his literary 
heir, Segismundo: ʻA lindero de morir, y a luz de la muerte, confiesa y declara que no fue su vida 
sino sueño de locura.  ¡La vida es sueño!  Tal es, en resolución última, la verdad a que con su muerte 
llega Don Quijote, y en ella se encuentra con su hermano Segismundoʼ (507).  Unamuno reads 
according to a much broader horizon of expectations than Cervantes.  The Quijote has become more 
meaningful in the years since the author wrote the text.  Twenty years after Cervantes died, Calderón’s 
La vida es sueño added itself to global literary tradition.  Unamuno traces affinities backwards from 
Calderón’s work to Cervantes’s, following the method that Borges would set out in his 1951 ʻKafka 
y sus precursoresʼ.  We can read resonances from modern authors into earlier ones without 
anachronism invalidating our interpretation.  Precisely because Cervantes and Calderón exist within 
Unamuno’s cultural field, Unamuno can read Cervantes through a Calderonian lens.  Such a lens 
grants the text a philosophical clout:  
 
Tu muerte fue aún más heroica que tu vida, porque al llegar a ella cumpliste la más grande 
renuncia, la renuncia de tu gloria, la renuncia de tu obra.  Fue tu muerte encumbrado sacrificio.  
En la cumbre de tu pasión, cargado de burlas, renuncias, no a ti mismo, sino a algo más grande 
que tú: a tu obra.  Y la gloria te acoje [sic] para siempre. (510)  
 
Quijote admits that his life has been a Calderonian dream, yet still acts according to a lofty ethical 
principle.  Unamuno makes this point through Calderón: 
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que estoy soñando y que quiero 
obrar bien, pues no se pierde 
el hacer bien aun en sueños (511) 
 
Don Quijote trusts in some material reality behind what might be a series of illusory images: ʻDon 
Quijote perdió su fe y murióse; tú la cobraste y vives; era preciso que él muriera en desengaño para 
que en engaño vivificante vivas túʼ (513).  Life might be a dream; but we must act as if it were not.  
Quijote showed us what it is to lose faith in the reality of his world view so that we must never repeat 
that sacred mistake.  Dreams, incidentally, are a key aspect in Unamuno’s and Borges’s texts on the 
Quijote.  Both take advantage of the metaphysical layering implied by the presence of the first volume 
in the second.  Borges extrapolates that such a moment fictionalises the audience.  This concern 
appears to underly Unamuno’s use of the term sueño when rewriting the final chapter of the Quijote.  
It seems appropriate that Unamuno would question reality through a text that comedically proposes 
such a quandary: 
 
¡Oh Dios mío!  Tú, que diste vida y espíritu a Don Quijote en la vida y en el espíritu de su 
pueblo; Tú, que inspirastes a Cervantes esa epopeya profundamente cristiana; Tú, Dios de mi 
sueño, ¿dónde acojes [sic] los espíritus de los que atravesamos este sueño de la vida tocados 
de la locura de vivir por los siglos venideros? (521) 
 
Cervantes’s Quijote opens those questions to Unamuno.  He cannot verify experiences in his mind 
by way of some principle outside of that mind.  So the only reassurance comes in the faith that the 
world is meaningful.   There is no human principle that can prove the validity of a reading of a text 
or a view of the world.  We need quixotic faith that our reading of the world accords with the world 
as it is: ʻ¡La vida es sueño!  ¿Será acaso también sueño, Dios mío, este tu Universo de que eres la 
Conciencia eterna e infinita?, ¿será un sueño tuyo?, ¿será que nos estás soñando?…ʼ (521).  
 
Borges’s discussions of the Quijote often compare textual production to dreaming. That nuance of 
the term ʻdreamingʼ exists in Unamuno.  Dreams are passive: they exist within the mind of the 
dreamer, but are not actively authored by them.  Cervantes can be said to have ʻdreamtʼ the Quijote 
far from having authored it, because the text is more than the result of an individual person’s thought.  
Hence the statement, rejected by critics such as Close, that Cide Hamete Benengeli is no mere literary 
device: 
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No cabe duda sino que en El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha que compuso 
Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra se mostró éste muy por encima de lo que podríamos esperar 
de él juzgándole por sus otras obras; se sobrepujó con mucho a sí mismo.  Por lo cual es de 
creer que el historiador arábigo Cide Hamete Benengeli no es puro recurso literario, sino 
que encubre una profunda verdad, cual es la de que esa historia se la dictó a Cervantes otro 
que llevaba dentro de sí, y al que ni antes ni después de haberla escrito, trató una vez más: 
un espíritu que en las profundidades de su alma habitaba. (524 - emphasis in original) 
 
Dreams exemplify authorship as Unamuno knows it.  No author has sole responsibility for their work, 
as a work is produced within a literary tradition.  Cide Hamete Benengeli could never have existed 
without the faux-historicity of chivalric texts such as Amadís de Gaula which promise a report of 
events witnessed first-hand.  The unreliable pre-narrator allows the novel to play many of the 
narrative tricks which have been convenient to Unamuno’s analysis, including the deferrals of 
authority from Cervantes which Unamuno co-opts in order to justify a non-intentionalist reading.  So  
it is unwise to read the claim literally.51 Benengeli’s presence in the work is crucial to its success, 
 and to demonstrating how Cervantes’s relationship with his literary milieu prevents an author-centric 
reading.  The author simply internalises the works in his cultural framework, carries them dentro de 
sí, reforms them into a broad horizon of expectations from which they passively produce literature.  
The horizon of expectations is formative to the text as it is authored and the text as it is read.  Just 
like Benengeli is the kernel of a literary work that appears to Cervantes in his readings of chivalric 
literature, Sancho and Quijote now appear to Unamuno, he develops a profound understanding of the 
characters in his reading of the novel, and they become part of the framework according to which 
Unamuno receives literature: ‘Y aun llego a sospechar que mientras he estado explicando y 
comentando esta vida, me han visitado secretamente Don Quijote y Sancho, y aun yo sin saberlo, me 
han desplegado y descubierto las entretelas de sus corazonesʼ (524-525 - emphasis in original).  
Unamuno warns us against taking an author to be a persona real y verdadera while taking their works 
to be the stuff of pure fantasy, arguing instead for the converse (525).  Texts influence reading far 
                                               
51 Though as Ugarte shows, doing so produces an interesting textual effect: ʻ¿Podrá algún día la 
investigación literaria descubrir, Dios sabe en qué rincón de los archivos de la Mancha, la existencia 
física de los héroes cervantinos?  ¿O acaso demostrar documentalmente que Cide Hamete Benenjeli 
[sic] fué un historiador arábigo de carne y hueso y no un recurso literario que utilizó Cervantes?ʼ 
(Ugarte 1951: 18).  Does entertaining the thought that Benengeli truly existed not transform the 
aesthetic experience of reading the text?   
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more than authors can.52  That view requires an undying faith in the power of the individual mind to 
discover objective meaning in a world that might be nothing other than a fiction.  That faith is 
embodied in don Quijote: 
 
No puede contar tu vida, ni puede explicarla ni comentarla, señor mío Don Quijote, sino quién 
esté tocado de tu misma locura de no morir.  Intercede, pues, en favor mío, ¡oh mi señor y 
patrón!, para que tu Dulcinea del Toboso, ya desencantada merced a los azotes de tu Sancho, 
me lleve de la mano a la inmortalidad del nombre y de la fama.  Y si es la vida sueño, ¡déjame 
soñarla inacabablemente! (527) 
 
The desire to live on is the aesthetic principle that validates a reading.  It relies on a faith that the 
world exists, and that the individual mind is capable of discovering truth in it.  If we believe in our 
view of the world, then we can impose an ideal onto it, and live on in some material sense after our 
physical bodies expire.  Or as Unamuno puts it in Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, we can supersede 
ʻlo que el mundo esʼ with ʻlo que queremos que seaʼ.53  If we believe in our view of the text and are 
inspired to act upon those views, then we take part in a literary tradition in which our names will live 
on as a link in a great causal chain of authorship and reception.  Unamuno collapses the boundary 
between word and world, between text and deed. Quixotic faith is the ultimate aesthetic and 
metaphysical principle, which assures us of life-giving eternal renown.  That faith relies on 
approaching the world and the text with the same faith in the meanings our minds find there. 
 
IV.5 The tragic sense of life 
 
By his 1912 ʻDon Quijote en la tragicomedia europea contemporáneaʼ, the concluding instalment of 
                                               
52 This echoes Ribas’s point that Unamuno makes an anti-Platonic statement which reverses the 
normal rules of cause and effect: ʻHay más gente que conoce a Don Quijote que a Cervantes.  Don 
Quijote es algo así como un símbolo universal, que ha tenido repercusiones en la literatura, en la 
pintura, en la música, etc.  Es decir, ha tenido efectos, ha operado.  Desde la perspectiva de la 
efectividad histórica, de los efectos a que ha dado lugar, Don Quijote está por encima de Cervantes.ʼ 
(Ribas 2002: 77) 
53 Vicén has also drawn this comparison between Vida de don Quijote y Sancho and Del sentimiento 
trágico de la vida: ʻSus aventuras y hazañas son símbolo del afán del hombre por vencer su destino 
más inexorable, impulso apasionado contra la certeza que nos habla del fin nuestro y del fin de todo 
robándonos así la fe en el sentido del mundo y de la vida.  La ʻlocuraʼ es para Don Quijote la 
revelación del problema fundamental de la existencia humanaʼ (Vicén 1947: 204). 
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Del sentimiento trágico de la vida,54 Unamuno has taken to referring to the hidalgo as ʻNuestro Señor 
Don Quijoteʼ.  The essay contains a series of comments on reading, authorship and anticipates 
Borges’s later ʻKafka y sus precursoresʼ by proposing that contemporary literature can be the lens 
through which to view preceding literary works. He applies this internationalist, anachronistic 
approach to the Quijote: 
 
Muy pocos años después de haber andado Nuestro Señor Don Quijote por España, decíanos 
Jacobo Boehme, (Aurora, cap. XI, §75), que no escribía una historia que le hubiesen contado 
otros, sino que tenía que estar él mismo en la batalla, y en ella en gran pelea, donde a menudo 
tenía que ser vencido como todos los hombres, y más adelante (§83) añade que aunque tenga 
que hacerse espectáculo del mundo y del demonio, le queda la esperanza en Dios sobre la vida 
futura, en quien quiere arriesgarla y no resistir al Espíritu.  Amén.  Y tampoco yo, como este 
Quijote del pensamiento alemán, quiero resistir al Espíritu. (2007: 303) 
 
The possessive ʻNuestroʼ functions similarly to the repeated ʻmiʼ in Don Sandalio; the narrator is 
interested only in telling the story of ʻmi Don Sandalioʼ, and admonishes the reader that if they want 
the story of the Don Sandalio then they must write it themselves.  ʻ Nuestro Don Quijoteʼ is our version 
of him.  A Spanish reader cannot claim to have an authoritative view of the character, because their 
interpretation is determined by cultural and historical circumstances.  Aurora, which was published 
in incomplete form in 1612, arose after the first volume of the Quijote, and becomes a rewrite of the 
Quijote from a German linguistic and cultural perspective.  It therefore adds itself to a possibly infinite 
number of Quijotes and can retrospectively alter our interpretation of that text.  Equally, Goethe’s 
Faust can retrospectively ʻdiscoverʼ Marlowe.  Marlowe’s 1604 Doctor Faustus ʻes ya el mismo que 
volverá a descubrir Goethe, aunque en ciertos respectos más espontáneo y más frescoʼ (305). 
Unamuno talks of literature in similar terms to Borges, who believes in renovating a text by attributing 
it to an author in another time and place.  The copy is superior to the original much as Menard’s 
Quijote is superior to Cervantes’s. 
 
Unamuno’s descriptions of literary and scientific progress make me suspicious of the claim by critics 
such as Otero (1967: 173) that Unamuno has turned wholly against Europeanisation at this stage.  Del 
                                               
54 The collection channels many of the same philosophical discussions as Vida. ʻEl hambre de 
inmortalidadʼ seeks a response to his inevitable mortality; ʻLa disolución racionalʼ argues that 
scepticism is the natural by-product of rational investigations; ʻEl problema prácticoʼ argues for a 
moral system where one ego exerts itself over another, in an attempt to make itself irreplaceable, 
insustituible.   
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sentimiento trágico de la vida nuances without negating Unamuno’s earlier comments on Spain’s 
relationship to Europe.  Europeanisation brought with it the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the 
Inquisition which took ridicule as its weapon.  It seems to me that Unamuno still values open cultural 
borders provided that Spain imposes itself onto the rest of the world as vice versa: ʻLos progresos 
suelen venir del bárbaroʼ (Unamuno 2007: 307) is hardly a statement of cultural isolationism.  The 
use of Italian, German and French sources to support arguments in this chapter would also torpedo 
any argument of anti-European intellectual seclusion.  As such Quijote remains a symbol of cultural 
and intellectual openness, the kind of cosmopolitanism he mentioned in En torno al casticismo: ʻY 
es aquí donde tengo que acogerme a mi señor Don Quijote para aprender a afrontar el ridículo y 
vencerlo, y un ridículo que acaso —¿quién sabe?— él no conocióʼ (307). 
 
Unamuno instructs his reader to embrace the limitations of their horizon of expectations.  The 
Spanish, he argues, do not have a scientific spirit, but in fact obey an intellectual principle shared by 
no others (310).  But Spanish intellectual culture must open itself to alternative methods of thinking, 
and must aggressively export itself:  
 
La razón ha de ser nuestra arma.  Lo es hasta del loco.  Nuestro loco sublime, nuestro modelo, 
Don Quijote, después que destrozó de dos cuchilladas aquella a modo de media celada que 
encajó con el morrión, ʻ la tornó a hacer de nuevo, poniéndole unas barras de hierro por dentro, 
de tal manera que él quedó satisfecho de su fortaleza, y sin querer hacer nueva experiencia 
della la diputó y tuvo por celada finísima de encajeʼ.  Y con ella la cabeza se inmortalizó.  Es 
decir, se puso en ridículo.  Pues fue poniéndose en ridículo como alcanzó su inmortalidad Don 
Quijote. (310) 
 
Quijote resists intellectual hegemony.  The ridicule of others blinded them to the moral goodness in 
his deeds.  Ridicule is faced only by those who present a countercurrent to accepted models of 
thinking.  So Spain must produce culture in spite of all intellectual superciliousness from outside.  
For this is how the Quijote came into being: ʻCarducci […] dejó escrito (en Mosche cochiere) que 
ʻhasta España, que jamás tuvo hegemonía de pensamiento, tuvo su Cervantes.ʼ ¿Pero es que 
Cervantes se dio aquí solo, aislado, sin raíces, sin tronco, sin apoyo?ʼ (310).  Spanish literature hit its 
zenith due to the creative minds of non-Spanish writers.  In fact, Spanish and non-Spanish readings 
of the work are just as valid as each other, for a text is simply a sum of all of its possible acceptable 
readings.  It is the impossible, never-ending task of human minds to catalogue all of those possible 
readings: ʻ El fin del hombre es hacer ciencia, catalogar el Universo para devolvérselo a Dios en orden, 
como escribí hace unos años, en mi novela Amor y pedagogíaʼ (312).  Humanity can tend only to the 
end of intellectual history when engaged in a cosmopolitan cultural exchange. 
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Having confessed to an apostasy in writing ʻ¡Muera Don Quijote!ʼ in 1898,55 Unamuno explains his 
motivations for writing Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho seven years on: 
 
Escribí aquel libro para repensar el Quijote contra cervantistas y eruditos, para hacer obra de 
vida de lo que era y sigue siendo para los más letra muerta.  ¿Qué me importa lo que Cervantes 
quiso no quiso poner allí y lo que realmente puso?  Lo vivo es lo que yo allí descubro, 
pusiéralo o no Cervantes, lo que yo allí pongo y sobre pongo y sotopongo, yo lo que ponemos 
allí todos.  Quise allí rastrear nuestra filosofía. (312 - my emphasis) 
 
When a reader accepts the role of literary agonista, they enliven the text, and realise meanings within 
it.  Also, while it is possible to take the text as if it were a mere aesthetic event — as Cervantes wished 
— Unamuno asks his reader to interpret Spanish literary texts on the assumption that they contain a 
set of philosophical meanings, not deliberately woven into narrative by an author, but which are 
nonetheless present because an author situated in an eternal philosophical and literary tradition will 
inevitably produce literature bearing traces of that tradition: 
 
Pues abrigo cada vez más la convicción de que nuestra filosofía, la filosofía española, está 
líquida y difusa en nuestra literatura, en nuestra vida, en nuestra acción, en nuestra mística, 
sobre todo, y no en sistemas filosóficos.  Es concreta.  ¿Y es que acaso no hay en Goethe, 
verbigracia, tanta o más filosofía que en Hegel?  Las coplas de Jorge Manrique, el Romancero, 
el Quijote, La vida es sueño, la Subida al Monte Carmelo, implican una intuición del mundo 
y un concepto de la vida Weltanschauung und Labensansicht [sic].  Filosofía esta nuestra que 
era difícil de formularse en esa segunda mitad del siglo XIX, época afilosófica, positivista, 
tecnicista, de pura historia y de ciencias naturales, época en el fondo materialista y pesimista. 
(313) 
 
Unamuno responds to the implicit complaint that Spain has not produced philosophy as much of 
continental Europe has.  The best philosophy, says Unamuno, is produced passively, automatically, 
non-intentionally.  The reader’s task is to look for the meaning that is produced without the author 
willing it into the text.  So the reader is not just asked, as Iser argued, to fill the lacunas in the text 
according to their creative faculties, but to fill lacunas in an entire literary tradition.  Given a lack of 
philosophical production since the mid 19th Century, a Spanish reader is required to read 
                                               
55 Just one example of the regenerationist literature that Unamuno believes caused, and was not 
caused by, the loss of the last of the Spanish colonies.  
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philosophical implications into the Spanish literary canon.  The reader’s role is to discover the 
possible philosophical discourses at the time of authoring.  That search for the Spanish philosophy in 
Spanish literature is exemplified in ʻPierre Menard’sʼ comparison between two versions of the same 
section of the Quijote, where the philosophical implication of the text is given by the extant 
ideological frameworks at the moment of writing.  It also recalls Jauß’s idea that a text is ʻan 
orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the 
material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existenceʼ (Jauß 1982: 21).  If a reader can 
discover the differing philosophical resonances at the moment of writing and compare them to those 
at the moment of reading — exactly as the narrator of ʻ Pierre Menardʼ does — then they will naturally 
discover the intra-historic Spanish philosophical discourse hidden beneath the surface of Spanish 
literature. 
 
Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote is not constitutive of a whole philosophy, but opens the doors to 
philosophical discourse through literature.  Quijotismo — reading without allowing ourselves to be 
constrained by literary expectations of others — is the method for discovering philosophy.   
 
Unamuno’s description of Quijote’s world-oriented idealism (or ‘espiritualismo’, as he terms it) could 
equally be applied to the conflict between prosaic and poetic readings of the text: 
 
Aparéceseme la filosofía en el alma de mi pueblo como la expresión de una tragedia íntima 
análoga a la tragedia del alma de Don Quijote, como la expresión de una lucha entre lo que el 
mundo es, según la razón de la ciencia nos lo muestra, y lo que queremos que sea, según la fe 
de nuestra religión nos lo dice. (322) 
 
A philosophy of imposing an ideal onto the world as it ought to be must include reader-centric 
interpretations of texts.  There is little distinction between the world and ideas, just as Quijote could 
not distinguish between them: ʻsé que todo el que pelea por un ideal cualquiera, aunque parezca del 
pasado, empuja el mundo al porvenirʼ (323).  So that kind of interpretive anarchism aims to be a 
motor of history.  Though the author does not argue for a distinct political position, but a method for 
bringing about the best possible world.  It is the role of all of us to convert our spiritual ideology into 
material effects.  As such, Unamuno’s readings of the Quijote have become politically ambivalent, 
and as I will argue in the final chapter, dangerously so.  For don Quijote ʻse ha dejado a sí mismo, y 
que un hombre, un hombre vivo y eterno, vale por todas las teorías y por todas las filosofíasʼ (324). 
 
Quijotismo is the practice of justifying our worldview despite the ridicule of others.  It does not fall 
along ideological lines, but represents something more abstract: ʻ¡el quijotismo, y no es poco!  Todo 
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un método, toda una epistemología, toda una estética, toda una lógica, toda una ética, toda una religión 
sobre todo, es decir, toda una economía a lo eterno y lo divino, toda una esperanza en lo absurdo 
racionalʼ (325).  Quixotic faith in one’s own perspective represents the salvation of the individual, 
and the society those individuals inhabit.  Don Quijote is reduced to an archetype by which to live.  
There are other versions of him, some preceding him, including Savonarola, ʻ Quijote italiano de fines 
del siglo XVʼ who battles against the tenets of modernity inaugurated by Machiavelli.  All of these 
Quijotes are united by a common human thread, a shared philosophy, despite their cultural and 
temporal distance. ʻDon Quijoteʼ no longer refers to a literary character but a spiritual idealism which 
unites the greatest thinkers in human history, from Jesus Christ, to Galileo, to Santa Teresa: 
 
¿Cuál es, pues, la nueva misión de Don Quijote hoy en este mundo?  Clamar, clamar en el 
desierto.  Pero el desierto oye, aunque no oigan los hombres, y un día se convertirá en selva 
sonora, y esa voz solitaria que va posando en el desierto como semilla, dará un cedro 
gigantesco que con sus cien mil lenguas cantará un hosanna eterno al Señor de la vida y de la 
muerte. (329) 
 
The reader must become the quixotic and Christ-like voice calling in the desert.  Stephen Roberts 
argues that all of Del sentimiento trágico de la vida’s commentaries on human life are viewed through 
a quixotic lens:  
 
Y esta identificación entre Unamuno y Don Quijote sirve también para confirmar 
retrospectivamente que todos los aspectos de la vida humana que han sido analizados en esta 
obra —desde el modo de conocer el mundo hasta la moral de la imposición y dominación 
mutuas—son aspectos también de la vida y del quehacer del intelectual quijotesco 
unamuniano. (Roberts 2013: 122)  
 
That is, quijotismo is the method by which the philosophical investigations of Del sentimiento trágico 
can be put into practice. When, for example, Unamuno argues in ʻLa disolución racionalʼ that 
materialism ʻno quiere decir para nosotros otra cosa que la doctrina que niega la inmortalidad del 
alma individual, la persistencia de la conciencia personal después de la muerteʼ (Unamuno 2007: 
120), he recommends a philosophy combining trends from idealism and voluntarism that are 
exemplified in don Quijote’s romantic worldview.  The human consciousness persists only when it 
has made itself irreplaceable, or insustituible as he says in ʻEl problema prácticoʼ (276).  In my view, 
the kernel of quijotismo common to all of these statements is, when applied to the world, what we 
might call idealism; when applied to a text, what we might call non-intentionalism.  Non-
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intentionalism is the recommended reading method for the Unamunian quijotista who wishes to 
become an irreplaceable part of the world they inhabit. 
 
Few of us can ever become a Quijote and dream the dream of life in eternal renown.  But for our own 
sake, and that of others, we must become the idealist reader, and convert ideas into action, for ideas 
themselves are not redemptive: 
 
Y vosotros, ahora, bachilleres Carrascos56 del regeneracionismo europeizante […] haced 
riqueza, haced patria, haced arte, haced ciencia, haced ética, haced o más bien traducid sobre 
todo Kultura, que así mataréis a la vida y a la muerte.  ¡Para lo que ha de durarnos todos! 
(329) 
 
Ideology turned action is the only defence against the tragic sense of life, against the finitude of our 
physical bodies.  That relies on a divine faith in the rectitude of our own thoughts, and a willingness 
to declare them in the face of dissent.  In this chapter I have shown that non-intentionalist readings 
strongly underly what Unamuno terms quijotismo.  What literary theorists would later refer to as 
reader-response is a cornerstone of the spiritualist, idealist and voluntarist philosophy of personal 
salvation and historical progress that he expounds in some of his most significant essays.  In my final 
chapter, where I will compare Unamuno’s quijotismo with Borges’s attribution of the Quijote to an 
invented author, I will argue that the political ambivalence of Unamuno’s quijotismo violates the 
Cervantine principle that a reader must not be moved to ill deeds, and that the ethical permutations 








                                               
56 Stephen Roberts considers this a swipe at Ortega y Gasset, who had turned against Unamuno’s 
metaphysical enquiries and begun to mischaracterise him as anti-European (Roberts 2013: 122). 
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V. Borges, reader of Cervantes 
 
Si las páginas de este libro consienten algún verso feliz, perdóneme el lector la descortesía 
de haberlo usurpado yo, previamente.  Nuestras nadas poco difieren; es trivial y fortuita la 
circunstancia de que seas tú el lector de estos ejercicios, y yo su redactor. 
 
—Borges, Fervor de Buenos Aires 
 
Borges’s affinity to the Quijote is extremely well documented.  The anecdote of having read the novel 
in English first, and then finding the Spanish original to be a poor translation unfaithful to it is a 
perfect emblem of his career-long treatment of Cervantes’s masterpiece.  The Quijote, a text that 
gleefully subverts the author’s monolithic status, and which does not prescribe a straightforward 
interpretation, is a convenient text to a writer for whom the nature of authorship was a source of 
curiosity.  The text becomes a canvas onto which he paints many of his inquiries into the possibility 
of literary originality, and the author’s and reader’s ability to determine the meaning of the literary 
work.  These are ideas common to most of his major works on the Quijote, and which would be of 
clear interest to theorists from Barthes to Jauß, Fish and Iser.   
 
It is beyond my scope to engage with every single major work Borges produced on Cervantes.  
Teodosio Fernández has successfully provided an overview of all of Borges’s works on the novel, of 
which I will contend with a small number.  His 2006 ‘“El Quijote” en Hispanoamérica’, to which I 
am indebted, provides a thorough overview of Borges’s explicit dealings with Cervantes.  
Importantly, he demonstrates that Borges’s interest in the Quijote is not purely theoretical.  Borges’s 
earlier work concerned itself with the novel’s style, and argued in his 1928 ‘La conducta novelística 
de Cervantes’ that its greatest success was the characterisation of its protagonist.  His 1933 ‘Una 
sentencia del Quijote’ sees in Quijote’s liberation of the galley slaves a cultural affinity between 
Argentina and Spain: ‘Siempre he sabido que esas tan decentes palabras eran un secreto que los 
hombres de nuestra América sólo podemos compartir con los hombres de España’ (Borges 2001: 65). 
It would be simplistic to argue that Borges sees in it only an aesthetics of readership.  I am therefore 
careful not to make sweeping generalisations about Borges’s view of the work.  My discussion will 
limit itself to a selection of works that lend themselves to a reader-response analysis, in order to show 
that some of Borges’s works on the Quijote demonstrate an aesthetics of reading that positions him 
within more contemporary theoretical trends.   
 
Taking the major works I have identified in a chronology, I will demonstrate the variety of ways in 
which the Quijote aided Borges’s investigations into the role of the reader in the discovery of 
   104 
meaning.  The critic Sergio Missana argued in his ‘Borges, lector del Quijote’ that Borges’s readings 
of the novel lend themselves to that kind of theorisation.  He argued that ‘Pierre Menard’: ‘desborda 
el tema del Quijote, lo toma como punto de partido para elaborar una teoría general de la lectura y de 
la escritura’ (Missana 1998: 61).  He also highlighted the viability of a future study on the relationship 
between Menard’s rewriting and the literary theories of Jauß and Iser (66).  This thesis will fill that 
lacuna by using the theories of Jauß and Iser, as well as Fish and Barthes, to identify a general theory 
of writing and reception across many of Borges’s works on the Quijote. 
 
I will begin with a brief comment on some of Borges’s earlier essays on reading and authorship, 
including ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ which credits wider literary tradition with the creation of some 
of the meaning of a text, and ‘La fruición literaria’ which explores the relevance of attribution to 
Borges’s aesthetics of reading.  I will also make note of some of Borges’s commentaries on 
Unamuno’s cervantine works, which speak to a shared method for reading the Quijote which brings 
them to strongly contrasting interpretations of it.  Contextualising Borges’s works on the Quijote  
within his wider aesthetics will allow for a clearer focus on the complexities of ‘Pierre Menard, autor 
del Quijote’ where the textual meaning is produced when author’s horizon of expectations meets the 
reader’s.  
 
Later texts have been specifically chosen both to allow for a comparison with Unamuno, and for their 
relevance to the literary theories that I have broadly termed reader-centrism.  His works in El hacedor 
show how both reading and authorship are a passive process guided on an unconscious level by the 
individual’s system of cultural references.  In the fourth major section of this chapter, I will discuss 
the ways in which Borges collapses the metaphysical boundaries between reader, author and text in 
works such as ‘Magias parciales del Quijote’ and ‘Sueña Alonso Quijano’.  I will demonstrate that 
the metaphysical game that Borges plays in those works aligns with an aesthetics of reading that 
broadly aligns with branches of reader-centrism, including Iser’s ‘effect theory’ which posits that a 
text’s meaning is determined by the effect that it exerts on the reader, as well as Jauß’s view that 
interpretation is restricted by the reader’s historical circumstances and cultural knowledge.  I will 
argue that the image of the dream in Borges’s work — which is also fundamental to Unamuno’s work 
on the Quijote — communicates profitably with many contemporary theories on reader-response.  
This will allow for a comparison between the complex systems of reading and authorship that 
Unamuno and Borges set out in their works on a novel which itself complicates those two poles. 
 
Though Borges dedicated significantly less page space to the Quijote across his career than Unamuno 
did, we must still be selective.  I have chosen a set of texts that deal with specifically the authorship 
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and re-authorship of the Quijote,57 as well as his famous essay ‘Magias parciales del Quijote’ which 
helps to explain the aesthetic nuances of some of Borges’s work on the novel.  Pierre Menard carries 
out a rewriting in the most literal sense, reproducing the same text from a different historical 
perspective.  In El hacedor, Borges explores the role of literary tradition in the creation and reception 
of the work.  He also posits a previously undiscovered chapter of the Quijote, thematically discordant 
with the rest of the novel, in an exploration of the specific process of reading, where the reader 
assimilates each moment in the text, forming the horizon of expectations by which every subsequent 
moment in the text is interpreted.  In his later work on the Quijote, Borges poeticises the novel.  In 
those rewritings he proposes that the relationship between author and text is the same as that between 
the dreamer and the dream: the text is created in a passive sense by the individual mind.  The dreamer 
cannot dream, and the author cannot author, what their circumstances do not allow them to.  I will 
not focus on the act of transferring the novel into a poetic mode per se, but investigate how these 
specific works theorise a complex relationship between author, reader, and text, where none has 
ultimate authority to determine meaning.   
 
V.1 The early Borges 
 
By the publication of Borges’s first book, Fervor de Buenos Aires in 1923, the Cervantine influence 
on him is obvious.  A 24-year-old Borges’s first major contribution to the world of letters prefaced 
itself in the Cervantine style with a direct address to its reader, apologising in advance should the text 
prescribe a reading unintended by the author.  Like Cervantes in the prologue to his Quijote, Borges 
refuses to prescribe any interpretation to his reader.58  For the role of the author and the role of the 
reader cannot be simply extricated from each other; it is mere circumstance that places them on either 
side of an arbitrary divide.  Neither the reader or author may prescribe the meaning of a work; they 
can only view it from their particular horizon of expectations and read into the text a personal 
meaning.  The introduction to Fervor de Buenos Aires is a microcosm of the relevance of modern 
reception theory when interrogating Borges’s reading of the literary work he returns to most across 
                                               
57 For this reason, his ‘Análisis del último capítulo del Quijote’ will not form a major part of my 
analysis, despite his admission that he was inspired to take on that analysis by Unamuno’s Vida de 
Don Quijote y Sancho.  I am not interested in Borges’s analysis of the novel per se, rather in how the 
novel provides him with a useful model by which to construct a complicated aesthetics of authorship 
and reading.   
58 In fact, in Las versiones homéricas he admits that the famous opening line to the Quijote might 
have meant little to Cervantes.  ‘Yo, en cambio, no podré sino repudiar cualquier divergencia.  El 
Quijote, debido a mi ejercicio congénito del español, es un monumento uniforme’ (OC I: 240). 
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the course of his literary career.  The reader is intellectually alone, and cannot rely on a declared 
intention from the author to guide their interpretation. The author in Borges has, as throughout most 
of Unamuno’s fictions, no authority to declare the sum of meanings in their work.   
 
It is interesting and presumably not incidental that Borges makes this point by borrowing the self-
effacing technique of Cervantes’s prologues.  The non-intentionalist method recommended by Borges 
as early as 1923 reaches its apex in his 1939 ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, the most perfect 
expression of a model which conflates the act of writing with that of reading.  It is the logical extreme 
of many of the ideas expounded in some of Borges’s literary investigations.  Some of these 
investigations not only justify reading Borges from the perspective of reader-based reception theory, 
but also demonstrate a strong affinity to Unamuno.  One example is ‘La flor de Coleridge’, published 
as part of Otras inquisiciones in 1952, which posits that literature is perpetuated throughout time by 
an endless human spirit.59  The sense that literature begets literature in an endless chain of reception 
and repetition, relegates authors to a footnote in the history of letters:  
 
La historia de la literatura no debería ser la historia de los autores y de los accidentes de su 
carrera de sus obras sino la Historia del Espíritu como productor o consumidor de literatura.  
Esa historia podría llevarse a término sin mencionar un solo escritor. (OC I: 161).   
 
The unimportance of great authors in the history of literature has an obvious relevance to Unamuno’s 
system of intrahistoria, which presents great men as the consequence of history, rather than vice 
versa.  Authors are as incidental to Borges as history’s great men are to Unamuno.  And great authors 
are simply a product of the literary tastes of their readership: ‘Detrás de la invención de Coleridge 
está la general y antigua invención de las generaciones de amantes que pidieron como prenda una 
flor’ (162).  Paradoxically, reading is the mother of literary invention.  Generations of readers beget 
new generations of readers, which provides new, valid readings.  
 
‘La fruición literaria’, published in El idioma de los argentinos in 1928 provides a useful framework 
for reading ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  It distinguishes between plagiarism and invention, a 
distinction that the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ is at pains to make (Borges 2008: 93).  It also denies 
the possibility of a total understanding of any given work: ‘Tus libros preferidos, lector, son como 
borradores de ese libro sin lectura final’ (94).  This implies that there exist possibly infinite valid 
readings which are decided purely by the circumstance in which the text is read.  But there also 
                                               
59 Borges makes this point by citing a 1938 work by Paul Valéry.  It does not seem incidental that 
works on Valéry appear in Menard’s bibliography published in 1939. 
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follows a comment that requires us to qualify Borges’s non-intentionalist method.  Where Unamuno 
was an extreme non-intentionalist, seeing little interpretive use for the author at the moment of 
reception, Borges proposes that the identity of the author has a hermeneutic relevance.  As he puts it, 
‘¿Cómo admirar los sonetos de Juan Boscán, si no sabemos que fueron los primeros de que adoleció 
nuestro idioma?’ (94).  The historical circumstance at the moment of writing, experienced by the 
author, is informative to reading.  And the interaction between the moment of reading and the moment 
of reception is the process by which meaning is produced in the text, as the narrator implies in ‘Pierre 
Menard’.  This distances Borges’s view of literature somewhat from Unamuno’s; the latter proposes 
that meaning can only be produced when the author does not concern us, whereas the former argues 
that meaning is produced by a synthesis of the author’s circumstances with the reader’s expectations.  
 
A fundamental argument of ‘Pierre Menard’ is that attributing the same text to different authors 
necessarily alters the meaning of the words on the page.  As Borges explains in ‘La fruición literaria’, 
the sentence, ‘El incendio, con feroces mandíbulas, devora el campo’ (94 - emphasis in original) must 
be read differently according to the source: ‘Esta locución ¿es condenable o es lícita?  Yo afirmo que 
eso depende solamente de quien la forjó, y no es paradoja’ (94).  ‘Pierre Menard’ ascribes some 
textual meaning to the author’s identity.  It also explores the ways the meaning of the text can change 
according to the source.  Should we ascribe the above quote to one of Borges’s contemporaries in 
Buenos Aires, ‘Ahora es vulgarísima tarea la de hacer metáforas’ (95) whereas, were this a verse of 
Oriental poetry, ‘Yo pensaré: Todo se les vuelve dragón a los chinos y me representaré un incendio 
claro como una fiesta y serpeando, y me gustará […] Ese concepto de un fuego con mandíbulas es 
realmente de pesadilla, de horror y añade malignidad humana a un hecho inconsciente’ (95).  Borges 
takes the author’s presumed horizon of expectations into account.60  The difficulty of such a method 
is that his view of what constitutes the horizon of expectations of another can only be given to him 
through his own61.  As such this attribution of the text to various different authors can still be said to 
                                               
60 Missana notes that confluence between Borges and Cervantes: ‘Si al menos en teoría la tesis de 
Borges debería funcionar en dos sentidos, el proceso se intensifica por la naturaleza misma del texto 
cervantino, su inasibilidad, su ironía, de modo que ocurre también al revés: la lectura del Quijote 
modifica la obra de Borges’ (Missana 1998: 76). In other words, Borges’s daring rewritings of the 
Quijote are only as daring as the original text has allowed him to be.  His narrative experiments are 
commensurate with the ludic narrative mode of the Quijote, which denies its own authorship. 
61 Edward Lane, one of the translators of The 1001 Nights, exemplifies this difficulty.  Despite living 
five years in Cairo, no amount of exposure to Egyptian culture or literary discourse could bring him 
to forget his British propensity towards modesty when translating (OC I: 398-399).  He could not 
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be a form of non-intentionalism where only the reader can form the meaning of the work.  As in 
‘Pierre Menard’, reading for Borges is a synthesis of what the author could have conceived of in their 
time and place, together with the literary expectations of the reader.   
 
Here he also highlights how the temporal distancing between writing and reception form 
interpretation.  In a move familiar to readers of ‘Pierre Menard’, he cites the opening verse of 
Cervantes’s Al túmulo del Rey Felipe II en Sevilla: ‘¡Vive Dios, que me espanta esta grandeza!’ (96). 
This kind of locution was generally accepted, says Borges, in Cervantes’s time, but ‘Nosotros lo 
vemos firme y garifo.  El tiempo — amigo de Cervantes — ha sabido corregirle las pruebas’ (97). 
The force of time has imbued new meaning into Cervantes’s work.  Jauß theorised precisely this idea 
in 1982: 
 
A literary work is not an object that stands by itself and offers the same view to each reader 
in each period.  It is not a monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence.  It is 
much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that 
frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence. (Jauß 
1982: 21) 
 
The meaning internal to the text is formed to a large extent by historical events external to it.  This is 
the central argument of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’: the attribution of the same text to authors 
in different historical circumstances produces meaning in the work.  To the same extent, reading old 
works in new historical circumstances will cause the work to strike ever new resonances among its 
readers.   
 
‘Kafka y sus precursores’, also published within Otras inquisiciones, represents an affinity between 
Borges’s literary essays and much of later reception theory. Borges argues that reading 
anachronistically is intellectually valid.  For after having read some of the works of Kafka, ‘creí 
reconocer su voz, o sus hábitos, en textos de diversas literaturas y de diversas épocas’ (279).  One 
Kafkaesque resonance can be found in Antiquity, as Zeno’s Paradox has the form of Kafka’s novel 
Das Schloss.  Kafka has not just added something modern to ancient thought.  It is also the case that 
Kafka’s works have integrated themselves into Borges’s cultural framework, or to use the Jaußian 
term, his horizon of expectations.  Borges cannot but read the works of Zeno from a Kafkaesque 
perspective.  This appears to violate the most natural method: reading Kafka as a recipient of Zeno.  
                                               
truly escape the influence of his original cultural circumstances, through which all of his cultural 
experiences are filtered. 
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However, reader-response theory provides for a reading of this kind.  Fish’s ‘Is there a text in this 
class?’ argues that valid models of reading, or ‘interpretive strategies’ are subject to constant 
invention: ‘A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of opposition to 
the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) from which it can 
emerge into respectability’ (Fish 1980: 349).  When Kafka produces literature, he provides his reader 
with new interpretive strategies by placing himself in a relationship with and opposition to pre-
existing works of literature.  The argument is also in keeping with Jauß’s idea on the way in which 
horizons of expectations are updated throughout history: 
 
Only as the horizon changes and expands with each subsequent historical materialisation, do 
responses to the work legitimise particular possibilities of understanding, imitation, 
transformation, and continuation — in short, structures of exemplary character that condition 
the process of the formation of literary tradition. (Jauß 1982: 64) 
 
As time advances, new texts enter into the horizon of expectations of readers.  Jauß’s theoretical 
approach therefore provides a basis for the anachronism of Borges’s statement on Kafka, and his 
reading of Cervantes through an invented author in his 1939 ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.  Here 
I am in fact borrowing that method, and reading ‘Pierre Menard’ through the lens of later works, 
including ‘Kafka y sus precursores’, as well as later literary theory.  ‘Pierre Menard’ itself practises 
that method, re-reading the Quijote from a new historical lens, reducing to glib aphorism many of the 
hidalgo’s grander pronouncements in Cervantes’s version, as the progress of history has invested 
them with greater meaning and more serious resonances.  Moreover, in a comparative thesis such as 
this I cannot avoid reading Unamuno to some extent through a Borgesian lens.  Unamuno is part of 
Borges’s horizon of expectations when revisiting the Quijote.  The obvious affinities between 
Unamuno’s and Borges’s works on the Quijote might be an inevitable consequence of Borges’s 
having read the works of his literary forebear, and need not be read as a deliberate homage to or 
commentary on Unamuno.   
 
The year after Unamuno’s death, Borges published a tribute to his counterpart in Sur.  ‘Inmortalidad 
de Unamuno’ credits Unamuno with having updated the framework of literary discourse: 
 
Este [Unamuno] fue, ante todo, un inventor de espléndidas discusiones. Discutió el yo, la 
inmortalidad, el idioma, el culto de Cervantes, la fe, la regeneración del vocabulario y de la 
sintaxis, la sobra de individualidad y falta de personalidad de los españoles, el humorismo, el 
malhumorismo, la ética […] El primer escritor de nuestro idioma acaba de morir; no sé de un 
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homenaje mejor que proseguir las ricas discusiones iniciadas por él y que desentrañar las 
secretas leyes de su alma. (Borges 1999: 144) 
 
It is not clear that all of Borges’s writings on Cervantes deliberately communicate with those of 
Unamuno.  It is however interesting to note that Borges admires Unamuno, among other reasons, for 
disputing the tendency among readers to venerate Cervantes.  Unamuno may have informed Borges’s 
non-intentionalist approach to Cervantes’s text.  That comes to light in three further essays, ‘Conducta 
novelística de Cervantes’ (1928), ‘Presencia de Unamuno’ (1937) and ‘Nota sobre el Quijote’ (1947).  
The first demonstrates certain affinities with Unamuno’s reading.  Borges calls it an antigua 
equivocación to see in the Quijote a mere aping of the chivalric form.  It therefore departs from the 
intentionalist reading of the Quijote, which would credit Cide Hamete Benengeli’s claim at the end 
of the second volume that the text’s function is to bring to an end the chivalric novels he so dislikes.  
He reads into it a moral significance, arguing for the sanctity of Alonso Quijano and against the false 
dichotomy between quixotic generosity and Quijano’s pragmatic practicality (Borges 2008: 122).  
These terms are of course familiar to Unamuno’s evangelical reading.  Borges even sympathises with 
the hidalgo to a similar extent as Unamuno does, extolling the carácter honestísimo of don Quijote, 
who has become a ‘semidiós en nuestra conciencia’ (124).  Though, as ‘Presencia de Unamuno’ 
makes clear, these shared conclusions can be arrived at without altering the form or content of the 
text.  In that work, he criticises Unamuno for his interference into the Cervantine narrative, 
denigrating the quality of Unamuno’s most significant work on the Quijote: 
 
Otros consideran que la obra máxima es su Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho.  Decididamente 
no puedo compartir ese parecido.  Prefiero la ironía, las reservas y la uniformidad de Cervantes 
a las incontinencias patéticas de Unamuno.  Nada gana el Quijote con lo que refieran de nuevo, 
en estilo efusivo; nada gana el Quijote, y algo pierde, con esas azarosas exornaciones tan 
comparables, en su tipo sentimental, a las que suministra Gustavo Doré.  Las obras y la pasión 
de Unamuno no pueden no atraerme, pero su intromisión en el Quijote me parece un error, un 
anacronismo. (Borges 1986: 79) 
 
The Quijote has gained nothing from the retrospective re-workings of its form and content, as the 
meanings Unamuno identified in that text were already present in the original.  Nor, as he explains in 
his 1947 ‘Nota sobre el Quijote’, from the invective against the author that characterises Vida de don 
Quijote y Sancho:  
 
Del culto de la letra se ha pasado al culto del espíritu; del culto de Miguel de Cervantes al de 
Alonso Quijano.  Este ha sido exaltado a semidiós; su inventor - el hombre que escribió: “Para 
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mí solo nació don Quijote, y yo para él, el supo obrar, y yo escribir” - ha sido rebajado por 
Unamuno a irreverente historiador o a evangelista incomprensivo y erróneo.  Descubrir que 
Alonso Quijano es un personaje patético es descubrir lo que no ignoraba su autor, sobre todo 
cuando escribió la segunda parte: también el olvidar es uno de los medios de Cervantes para 
hacerlo patético. (Borges 2001: 251) 
 
Borges criticises Unamuno’s reduction of Cervantes to a deficient historian, given that Cervantes was 
presumably well aware of many of the traits that Unamuno found in the character.  An investigation 
into the reader’s place in the production of meaning in the text need not rely on a diatribe against the 
author.  It suffices, as I will show, to simply attribute the text to someone else.  Nor is it necessary to 
change the form of the text in order to discover meaning in it; Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’ shows how 
much the text can gain from changing only its para-textual information, attributing the same form and 
content to an alternative source.  It can be read to some extent as a critique of Unamuno’s practice of 
finding new meaning in the Quijote by denigrating the author, and by rewriting his text in the most 
literal sense.   
 
V.2 Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote 
 
The various ways in which Borges’s 1939 ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ problematises the 
relationship between author and reader are of interest from a reader-response point of view, as well 
as for a comparison with Unamuno.  It is a tale of the role of attribution in interpreting a text, where 
reading and authoring are beholden to the individual’s horizon of expectations.  However, the 
deliberate attribution of one text to a different author is complicated by the fact that the reader can 
only construct the author’s horizon of expectations by way of their own.  As such the act of 
interpreting by combining the reader’s viewpoint with the author’s historical circumstances — the 
key point of comparison between Menard’s and Cervantes’s versions — remains a non-intentionalist 
method.  For there is no appeal to what the author wanted to say, but what the author could possibly 
have said.62  In this sense I take ‘Pierre Menard’ not only as the story of an impossible rewriting by 
an apocryphal author, but a kind of literary thought experiment, which can be read through theories 
related to the reader’s horizon of expectations and the way in which historical circumstances create 
and permit new readings.   
                                               
62 Though reading this way has been categorised under intentionalism.  This reflects what Paisley 
Livingston calls ‘conditionalist intentionalism’, which ‘recommends conjectures as to meanings the 
author “could have intended”, where the possibilia in question are appealing ones in worlds close to 
the actual artist’s’ (Livingston 2005: 140-141). 
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In ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, the reader is placed in the critical position of determining 
meaning.  The name of the author is a useful interpretive tool for the reader.  This is in keeping with 
Iser’s view that:  
 
author and reader are to share the game of the imagination, and, indeed, the game will not 
work if the text sets out to be anything more than a set of governing rules.  The reader’s 
enjoyment begins when he himself becomes productive, i.e., when the text allows him to bring 
his own faculties into play. (Iser 1987: 108) 
 
The narrator’s enjoyment of Menard’s work, which is ‘más sutil que el de Cervantes’ (Borges 2015: 
49) is due to its taking Cervantes’s Quijote as a set of governing rules by which he could play an 
extremely daring literary game.  The narrator’s method of reading Menard’s work posits that in any 
moment of reading the author’s and reader’s respective horizons of expectations clash and synthesise 
into a unique meaning.  This divests Cervantes of authority; he is the point of origin that has destroyed 
itself in the Barthesian style, allowing himself to be usurped by a contemporary reader outside of his 
immediate cultural vicinity.63  Moreover, what Cervantes specifically may have intended by the 
Quijote is relegated behind a reader’s perspective on what Cervantes might have been able to produce 
in his context of 17th Century Spain.   
 
In ‘Pierre Menard’, texts are rewritten as soon as they are read.64  A text is a canvas onto which the 
reader paints their own expectations, departing from the original meaning of the author, intended or 
otherwise.65  This is by its nature an anachronistic approach to the literary work.  It is therefore 
relevant to Jauß’s later theory on historical materialisations of new readings (Jauß 1982: 64).  This is 
                                               
63 ‘Menard’s project undermines the idea that a text communicates a message from what Barthes 
called “The Author-God’ (Williamson 2013: 211). 
64 This point is made in Alazraki’s investigation into Borges’s metaphysics: ‘“Paul [sic] Menard, 
autor del Quijote” es la expresión literaria de ese pensamiento de Borges según el cual “una literatura 
difiere de otra, ulterior o anterior, menos por el texto que por la manera de ser leída”’ (Alazraki: 1968: 
35). Though more precisely, ‘Pierre Menard’ shows how each literary work can differ to itself 
according to the way it is read. 
65 As Iser suggests, ‘Apprehension of a literary work comes about through the interaction between 
the reader’s presence in the text and his habitual experiences, which are now a past orientation.  As 
such it is not a passive process of acceptance, but a productive response’ (Iser 1987: 133).  That is, 
the reader responds actively to a text in a way that determines an individual meaning for the work.  
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also a point of comparison with Unamuno, who was guilty of writing the kind of parasitic text that 
inspired Menard’s enterprise to compose the Quijote, the kind that places Jesus Christ on a Marseille 
avenue or don Quijote on a Parisian boulevard.  A key dividing factor between Borges’s rewriting 
and Unamuno’s is that in the former’s case, the anachronism is only in the act of reading.  The fact 
that Unamuno rewrites the Quijote in an authorial sense makes his version intellectually uninteresting.  
The deliberate modernisation of the text will obviously entail a modernised reading.66  Much more 
interesting is how a classic text can yield a contemporary interpretation.  This is a key dividing factor 
between Borges’s and Unamuno’s approach to the Quijote.  In Borges’s view, Unamuno seems not 
to have realised that a daring reading of a work’s contents does not require a chapter-by-chapter 
rewriting of the novel’s form. 
 
Menard’s bibliography betrays an interest in non-intentionalist methods.  On his friend’s passing, the 
narrator takes it upon himself to catalogue the visible works that Menard left behind, arriving finally 
at a correction to Madame Bachelier’s incomplete version published in a journal of Calvinist leanings.  
Among the visible works are a symbolist sonnet published twice in the same journal, a monograph 
on Leibniz’s Characterista universalis and various translations of works by authors from López de 
Segura to Quevedo.  Item p particularly captures our interest.  It is a diatribe against Paul Valéry, ‘el 
reverso exacto de su verdadera opinión sobre Valéry. Éste así lo entendió y la amistad antigua de los 
dos no corrió peligro’ (44).  The text is an imperfect representation of the view of the author — 
something that Paul Valéry understood, but other readers of his obra visible may not.  This raises a 
key question: how is the meaning of that text determined?  Is the narrator’s reading of that text 
superior to others’ because he has a personal knowledge of the author’s real point of view?  Would it 
be a misreading of Pierre Menard’s work to be persuaded of Valéry’s literary shortcomings?  A non-
intentionalist reader might argue that not only does a reader without knowledge of Menard’s intention 
have an equal say in uncovering meaning in the text, but that their reading might in fact be superior 
to that of those readers who interpret the text according to features not present within it.  It plays by 
the rules of the textual game to read a diatribe against Valéry into a work by an author whose distaste 
for the French poet was expressed only ironically.  
 
                                               
66 For that reason, Borges’s claim that Unamuno’s interference with the Quijote is an anachronistic 
mistake is not contradictory with his interest in reading the text from an anachronistic perspective.  
In fact, perhaps Borges was inspired to write ‘Pierre Menard’ by reading Unamuno’s Vida de don 
Quijote y Sancho, in exactly the same way Pierre Menard was inspired to write his Quijote by reading 
a series of texts which mirror Unamuno’s technique. 
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Menard authors texts in such a way as to render his method of authorship an irrelevant factor to the 
reader.  Item e is another example.  Menard proposes a modification to the rules of chess, initially 
arguing for and eventually against the position he advances.  The reader, in the act of interpretation, 
is intellectually isolated as Menard’s essay, much like the Quijote he rewrites, does not prescribe an 
interpretation.  Meaning in that text is produced only in as far as the reader declares their position in 
the discussion that Menard initiates.  Item p only provides one view — that Valéry’s writing was 
substandard.  Similarly, that text’s meaning extends to how a reader engages their critical faculties 
and positions themselves in the discussion around the quality of Valéry’s works.  As such, the 
paleontological investigation67 into the real attitude of the author offers little to the reader’s 
interpretation.   
 
When the narrator introduces the impossible conceit of the story — that Menard’s intention was to 
arrive at a version of the Quijote through an act of enormous authorial endeavour — it hints at the 
limitations of non-intentionalist methods.  For a work of literature needs to be considered an artistic 
achievement, created intentionally, in order for it to have any interpretable value.  To copy a 
Velázquez masterpiece in such a way as to make it indistinguishable from the original would entail 
an outstanding artistic accomplishment (Genette 1997: 385-386).  To copy Cervantes’s Quijote 
directly from the page entails no such achievement. For this reason, Menard needs his reader to 
believe that his Quijote is the product of independent thinking.  Literature must be produced by the 
mind and not by an act of mechanical reproduction; there is no difference between each printed copy 
of Cervantes’s version whereas Menard’s apocryphal version is formally equal but intellectually 
different.  In other words, it is the same text, but a different work.68  
                                               
67 A term Demetrios Basdekis uses to describe the method of cervantist intentionalism Unamuno so 
disliked, but which would also comfortably describe the act of searching for the author’s intention as 
a means to construct an interpretation. 
68 The fact that it can be interpreted differently to Cervantes’ version rescues Menard from the 
criticism that he was a mere charlatan, and a plagiarist, much like the one made by Saer (Saer 1998: 
36) as well as that of Villada: ‘“Pierre Menard” is a richly textured argument in defense of an author 
who writes another man’s work verbatim, indeed, claiming with ironclad logic that Menard’s effort 
is commendable precisely because he wrote someone else’s writing’ (Bell-Villada 1999: 37).  Delia 
Ungureanu’s recent study, ‘Pierre Menard, the Sur-realist’ also argues that ‘Creative plagiarism is 
precisely the theme of Borges’ short story’ (Ungureanu 2016: 115).  Ungureanu’s argument rests on 
the fact that, while Borges was publishing ‘Pierre Menard’ in La Nación in 1939, a real author by the 
name of Pierre Menard published a defence of Lautréamont’s plagiarisms in a surrealist magazine, 
La Minotaure. In her view this strongly suggests that ‘Pierre Menard’ is a defence of the practice of 
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This raises the question as to whether the act of attributing a text to an author can be included in a 
non-intentionalist method of reading.   Iser argues in The Act of Reading that a text is a ‘structured 
prefigurement’ that has to be received in order to have meaning, and the reception of the text relies 
on the reader.  That ‘prefigurement’ provides governing rules for interpretation (Iser 1987: 107-108).  
Iser’s theory, which highlights the interaction between text and reader as the guiding principle for 
interpretation, does not ignore the author.  The author is a surrogate for the orchestrating guidelines 
that permit and exclude certain interpretations.  This does not have to extend to an effect intended by 
the author.  It suffices to know that an author intended to create a literary work.  The specific 
intentions within that literary work can be put aside.  
 
Menard’s text is not just a valid piece of literature, worthy of interpretation in its own right.  In fact, 
says the narrator, it’s actually better than Cervantes’s version: ‘el fragmentario Quijote de Menard es 
más sutil que el de Cervantes’ (49). The narrator explains that Menard’s version is superior to 
Cervantes’s for the fact that writing the Quijote from Menard’s horizon of expectations is a greater 
artistic endeavor.69  For that reason it is so much less interesting (not to say impossible) for Menard 
to write the Quijote by becoming Cervantes.70  The availability of cultural references and historical 
events to Cervantes makes the novel, in the narrator’s view, a crude juxtaposition of the provincial 
reality of his country.  Cervantes was a man of letters and action, losing the use of his arm at Lepanto 
before becoming a key figure in his country’s cultural life: 
 
                                               
plagiarism.  I cannot agree with any of the critics I mention here, however.  Menard would only have 
been plagiarising had he copied the Quijote directly from the page.  We know that he did not.  I 
believe that ‘Pierre Menard’ can be read as an experiment in attribution, based on the question as to 
how we might interpret the Quijote differently, not when Menard takes credit for it, but when we give 
that credit to him nonetheless.   
69 This was recently highlighted by Michael Wood: ‘[He] is not a native speaker of Spanish, and he 
lives in the wrong country and the wrong century’ (Wood 2013: 37). 
70 As Kristal points out, Menard also rejects Novalis’s notion that in order to understand an author, a 
reader must be able to fully identify with him. ‘Once he rejects the idea of becoming spiritually one 
with Cervantes, Menard decides to continue with his project of producing a work that would be 
identical to pages found in Don Quixote but to continue as himself, not as Cervantes’ (Kristal 2002: 
31).  He does not attempt to understand the work by identifying the author. He understands the work 
by reading it from a modern perspective. 
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Éste, de un modo burdo, opone a las ficciones caballerescas la pobre realidad provinciana de 
su país; Menard elige como ‘realidad’ la tierra de Carmen durante el siglo de Lepanto y de 
Lope.  […]  En su obra no hay gitanerías ni conquistadores ni místicos ni Felipe II ni autos de 
fe.  Desatiende o proscribe el color local.  Ese desdén indica un sentido nuevo de la novela 
histórica. (49) 
 
The challenge to Menard’s vision of Spain is to avoid the local colour, the exoticisation of the Spanish 
landscape that Larreta, who is mentioned by the narrator, was guilty of in his La gloria de don Ramiro.  
The literature produced between Cervantes’s time and his own, including Mérimée’s Carmen (a text 
with which it seems fair to assume that Menard was familiar) might have romanticised and distorted 
the Spanish landscape in his mind.  Cervantes writes according to a local perspective, spatially and 
temporally; Menard writes according to a perspective wholly removed from his time and place.71  
Menard has defied his horizon of expectations, conceiving of a vision of Spain that ought to have 
been unavailable to him.  This is one of the reasons that false attribution enriches the text.  The 
reader’s relationship to the text changes fundamentally according to the identity of the author.  Given 
that a text needs to be authored in order to have an interpretive value, the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard, 
autor del Quijote’ implies that the greater the authorial endeavour, the worthier of interpretation the 
literary work becomes.  The interpretive richness of Menard’s version is directly proportional to the 
effort needed to produce a copy of the Quijote from his particular cultural circumstances. 
 
The act of attribution in ‘Pierre Menard’ has a nuanced relationship to later non-intentionalist 
theories, including Jauß’s reception theory and Iser’s effect theory, in that it traces interpretation as a 
tripartite relationship between reader, author and text, as opposed to an interaction solely between 
text and reader.  The reader is the most intellectually active and decisive aspect of this relationship.  
Attributing aspects of the Quijote to Menard that he in fact never attempted gives them the same 
interpretive value as those Menard did attempt.  Attributing the work of one author to another is a 
way of considering them in the context of and in comparison with other works of literature, to 
investigate how they communicate.72  Texts are not meaningful in a vacuum.  Their meaningfulness 
                                               
71 As Boldy argues, ‘Our understanding of older texts is inevitably done through the lens of 
intervening literature.  Thus, Cervantes contrasts chivalresque romances with the poor provincial 
reality of his time, while for Menard, this reality has become something altogether more literary and 
exotic, out of Bizet and Mérimée’ (Boldy 2009: 72). 
72 That technique in fact is Cervantine; the attribution of the Quijote to Menard is equivalent to 
Cervantes’s attribution of the same text to Benengeli. For that reason Guillermo Corona argues that 
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is determined by the historical and cultural circumstances in which they are produced.73  Reading the 
same text as if it had been authored by another plays by the text’s orchestrating rules, as the text 
remains unmodified.  It traces comparisons between texts, and not between authors, in order to 
enliven meaning within them.  There is therefore an interpretive use in the author’s identity, though 
not his intention.  It is effectively a method for comparing different works across cultural and temporal 
divides.  The author’s name is a metonym for a body of literature which arbitrarily includes some 
works but excludes others.74  Perhaps this is the narrator’s motivation for issuing a corrective to Mme. 
Bachelier, scolding her for misrepresenting Menard’s easily enumerated bibliography.  It is a debate 
about the framework in which the text should be read.  Mme. Bachelier’s readers might read Pierre 
Menard’s Quijote differently in light of a different interpretive framework.  The author has some 
interpretive value in as far as his name stands for a group of texts that a reader must relate to each 
other.  When the narrator attributes the Quijote to Menard, he does so in the context of the extended 
bibliography of visible works that Menard has brought to public attention.  The way the reader will 
interpret his Quijote cannot extricate itself from that body of work, whose meaning will guide 
interpretation.  To wit, Menard is a meta-textual author.  Many of his texts are about texts themselves: 
they include translations, transpositions and literary experiments.  Would that not cause his reader — 
in this case the narrator — to receive Menard’s Quijote in a similar way?   
 
                                               
‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ can itself be seen as a rewriting of the novel: Borges’s story and 
Cervantes’s are narrated by a reader of the work of another (Corona 2008: 424). 
73 And, as Beatriz Sarlo argued, in which they are read: ‘In fact Borges is using the paradox of Menard 
to assert that all texts are the rewriting of other texts (in an endless interplay of textuality and meaning) 
— but that at the same time, all texts are read against a cultural background which forms the fleeting 
course of meaning into a historical pattern’ (Sarlo 2006: 32).  There might be a fixed number of 
possible texts — even the Library of Babel is mathematically finite albeit functionally infinite — but 
the number of possible readings is not bound in the same way.  New readings are permitted by ever-
changing circumstances. 
74 In this sense Borges practises what Sherri Irvin calls ‘hypothetical intentionalism’, which holds 
that ‘To understand a work appropriately, perhaps we must see it as the product of an author: a 
particular human being in a certain socio-historical context, who writes with a certain style, tends to 
use words in certain ways, brings certain background knowledge and experiences to bear, and has 
written a body of works which may inform one another’ (Irvin 2006: 122).  Though this is an even 
more hypothetical form, which treats the author as a shifting category, an imagined context in which 
texts can be read and inform each other. 
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When our narrator collates the same excerpt from Cervantes’s and Menard’s version, not only does 
he find in Menard’s version a more pragmatic series of philosophical statements, but also a superior 
written style.  He argues that: ‘También es vívido el contraste de los estilos.  El estilo arcaizante de 
Menard — extranjero al fin — adolece de alguna afectación.  No así el del precursor, que maneja con 
desenfado el español corriente de su época’ (Borges 2015: 51).  But the satirical reading of the Quijote 
is enabled by the fact that the language of the novel is already outdated by the time Cervantes puts 
pen to paper.  While Menard’s writing is even more anachronistic than Cervantes’s, the latter can 
hardly be seen to write according to contemporary cultural norms.75  For this reason, the wary reader 
of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ will be suspicious of the motivations of the narrator.  He is, of 
course, a reader of Pierre Menard’s oeuvre, an oeuvre entirely unavailable to us. His reading is not 
without motivation or biases.  For as Stanley Fish argued, reading is generally an act of conforming 
a text to a preconceived notion of it, of confirming an a priori interpretation (Fish 1980: 340).   
 
Problematically, the narrator’s preference for Menard’s version is based on his failure to reconstruct 
the horizon of expectations relevant to Cervantes.  The narrator’s method of reading — where the 
reader’s horizon of expectations interacts with what he assumes the author’s horizon of expectations 
must be — is subjective.  The narrator attempts to reconstruct Menard’s and Cervantes’s expectations, 
in order to compare them, but can only do so through his own.76  When the narrator upholds as 
philosophically profound the quote in Chapter IX that history is the mother of truth, he does so in 
light of the textual experiments that Menard has already carried out.  Menard’s literary experiments 
are the context in which Cervantes’s statements are given philosophical profundity.  When Cervantes 
wrote the phrase la verdad, cuya madre es la historia, he was putting to paper an item of rhetoric 
common to his historical situation, ‘un elogio retórico de la historia’ (50).  When Menard writes, he 
does so from the perspective of an early 20th Century French author, one acquainted with William 
James and Bertrand Russell.  That is sufficient, says the narrator, to change the meaning of the phrase.  
Only when the text is produced by Menard, a 20th Century French intellectual, does the phrase 
possibly signify that there is no objective hermeneutic principle for establishing truth.  But a reader 
might be critical of the narrator’s view that Cervantes could not have conceived of the idea with any 
                                               
75 ‘[Cervantes] himself used a language that had already been out of usage and was thus archaic with 
respect to his usage of Spanish, that is to say, of Medieval Spanish’ (Grandis 1988: 21). 
76 This is also problematic for the various narrative theories I have drawn on.  The discussion of 
horizons of expectations has its limitations in that it can reduce to sweeping statements the possible 
meaning of text in its time and place.  We may be able to justify the idea that texts mean different 
things across history, that canons of acceptability change with historical circumstances, but it remains 
difficult to demonstrate what readings were permitted at any one historical time. 
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philosophical depth.  In fact, could a reader not simply read a discussion of the nature of truth into 
Cervantes’s version?  For how can the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ know that his contemporary has 
actually put forward a different viewpoint to the one imputed to Cervantes?  Their respective horizons 
of expectations might differ, but there must be some intellectual common ground between Menard 
and Cervantes in order for one to read the work of the other.  The fact that the narrator happens to be 
a contemporary of Pierre Menard does not particularly credit him, as he is still guilty of the 
paleontological argument that he can reconstruct the author’s possible intellectual state through 
objective investigation.  An author might betray their declared intention, as two of Menard’s works 
in fact do.  It also seems uncertain that Cervantes’s status as a 17th Century author would prevent 
him from arriving at the philosophical idea that truth is what each of us judges it to be.  That is 
especially the case in a text whose protagonist puts that philosophical standpoint into practice.77   
 
It is not merely attribution that alters textual meaning.  Fragmentation has an equal role to play in the 
interpretation of the work.  Both Menard’s and Unamuno’s versions are fragmentations of the original 
work78 which exercise the creative faculties of the reader, and compel them to create the thematic 
link between the disconnected chapters independently.  Iser’s argument on the function of narrative 
omissions can be applied equally to Borges as to Unamuno: 
 
Si el blanco es en gran medida responsable por las actividades descritas, entonces 
participación significa que el lector no está simplemente llamado a internalizar las posiciones 
dadas en el texto, sino que él es inducido a hacerlas actuar una sobre otra, haciéndolas 
transformarse mutuamente como resultado de lo cual el objeto estético comienza a emerger. 
(Iser 1982: 236-237) 
 
Iser argues that the act of reading relies on what Husserl calls ‘protensions’.  That is, the structure of 
the text provides us with certain expectations of what is to follow that inevitably colour our view of 
the text later on: ‘The semantic pointers of individual sentences always imply an expectation of some 
kind’ (Iser 1987: 111).  As such, the reader, faced with a text consisting of Chapters IX and XXXVIII, 
                                               
77 This is why Unamuno’s intrahistoria is narratologically compelling.  In his search for an eternal 
Spanish philosophy, he shows that horizons of expectations are constantly changing ad infinitum, but 
there will always remain intellectual commonalities throughout human culture which allow for 
exchange of ideas across time. 
78 Though it must be pointed out that Menard’s fragmentary version is presented as superior, while 
Unamuno’s version is presented in ‘Presencia de Unamuno’ as inferior to Cervantes’s. 
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as well as a fragment of Chapter XXII, will trace a thematic continuity between the chapters based 
on the initial stages of their reading, which will continually form their interpretation.   
 
Chapter IX concludes the battle between don Quijote and the Biscayan, but not before a discussion 
of the relationship between author and reader that seems to inform Menard’s approach.  In this 
chapter, Cervantes relegates himself to the level of just another reader, introducing the conceit of 
Cide Hamete Benengeli, an apocryphal author to whom he attributes his own text.79 The narrator 
describes the reader’s frustration at the moment when the narrative is interrupted.80  The narrator’s 
apology follows the account of how Cervantes came by the story.  It is, he says, a translation of a 
found Arabic manuscript by a morisco, tasked with conveying the records into Spanish ‘sin quitarles 
ni añadirles nada’ (Cervantes 2010: 117). The narrator is an editor of a text provided him by a 
translator transposing a work that is not itself the ‘original’, as its narrative conveys hearsay of 
ostensibly real-life people, including Dulcinea del Toboso.  Menard’s work is a fragmentation of a 
work that claims to be a fragmentation.  His method of attribution is opposite and equivalent to 
Cervantes's.  Cervantes attributes the text to multiple other sources.  Menard reverses this, attributing 
the text back to himself.  For this reason the relationship between the Cervantine narrator and the 
reader mirrors that of the reader to the Borgesian narrator. In both cases an unavailable text is 
described to us by a third-party reader.  Menard’s practice of false attribution, and the way our narrator 
reads Menard’s version, are derived from the specific aspects of the Quijote that Menard rewrites.  
Menard’s rewriting is therefore a copy in terms of form: the specific words on the page, and the 
content: the problematic status of the author as a reader in the text.  With Chapter IX reflecting the 
limited authority of an author in the face of preceding tradition, Chapter XXXVIII reflective of the 
status of intellectual thought in a world ruled by material action, and a fragment of Chapter XXII 
reflecting the inability of human beings to adequately reflect reality through narrative, Menard’s 
Quijote is thematically consistent.81  
                                               
79 Mario Fernández argues that this choice is far from incidental, as it represents the ‘Primer punto 
cervantino desde donde se inicia la construcción de la paradoja, de la parodia borgeana: el punto en 
que un autor deviene lector’ (Fernández, M. 2005: 104). 
80 ‘Causóme esto mucha pesadumbre, porque el gusto de haber leído tan poco se volvía en disgusto, 
de pensar el mal camino que se ofrecía para hallar lo mucho que, a mi parecer, faltaba de tan sabroso 
cuento’ (Cervantes 2010: 113). 
81 My reading is simply an exercise of my horizon of expectations.  My aim as expressed in the 
introduction was to deliberately seek the resonances in Borges’s works on the Quijote which would 
be relevant to certain literary theories.  My interpretation cannot be anything other than a projection 
of that intention. 
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Textual experimentation is, however, not the only thematically continuous idea present in Menard’s 
version.  While we might read into his Quijote a philosophical document, the immediate shift between 
Chapters IX and XXXVIII reveals a more sinister, political meaning.82 The discussion on the meaning 
of the phrase, ‘la verdad, cuya madre es la historia’, that gives our narrator such pause in Chapter IX, 
is placed at a remove from Cervantes’s self-ironic discussion of the unreliability of Arabic-speaking 
narrators given that this no longer strikes the same cultural resonance among a modern readership.83  
What might read as a self-ironic statement on an unreliable narration in Cervantes’s version takes on 
startling resonances in Menard’s:  
 
Si a ésta [historia] se le puede poner alguna objeción cerca de su verdad, no podrá ser otra 
sino haber sido su autor arábigo, siendo muy propio de los de aquella nación ser mentirosos; 
aunque, por ser tan nuestros enemigos, antes se puede entender haber quedado falto en ella 
que demasiado. (Cervantes 2010: 118) 
 
As I highlighted in the second chapter, it is worth asking under which jurisdiction the phrase ‘nuestros 
enemigos' falls under.  That question, as Irvin shows, reintroduces an appeal to the author in reading 
                                               
82 I confess that Chapter XXII only bears a tenuous relation to the other two if read from a political 
viewpoint.  This is made all the more difficult given that it is never specified which particular 
fragment of the text Menard writes, which could be one of a practically infinite number.  One could 
for example read into don Quijote’s freeing of the galeotes a tract on imposing justice through 
physical force.  Balderston suggests that the fragment can only be the meeting between don Quijote 
and Ginés de Pasamonte (Balderston 1993: 22).  Though which fragment we impute to Menard 
depends entirely on the way we interpret the purpose of the other two chapters in the work.  If they 
are taken as an investigation into the limitations of the author, then it is natural to assume that Menard 
chose the meeting with Ginés as his fragment. 
83 Even beyond any ethical interest in the work, Corona argues that reading the original chapter should 
be cause for suspicion on the part of the reader: ‘we discover that, just before the passage quoted in 
the “Pierre Menard”, there is that other one in which Cervantes calls Hamete a liar. Is Borges calling 
himself a liar? Should we, therefore, question Borges’ reliability in the “Menard” too? Let us bear in 
mind that Borges, commenting Menard’s Quixote, says that the truth “no es lo que sucedió; es lo que 
juzgamos que sucedió” (Ficciones, p. 53).  Is Borges telling us the truth about Menard or simply what 
he reckons to be true?’ (Corona 2009: 428).  I do not conflate Borges with the narrator to the same 
extent, but I agree that the narrative voice should be taken as unreliable.  My aim is to show a logical 
extreme of that narrator’s unreliability. 
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(Irvin 2006: 121).  The statement is given in Spanish by a French author in the late 1930s.  Is the first-
person plural inclusive of Spain, or exclusive to France?  Let's consider both possibilities.  When 
Cervantes’s Quijote referred to the mendacious Arabs of a hostile nation, he will have been writing 
as a war-weary veteran of the Battle of Lepanto against the Ottoman Empire, a power which 
enveloped much of the North African territory from which Cide Hamete Benengeli hailed.  This 
would explain both the original statement of enmity towards Arabs, as well as the reference to the 
Arabic-speaking world as a single nation.  The declaration that Arabs are prone to dishonesty 
undercuts itself humorously in a narrative where truth is a shifting category. 
 
Assuming that when Menard writes ‘nuestros enemigos’ it is focalised only through a French 
perspective, the intervening historical changes between Cervantes’s moment of writing and Menard’s 
produce a wholly different reading.  Cide Hamete Benengeli is a Moor, broadly speaking a resident 
of the Maghreb region which encompasses Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.  At Menard’s time of 
writing, France has become a major colonial power in precisely this part of the world.  After a series 
of military engagements in the region, France had effectively colonised all three nations: Algeria in 
1834, Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912.  French involvement in the Levant was almost at an end, 
with Lebanon and Syria declaring independence in 1943 and 1946 respectively.  All of those nations 
remained under French hegemony when Menard condemned Arabs as a national enemy.  His 
invention of a deceitful historian in Cide Hamete Benengeli singles out the Arab as a morally-debased 
‘other’.  It suggests that French colonial interests across North Africa and the Levant are the natural 
consequence of his country’s antagonism towards those regions.  Colonialism as enmity speaks the 
language of fascism.  The purpose of colonialism is not based on the manifest destiny of North 
American political doctrine, nor is it based on the great civilising myth.  It is simply based on an 
ostensible duty to conquer a belligerent.  And to that point, Menard betrays a level of cultural 
ignorance in referring to the Arab world as ‘aquella nación’.  This was a description with some 
validity, perhaps, in Cervantes’s time and place, but which is now long since defunct.84   
                                               
84 Pierre Menard, whatever his intention, adds his voice to the racial and cultural suprematism behind 
French expansionism into North Africa and the Middle East.  That legitimises the kind of postcolonial 
reading of Menard’s work that Fiddian (2017) recently alluded to.  There is a trend of reading Borges 
from the perspective of postcolonial studies.  Julia Kushigian (1991) explores Borges's exoticising 
view of the Orient in her chapter 'The Orient of Borges.’ Edna Aizenberg (1992) interrogates Borges’s 
essays on tradition as an exploration of linguistic nativism in the formation of literary culture.  Ian 
Almond (2004) criticises Borges’s works on Islamic themes for their reliance on well-worn 
Occidental clichés of the East.  No study I can identify has thoroughly explored the colonialist, 
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Though writing in Spanish from a French historical perspective makes the statement all the more 
questionable.  Is Menard writing from a pan-European perspective?  What unifying factors are there 
between the national context of his writing and the linguistic codes in which his work is read?  The 
work does not seem to be meant for a French-speaking audience.  The French colonial resonances are 
difficult to ignore.  But the text is aimed at a well-read, Spanish-speaking readership.  Perhaps it is a 
statement of cultural proximity to Spain with an antagonism towards Arabs at its heart.  Perhaps 
Menard appropriates aspects of a text written little over a century after the reconquest of Spain, by an 
author present at a battle against the Ottoman Empire, in order to cast a racial other as an eternal 
enemy to European countries like Spain and France.  That would be all the more difficult to ignore if 
it were clear that Menard did indeed write after the onset of the Spanish Civil War.   
 
The statement is also very proper of the kind of anti-Semitic, xenophobic rhetoric at the heart of a 
regime that rose to power in 1933, a year before Pierre Menard set out on his Quijote.85 Both the 
narrator and Pierre Menard mix in intellectual circles characterised by intellectual snobbery and latent 
xenophobia.  The narrator makes a series of thinly-veiled comments which betray anti-Semitic 
attitudes.  There is a nod to the Jewish readership, the circuncisos who subscribe to Mme. Bachelier’s 
journal, and a swipe at the presumably Jewish American magnate Simon Kautzsch and the many 
victims of his ‘disinterested manoeuvres’, a comment reflecting a stereotypical contemporary 
caricature of Jewish people.  The narrator scarcely mentions the racial aspect of Menard’s work.  He 
is too concerned with how the meaning of the statement ‘la verdad, cuya madre es la historia’ has 
changed over time to turn his attention to the immediately preceding statement on the enmity between 
Europeans and Arabs.  Menard produced that statement independently, in a contemporary setting 
where such rhetoric would soon have such disastrous consequences for so many.  He and his 
contemporary see in the Quijote a racially supremacist ideology relevant to their modern setting.  This 
is one of the dangers of a method where the reader is king.  As Stanley Fish said, all readers interpret 
the text in such a way as to confirm their pre-conceptions of it (Fish 1980: 340).  As we cannot appeal 
to the text to reject an interpretation, our rejection of his interpretation must be world-oriented, and 
not text-oriented.  It is ethical, and not aesthetic. 
 
                                               
expansionist element of Menard’s Quijote. Future studies may be able to subject ‘Pierre Menard' to 
a detailed postcolonial analysis. 
85 As Balderston also notes, the narrator is ‘antisemita, antiprotestante, [y] un esnob empedernido’ 
(Balderston 2010: 82). 
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The xenophobic proclamations of the ninth chapter are followed immediately by a discussion on the 
relevance of arms in intellectual society.  The narrator acts on the premise that don Quijote is a 
mouthpiece of Cervantes, and wonders only at the fact that Menard, an intellectual, could ever suggest 
that the sword is mightier than the pen: ‘Cervantes era un viejo militar: su fallo se explica.  ¡Pero que 
el Don Quijote de Pierre Menard — hombre contemporáneo de La trahison de clercs y de Bertrand 
Russell — reincida en esas nebulosas sofisterías!’ (49-50).  The narrator enjoys Menard’s work to 
the extent that he represents a countercurrent to the intellectual trends of his time.  Even so, he does 
not take into account how historical events can legitimise and delegitimise particular understandings 
(Jauß 1982: 64).  The speech on arms and letters is filled with references contemporary to Cervantes.  
The presence of those references in a modern version suggests, perhaps, a romanticisation of war 
given its appropriation of Golden Age imagery: 
 
dicen las letras que sin ellas no se podrán sustentar las armas, porque la guerra también tiene 
sus leyes y está sujeta a ellas, y que las leyes caen debajo de lo que son letras y letrados.  A 
esto responden las armas que las leyes no se podrían sustentar sin ellas, porque con las armas 
se defienden las repúblicas, se conservan los reinos, se guardan las ciudades, se aseguran los 
caminos, se despejan los mares de cosarios, y, finalmente, si por ellas no fuese, las repúblicas, 
los reinos, las monarquías, las ciudades, los caminos de mar y tierra estarían sujetos al rigor 
y a la confusión que trae consigo la guerra el tiempo que dura y tiene licencia de usar de sus 
privilegios y de sus fuerzas. (Cervantes 2010: 495) 
 
Had Menard written the whole of the Quijote from scratch then the discussion on arms and letters 
might not resonate quite so strongly with the xenophobic statements made in the previous chapter.  
But placing these chapters side by side, which is jarring from a narrative point of view, causes them 
to be read in light of each other.  This imputes to the text a rhetoric that would be immediately familiar 
to a European reader in 1934.  Menard deliberately chooses the language of racial suprematism and 
war propaganda at a time when this had become the intellectual norm in a country bordering his own.  
Attributing the text to a major figure in that country’s intellectual life would make these resonances 
difficult to ignore.  For now, they remain strongly suspicious. We know that Menard had a habit of 
saying the opposite of what he thought.  This makes the question as to whether Menard truly believed 
in the supremacy of arms over letters, or the racial supremacy of the Europeans over the Arabs, as 
irrelevant to the interpretation as the question as to whether Unamuno truly longed for a civil war.  
The correct interpretation is not a reconstruction of Menard’s viewpoint, but an ethically sound 
reading as permitted by historical circumstances. 
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When the author’s intention cannot arbitrate between meanings, and the text cannot be the source of 
disagreement on the meaning of the text itself, as Fish argued, then reader-centric models can provide 
readers with an anarchistic power to determine meaning.  For textual meaning under reader-response 
theory is entirely appropriable according to the expectations of individual readers.  This is one aspect 
of ‘Pierre Menard' that literary criticism has only touched on.  Fish shows that readings are validated 
when the canons of acceptability change; Jauß shows that texts are events that continue to strike ever 
new resonances with readers.  The horizon of expectations includes cultural and historical 
circumstances outside of the text, which produce new canons of acceptability within the text86.  It is 
worthwhile examining the horizon of expectations in which Menard writes, and showing how the 
canons of acceptability might have changed by the time his contemporary reads the work. 
 
There is an intervening period of five years between Menard’s original plan and the narrator’s 
reception of the text.87  Menard writes to his friend from Bayonne in 1934 to outline his plan to 
produce the Quijote.  The narrator publishes his reading of Menard’s Quijote in May 1939.  Between 
those years, one could argue that the canons of acceptability for reading may have changed.  That is, 
how the text ought to have been read in September 1934 is different to how the text ought to have 
been read in 1939.   It is amply recognised that the story posits the reader as a kind of author, that the 
act of reading is a way of creating the text anew.  But little scrutiny has been paid to the narrator’s 
interpretation, to what particular type of text the author creates in his reading.  A wary reader might 
discover a version of the Quijote that places the narrator’s view of the text alongside Unamuno’s.  
Unamuno’s anarchistic reading of the Quijote directly permits him to tell his reader that Spain ought 
to go to war with itself without his reader pointing to the text in contradiction of his idea.  Unamuno 
wrote 31 years before the onset of the Civil War, and his pain of seeing himself defeated by his own 
argument is historically well-documented.88  That might provide him with some sympathy from the 
                                               
86 This is also how Jaime Alazraki conceptualises meaning in ‘Pierre Menard’: ‘El tiempo, al 
modificar el contexto de una obra, modifica también su sentido, sus valores, sus alcances; así, con el 
girar del tiempo, una obra puede alcanzar una estatura imprevisible o insospechada en el original’ 
(Alazraki 1968: 35).  Fundamentally, the passage of time produces readings that the author cannot 
possibly have conceived of.  This makes a purely intentionalist reading of the text inappropriate. 
87 The exact moment at which Menard writes is not certain, but Daniel Balderston has pointed out 
that the reference to Novalis’s ‘Pflichtenlehre des Lesers’ as an inspiration for Pierre Menard’s 
enterprise, and the letter dated September 30th, 1934, strongly suggest that he wrote his Quijote 
during the mid-1930s (Balderston 1993: 21-22).  
88 The point that intellectual rhetoric can be appropriated and used to justify the use of force is made 
by Jon Juaristi in his recent biography of Unamuno.  Unamuno, having seen how his rhetoric had 
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reader.  Perhaps he could not have foreseen the future political situation and how it unfolded.  But 
Menard’s narrator’s reading is ethically dubious given the European political situation at the precise 
moment of reading. 
 
Critics such as Fernando Iwasaki Cauti have expressed the view that Pierre Menard is an avatar of 
Unamuno in Borges’s work (Cauti 2005).89 There are certainly affinities.  They have some connection 
to the Basque Country.  Both write politically outrageous statements that would later be damned by 
history.  Assuming that Menard began writing before 1936, neither he nor Unamuno could have 
foreseen the fall of the Basque country to the political ideology that their writing would permit.  
Though unlike Unamuno, Menard does not bring his work to public attention.  It became a matter of 
public discourse through a contemporary in May 1939.  Perhaps Menard was cautious of violating 
the Cervantine principle, set out in the prologue to the Novelas ejemplares, that no reader ought to be 
brought to an ill thought or deed by reading.  Was Menard wary of adding fillip to burgeoning 
European militarism and racial extremism at his moment of writing?  His version of the Quijote seems 
like another draft that would have been destined for the bonfire but for his untimely death and the 
intervention of his contemporary.  Perhaps the full implications of the statements he makes in his text 
were not clear to him until he finished authoring the text, and started reading it.  
 
The narrator’s historical circumstances ought to forbid his reading of Menard’s Quijote.   In the 
intervening period between Menard’s writing and the narrator’s reading, Spain has fallen to fascism. 
The Spanish Civil War will be a familiar and timely reference for Menard and the narrator.  He is 
also an intellectual with a command of the Spanish language and literature, an awareness of German 
and Greek philosophy and expertise in the French poetic tradition.  Yet a fascist regime set up in a 
country he knows intimately well does not prevent him from taking pleasure in Menard’s statements 
on the superiority of arms over letters, or the racially motivated statements that readily recall 
Shakespearean quotes on malignant Turks.  Would any reader on the Republican side of the Spanish 
Civil War possibly produce such a reading?  Would the horizons of expectations of a left-wing 
intellectual not prevent such a reading from being produced? 
                                               
found its way into Primo de Rivera’s fascist manifesto, ‘se percató con horror —y no sería la última 
vez— de que los odiosos militares se habían apropriado fácilmente de sus ideas para justificar un 
golpe de Estado, y, por tanto, se creyó urgido a marcar distancias entre lo que él había sostenido y lo 
que el manifiesto proclamaba’ (Juaristi 2015: 353). 
89 Unlike him I think there are key differences.  Unamuno’s rewriting changes form and content; 
Menard’s changes neither.  Menard’s narrator is the one who reads into the Quijote a militaristic fable 
for contemporary times, much like Unamuno does in 1905. 
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The narrator’s reading defies the intellectual trends of his time and place.  But where the narrator sees 
this as a mark of the quality of Menard’s work, the reader ought to see this as a mark of the deficiency 
of the narrator’s reading.  The narrator reads the original Quijote in a highly dubious way.  When 
Menard writes on the relationship between arms and letters, he presumably does not remove don 
Quijote’s admission that the superiority of the former over the latter has yet to be demonstrated: 
‘volvamos a la preeminencia de las armas contra las letras, materia que hasta ahora está por averiguar’ 
(Cervantes 2010: 495). The narrator therefore reads into Menard’s Quijote a significance that the text 
as it is written might not allow for.  He imputes to don Quijote a statement that he did not explicitly 
make.  The narrator’s appropriation of Menard’s text may in that sense rely on a reading of the Quijote 
that ignores the text’s role in defining meaning. 
 
For the narrator, the question as to whether Menard truly places arms above letters is in no way 
interesting to his interpretation.  His interest extends to the fact that Menard ignites that discussion in 
his contemporary situation, and a reader is free to project their own viewpoints onto the text without 
seeing their interpretation negated by the discovery of what the author really wanted to say.  Herein 
lies one of the difficulties of reader-centric methods.  It allows readers to co-opt texts for various 
purposes with no mind for the author’s wishes, and without the text itself being able to disprove their 
reading (Fish 1980: 342).  Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ professes both a reader-centric 
method, and explores its limitations and liability to appropriation.90 Is it not adequate grounds to 
reject the narrator’s interpretation, in May 1939, that Europe is heading inexorably towards war; that 
three of France’s immediate neighbours have fallen to fascist dictatorships?  I would add that 
Borges’s explicit rejection of totalitarianism throughout his career91 separates him from the narrator 
                                               
90 Zur Linde in ‘Deutsches Requiem’ is guilty of appropriating Schopenhauerian determinism in order 
to exonerate himself from his active role in the Holocaust.  Boldy also notes his quixotic conversion 
of reading into action: ‘He is a Germanic Don Quijote who has gone mad by reading too much 
Spengler, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, or by reading it too naively and literally’ (Boldy 2009: 169). 
Echevarría reads zur Linde as an emblem of the intellectual baselessness of fascism, who has arrived 
at his doctrine by misreading philosophical texts (Echevarría 2013: 131).  Though zur Linde has 
similarities to Borges — he is of similar familial and intellectual extraction — he like the narrator of 
‘Pierre Menard’ shares a method of reading with Borges which serves wholly incompatible 
viewpoints. 
91 It took many forms, from the subtle to the explicit.  In a 1946 speech he argued that, ‘Las dictaduras 
fomentan la opresión, las dictaduras fomentan el servilismo, las dictaduras fomentan la crueldad; más 
abominable es el hecho de que fomenten la idiotez […] Combatir estas tristes monotonías es uno de 
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to a large extent.  Borges shares a methodology of reading with his narrator.  But the conclusions they 
draw will differ wildly.  The narrator is about to feel the full force of his own argument when the 
Nazis invade France twelve months from the publication of his review of Menard’s work.92  
 
Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’ is prescient in that sense.  As Jauß shows, the force of historical progress 
provides new aesthetic frameworks by which to interpret and critique texts.  History allows us to 
criticise the narrator’s glorification of arms and his disregard for racial suprematism all the more 
acutely than would have been possible in 1939.  The modern reader benefits from the knowledge of 
the subsequent World War, Holocaust and collapse of European fascism as interpretive tools for 
determining the acceptability of the narrator’s reading.  The narrator goes some way to helping us 
answer the question Fish asked in 1980 as to what constitutes an acceptable reading of the text.  It is 
a world-oriented interpretation, one in keeping with the Cervantine principle, that no reader must be 
moved to ill thought or deed by the text.  For the author cannot intend for their text not to be 
appropriated for ill purposes.  Cervantes recognised his own inability to prevent this.  The 
appropriation of texts for ill ends is what constitutes an unacceptable reading, even if it is in keeping 
with the rules of the textual game.  Proper reading is historically and ethically motivated; it obviates 
the totalitarianism that Borges stood against; the kind that Unamuno, it has been argued, helped to 
precipitate.  Cervantes’s principle that: ‘si por algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas 
pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún mal deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la mano con 
que las escribí, que sacarlas en público’ (Cervantes 2005: 135) is an important check on the reader-
centric method which leads Unamuno, and the narrator of Pierre Menard, to ethically dubious 
interpretations.  Any ill desire or thought produced by the text must be considered an unacceptable 
reading, and as such discarded.   
 
                                               
los muchos deberes del escritor. ¿Habré de recordar a los lectores del Martín Fierro y de Don Segundo 
Sombra que el individualismo es una vieja virtud argentina?’ (Déle, Déle, August 1946).  Interesting 
is his position that, for all his fascination with arms and letters, or civilisation and barbarism, 
militaristic totalitarianism is anathema to intellectual liberalism. 
92 In another twist, it was published originally in La Nación in Argentina, a country whose sympathy 
towards Nazism was the target of Borges’s 1940 ‘Definición del germanófilo’: ‘He tenido el candor 
de conversar con muchos germanófilos argentinos; he intentado hablar de Alemania y de lo 
indestructible alemán; he mencionado a Hölderlin, a Lutero, a Schopenhauer o a Leibnitz; he 
comprobado que el interlocutor “germanófilo” apenas identificaba esos nombres’ (Borges 1986: 335). 
A text stating the specious case for arms over letters by way of a literary reading will have found a 
welcoming readership in Buenos Aires. 
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V.3 El hacedor 
 
Borges’s later writings on the Quijote are interesting from a more purely aesthetic point of view than 
from an ethical one.  Where Borges pays much attention in the first half of the 20th Century to readers 
of the Quijote, including Unamuno and Pierre Menard, in the latter half he takes the Quijote as a 
symbol of the possibilities and limitations of reading.  In ‘Un problema’, an essay published in his 
1960 El hacedor, he posits the objective reality of Cide Hamete Benengeli in order to set out 
interpretive possibilities for the work.  This, as I will show, aligns him somewhat with Unamuno 
despite the latter’s anachronistic and emotional interference with the work.  For both profit from the 
paradoxically non-intentionalist method of taking the author in the most literal sense of his words.  
Though for Borges, Benengeli is made all the more relevant to the interpretation when taking one 
more imaginative step: that of attributing a missing chapter to the whole body of the work.  Here 
Borges does not quite state a case for non-intentionalist methods, but rather explores how the reader’s 
interpretation is an act of assimilating new information in real time, of how each moment in the text 
has an interpretive impact on all following moments. 
 
He opens asking the reader to imagine that Cervantes had indeed stumbled upon the Arabic 
manuscript written by someone who had left the signature Hamete Benengeli, and had translated it 
personally.  The original manuscript is unfaithful to the copy in the novel that we know today: 
 
En el texto leemos que el héroe (que, como es fama, recorría los caminos de España, armado 
de espada y de lanza, y desafiaba por cualquier motivo a cualquiera) descubre, al cabo de uno 
de sus muchos combates, que ha dado muerte a un hombre.  En este punto cesa el fragmento: 
el problema es adivinar, o conjeturar, cómo reacciona Don Quijote. (OC I: 794) 
 
This would represent an obvious breach of the canonical text.  The humorous, satirical reading to 
some extent relies on the fact that don Quijote is relatively harmless, that the worst of his sins is to 
inconvenience those around him, without ever bringing them to harm.  He is a figure of ridicule for 
his inability to impose his will through physical force.  Should the reader find that Quijote is in fact 
competent with arms, this would represent a total reinvention of the character.  They are invited to 
conjecture their own version of what happens next, to impute a psychological state to the hidalgo 
having found that he had been capable of killing.  From here a reader will create their own version of 
the character, one who acted according to their particular expectations of him.  As such, ‘Un 
problema’ represents another thought experiment that sets out how a reader invents a new version of 
the text at the point of reading.  Interestingly, Borges does so in full respect of many of the novel’s 
original devices, including the claim that the novel is a translation of an extant historical work, and 
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the exclusion of episodes which the narrator claims have been lost to history.  Should we imagine a 
chapter as described here, and intersperse it into the original novel, this would surely alter our 
interpretation of what followed.  In this way ‘Un problema’ demonstrates that a literary work is a 
complex organism of interacting cells, where the interpretation of one aspect relies on the 
interpretation of all preceding aspects. 
 
Borges offers three possible readings of the theoretical event, all with a unique interpretive value for 
the rest of the work: 
  
La primera es de índole negativa; nada especial ocurre, porque en el mundo alucinatorio de 
Don Quijote la muerte no es menos común que la magia y haber matado a un hombre no tiene 
por qué perturbar a quien se bate, o cree batirse, con endriagos y encantadores.  La segunda 
es patética.  Don Quijote no logró jamás olvidar que era una proyección de Alonso Quijano, 
lector de historias fabulosas; ver la muerte, comprender que un sueño lo ha llevado a la culpa 
de Caín, lo despierta de su consentida locura acaso para siempre.  La tercera es quizá más 
verosímil.  Muerto aquel hombre, Don Quijote no puede admitir que el acto tremendo es obra 
de un delirio; la realidad del efecto le hace presuponer una pareja realidad de la causa y Don 
Quijote no saldrá de su locura. (OC I: 794) 
 
Borges does not comment on how these conjectures might be formative to the reading.  But in the 
first instance, it is suggested that the reader might think little of it.  For if an accidental killing is an 
occupational hazard of knight-errantry, events such as this are simply to be expected.  By contrast the 
reader might respond with pathos, feeling sympathy for a protagonist who had been bedevilled by 
books of chivalry, only to have the illusion broken when faced with the real consequences of his 
actions.  Or, the reader might assume that Quijote will continue unperturbed, unable to assimilate the 
accepted rules of cause and effect into his worldview.   
 
Each reader will have interpreted the Quijote according to a unique horizon of expectations.  That 
includes the particular approach adopted before the moment of writing: say, the satirical approach or 
the romantic one.  That approach will inevitably form which of the explanations the reader chooses.  
That explanation will then propagate throughout the rest of the interpretation.  Let us assume for 
example that the reader places this apocryphal chapter early on in the novel.  This would surely impact 
on the way in which the reader experienced the rest of the text.  Would a reader not approach each 
new Quijote adventure with fear, then relief, at the outcome of each new episode of Quijote’s 
adventures?  Borges’s attribution of an apocryphal chapter to the Quijote is here not so much an 
exploration of what the reader can deliberately bring to a text, of the meaning that they can actively 
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produce, but of how the reader’s interpretation is a self-propagating model, where each new aspect is 
interpreted in the light of all previous aspects.  This aligns neatly with Iser’s argument that textual 
meaning is given by the effect that each text has on a given reader.  The impact of the apocryphal 
chapter is a literary thought experiment whose results Iser puts to theory: ‘The reader’s position in 
the text is at the point of intersection between retention and protension. Each individual sentence 
correlate prefigures a particular horizon, but this is immediately transformed into the background for 
the next correlate and must therefore be necessarily modified’ (Iser 1987: 111).  Interpretation is a 
complex process.  It involves a reader constantly updating their expectations of the text in the face of 
new information; however, that new information is always interpreted in line with the reader’s 
expectations.   
 
Borges again makes note of how different horizons of expectations produce entirely different 
interpretations.  There is a final conjecture that bears almost no relation to Cervantes’s text as we 
know it:  
 
Queda otra conjetura […] Don Quijote — que ya no es Don Quijote sino un rey de los ciclos 
del Indostán— intuye ante el cadáver del enemigo que que matar y engendrar son actos 
divinos o mágicos que notoriamente transcienden la condición humana.  Sabe que el muerto 
es ilusorio como lo son la espada sangrienta que le pesa en la mano y él mismo y toda su vida 
pretérita y los vastos dioses y el universo. (794) 
 
What if the Quijote is a distant product of literature in a totally different time and place?  How would 
that guide the reader’s interpretation of the text?  In Unamuno’s case, where the Quijote is a product 
of an intra-historic spirit, the authoring and therefore interpretive authority over the work is shared 
across temporal generations and communities.  Borges’s suggestion that the Quijote might be one of 
endless distortions of given narratives from other cultural and historical frameworks makes a similar 
but slightly different argument.  The interpretive authority over the novel is not shared across a 
community, but does not exist at all.  It cannot lie with the author, who merely distorted given forms 
and archetypes he could not fully conceive of.  For the same reason it cannot lie with the reader either: 
the text is produced in its own historical circumstances, and read in a different set of historical 
circumstances.  Neither reader nor author can fully conceive of the sheer number of cultural 
influences which have impacted on the way the text is authored, and the way it is read.  A reader’s 
horizon of expectations is formed by all of the texts that they have read, all of which have distilled 
given tradition in ways accessible to the author.  This reflects Iser’s idea on protensions on a grand 
scale.  Not only is the act of reading a process of updating one’s expectations in the face of new 
information, and interpreting new information in line with those expectations.  The act of writing 
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literature is similarly a process of updating works of literature in light of new ideas, and interpreting 
new ideas in light of given works.  This is how the horizon of expectations of an author and a reader 
is formed.  Ultimately, reading on the most microscopic level is reflective of authorship on the most 
macroscopic.  
 
It also connects strongly to Borges’s views on tradition, that there is a set of human myths common 
to all world literatures that are simply regurgitated over time.93 Tradition has a limiting effect on the 
authorial authority over the work.  The writer cannot produce an original work of literature, one that 
does not crystallise the literary influences that have gone before.  Tracing Cervantes’s literary 
influences all the way backwards throughout cultural history would be an impossible endeavor.94  But 
those influences make themselves felt at the moment of writing, even if the author does not fully 
understand how.  Perhaps if it were possible to trace the Quijote back to literary archetypes in different 
times and places, it would provide the reader with enough contextual information to form a new canon 
of acceptability through which to read the work, and therefore arrive at a new interpretation entirely 
removed from any major trend of thinking on the novel.   
 
The deconstruction of Cervantes’s authority continues in ‘Parábola de Cervantes y de Quijote’.  This 
short poetic essay proposes that the Quijote is the product of a cosmopolitan author, distilling both 
Spanish and Italian cultural influences into a single text.  Borges paints Cervantes as a former military 
man looking for solace in literature, and finding it in an Italian Renaissance tradition: ‘Un viejo 
soldado del rey buscó solaz en las vastas geografías de Ariosto, en aquel valle de la luna donde está 
el tiempo que malgastan los sueños y en el ídolo de oro de Mahoma que robó Montalbán’ (OC I: 
799).  The act of cultural borrowing from Ariosto negates any possibility of referring to the novel as 
a specifically Spanish work.  The Quijote has a meaning that pre-dates Cervantes.  It cannot be 
considered a satire without the existence of previous texts for the novel to lampoon.  The hapless 
knight-errant cannot have come to life without the adventures of Amadís, Roland or his avatar in 
Orlando.  So Cervantes’s right to determine the meaning in the text is deconstructed commensurately 
                                               
93 ‘El encuentro’ makes that point by showing how outlaw Juan Almada’s tribal rivalry against Juan 
Almanza repeats itself in the battle between Uriarte and Duncan that Borges remembers from his 
childhood. 
94 Though it must be said that the limitation of this model is that it implies no beginning to human 
culture.  If each work is just a repetition of a previous one, this must entail an infinite set of texts 
going ever backwards. 
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with the Spanish nation’s claim to have a sole interpretive authority over the work.95 The author’s 
writing is as beholden to a set of international influences as the reader’s interpretation is.   
The mention of Ariosto is interesting for our purposes.  Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso is a continuation 
of Boiardo’s Orlando Innamorato, which itself is heavily influenced by the French Chanson de 
Roland.  All will have been heavily influenced by the British Arthurian legend.  So the Quijote is not 
to be interpreted as a simple homage to Ariosto, but a trove of an unimaginable number of cultural 
strands which have been woven into the novel that we know today.96 The presence of these cultural 
strands within the work forbid an intentionalist reading.  For the Quijote has a meaning that can be 
explored when collated with the works of Boiardo, Montalvo or Ariosto, from whom Cervantes 
inherits the literary form he satirises.  Cervantes has no way to intend the whole meaning of a text 
that is meaningful in comparison to the works of others.97  
 
There also appears a comment that allows for a comparison with Unamuno.  Borges mythologises 
literature, reducing it to a series of set-pieces that are repeated throughout time in different ways and 
from different perspectives98.  Within that statement is an interesting reference to Cervantes and don 
Quijote as the dreamer and the dreamed:  
                                               
95 As Ilan Stavans recently suggested, even the aesthetic investigations into the Quijote are not easily 
divorced from an interest in national issues: ‘By using Menard as an endorser of derivative art as 
authentic, Borges therefore announces that the former colonies known today as the Spanish-speaking 
Americas, while arriving late to the banquet of Western civilisation, are as original in their derivative 
culture as Europe is’ (Stavans 2015: 88).  Fiddian’s recent chapter on ‘Pierre Menard’ also considers 
the work to be important from a cross-cultural point of view, demonstrating the tendency of European 
intellectual circles to appropriate great works for entirely self-serving purposes (Fiddian 2017: 55-
77). 
96 Borges tended to see national literature as the product of international borrowing.  In ‘El escritor 
argentino y la tradición’, he wrote of Güiraldes’s Don Segundo Sombra that ‘para que nosotros 
tuviéramos ese libro fue necesario que Güiraldes recordara la técnica poética de los cenáculos 
franceses de su tiempo, y la obra de Kipling que había leído hacía muchos años; es decir, Kipling, y 
Mark Twain, y las metáforas de los poetas franceses fueron necesarios para este libro argentino’ (OC 
I: 271). 
97 As Livingston argues: ‘As a meaningful attitude, an intention represents some targeted situation or 
state of affairs as well as some means to that end. The content of an intention is schematic, requiring 
specification and adjustment at the time of action’ (Livingston 2005: 8). 
98 Borges expressed similar in conversation with Willis Barnstone: ‘I think in the case of an author 
the best thing is to be part of tradition, to be a part of a language, since the language goes on and the 
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Vencido por la realidad, por España, Don Quijote murió en su aldea natal hacia 1614.  Poco 
tiempo lo sobrevivió Miguel de Cervantes.   
 
Para los dos, para el soñador y el soñado, toda esa trama fue la oposición de dos mundos: el 
mundo irreal de los libros de caballerías, el mundo cotidiano y común del siglo XVII. 
 
No sospecharon que los años acabarían por limar la discordia, no sospecharon que la Mancha 
y Montiel y la magra figura del caballero serían para el porvenir, no menos poéticas que las 
etapas de Simbad o que las vastas geografías de Ariosto.  Porque en el principio de la literatura 
está el mito, y asimismo en el fin. (OC I: 799) 
 
Cervantes could not have conceived of the way his novel would be read in the future, because 
different historical circumstances will continue to find new relevance in old works, as Borges shows 
us in his ‘Pierre Menard’.99  The canons of acceptability change in ways that the author cannot dictate.  
More interesting here might be the reference to Cervantes and Quijote as the dreamer and the 
dreamed, which speaks the language of Unamuno’s Vida de don Quijote y Sancho.  This will be 
useful for the comparison between Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of the Quijote in the next 
chapter.  Here the dream is the dream of literature, and not life.  The act of writing literature is akin 
to dreaming, as I will argue in the next section.  In Unamuno’s work, the world and the dream exist 
on the same plane; in Borges’s, the world and the dream are extricable from each other.  For literature 
is a series of myths which are transmitted across history.  The plot is a simple clash between the 
unreal world of chivalric novels and the real world of readers.  Don Quijote’s madness is based on an 
inability to separate these two worlds; a separation that Unamuno hotly denies.   
 
V.4 Magias parciales y crónicas de sueños 
 
                                               
books may be forgotten, or perhaps every age rewrites the same books over and over again, changing 
or adding a few circumstances.  Perhaps the eternal books are all the same books.  We are always 
rewriting what the ancients wrote, and that should prove sufficient’ (Barnstone 1982: 9). 
99 Rodríguez-Luis argues similarly: ‘las circunstancias que afectaron la recepción del Quijote hicieron 
que éste terminase atrayendo interpretaciones de tipo romántico, el equivalente moderno de la 
idealización característica de aquellas novelas que Cervantes atacó parodiándolas’ (Rodríguez-Luis 
1988: 488).  
   135 
Borges’s later works on the Quijote do not explore a reader-centric model of interpretation in explicit 
terms, but do so by exploring the novel through a more metaphysical lens.100 This shift from focusing 
on the novel’s readers to focusing on its metaphysical play reaches its completion when Borges pens 
his 1952 ‘Magias parciales del Quijote’.  It does not seem coincidental that the Quijote serves as a 
useful tool by which Borges can explore many of the key notions behind some of his earlier fictions: 
‘Las ruinas circulares’ expresses an irrevocable concern that the self might, humiliatingly, be the 
dream of another, who might be the dream of another, ad infinitum.  That particular interest does not 
abandon Borges in his later career.  At this point the Quijote bears the weight of Borges’s 
metaphysical investigations. Those metaphysical investigations, however, are still interesting to 
reader-response theory.   
 
In ‘Magias parciales’, Borges recognises the Quijote as a work which opposes two different worlds: 
the prosaic world of Cervantes and the poetic world of don Quijote (Borges 2013: 207).  Don 
Quijote’s inability to separate the poetic world from the prosaic one becomes a useful intellectual 
support for Borges’s discussion of that separation.  In fact, Borges argues that the creation of realist 
literature in the Cervantine mode is an act of fictionalising or poeticising the prosaic reality of the 
reader:  
 
Cervantes ha creado para nosotros la poesía de España del siglo XVII, pero ni aquel siglo ni 
aquella España eran poéticas para él; hombres como Unamuno o Azorín o Antonio Machado, 
enternecidos ante la evocación de la Mancha, le hubieran sido incomprensibles.  El plan de su 
obra le vedaba lo maravilloso. (208) 
 
This is simultaneously a comment on the opposition between a poetic reality and a prosaic one — the 
world of Quijote versus the world of Cervantes, for instance — and on the author’s ability to establish 
canons of acceptable readings of their work.  For Cervantes’s plan might have been to create a work 
whose narrative depended on the reader’s ability to understand, as Quijote could not, that the world 
of fiction and the world of reality were separate.  But that authorial assumption cannot forbid modern 
readers, including Unamuno, from reading a poetic significance into the work, or from projecting an 
idealised, poetic vision onto the prosaic world.  In other words, Borges highlights that Cervantes’s 
intention to write a satire on one man’s inaptitude to separate chivalric fiction from objective fact is 
no hindrance to the Romantic approach, which extols Quijote’s ability to see in the world what he 
wished to find there, and which was significantly expanded upon later by intellectuals such as 
                                               
100 By metaphysical, I mean here the difficulty of separating fictional reality from material reality.  
This is also explored through the motif of the dream as an act of literary production. 
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Unamuno.  In fact, his intention to produce a work with a particular meaning obstructed him from 
seeing the full wealth of meanings that his work could contain.101 As I will maintain throughout this 
final section, the meeting of two different metaphysical planes in Borges’s work — whether it be 
prose versus poetry, dreams versus wakefulness — is highly symbolic of the reader’s freedom to 
produce meaning, and the author’s inability to dictate the limits of the meaning of their work.102   
 
The metaphysical ambiguity of the Quijote, where the fictional character can judge the work of the 
real author, and the real author claims to be the editor of a work written and translated by two other 
fictional characters, meets its apex in Volume 2, Chapter 2: ‘Ese juego de extrañas ambigüedades 
culmina en la segunda parte; los protagonistas han leído la primera, los protagonistas del Quijote son, 
asimismo, lectores del Quijote’ (209).  The obvious jarring effect that this will exert on a reader, used 
to the feigned historicity of chivalric novels, is highlighted by Sancho, who informs don Quijote that 
their exploits have been put to print by a certain Cide Hamete Berenjena: 
 
anoche llegó el hijo de Bartolomé Carrasco, que viene de estudiar en Salamanca, hecho 
bachiller, y yéndole yo a dar la bienvenida, me dijo que andaba ya en libros la historia de 
vuestra merced, con nombre de El Ingenioso Hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha; y dice que 
me mientan a mí en ella con mi mesmo nombre de Sancho Panza, y a la señora Dulcinea del 
Toboso, con otras cosas que pasamos nosotros a solas, que me hice cruces de espantado cómo 
las pudo saber el historiador que las escribió. (Cervantes 2010: 704) 
 
This leads Borges to a discussion of the motif of literature containing itself, taking the 1001 Nights 
and Royce’s The World and the Individual as examples, which he concludes not by separating the 
world of the reader from the world of Quijote, but by uniting them:  
                                               
101 This is a point of agreement with Unamuno, who explicitly argued in his 1906 ‘Sobre la lectura e 
interpretación del Quijote’ that an author cannot explain the full meaning of a work: ‘¿qué tiene que 
ver lo que Cervantes quisiera decir en su Quijote, si es que quiso decir algo, con lo que a los demás 
se nos ocurra ver en él?  ¿De cuándo acá es el autor de un libro el que ha de entenderlo mejor?’ (OC 
I: 1230). 
102 The mention of the basin as an explicit discussion of the distinction between objectivity and 
subjectivity is indicative of this (208).  The implicit question behind this section of the Quijote is 
whether the identity of the object is given objectively, or whether it depends on the subjectivity of 
each individual viewer.  This can be extrapolated to include readings.  Is there an objective meaning 
to a text — which would logically have to be given by an author — or can the reader read subjectively, 
producing a helmet from the basin that is the text? 
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¿Por qué nos inquieta que el mapa esté incluido en el mapa y las mil y una noches en el libro 
de Las mil y una noches? ¿Por qué nos inquieta que Don Quijote sea lector del Quijote, y 
Hamlet, espectador de Hamlet? Creo haber dado con la causa: tales inversiones sugieren que 
si los caracteres de una ficción pueden ser lectores o espectadores, nosotros, sus lectores o 
espectadores, podemos ser ficticios. En 1833, Carlyle observó que la historia universal es un 
infinito libro sagrado que todos los hombres escriben y leen y tratan de entender, y en el que 
también los escriben. (210-211) 
 
Don Quijote is the embodiment of the need to make a distinction between the poetic world and prosaic 
one.  The fact that his poetic vision does not compute with the world he lives in is the basis of the 
satiric, humorous reading of the novel.  Borges eschews such a reading, opting instead to unite the 
reader with Quijote on the same plane of existence.  For perhaps the reader is, like Quijote, a mere 
fiction, or the dream of another.  The combination of the novel’s realism — Quijote and Sancho travel 
across a realistically-portrayed Spanish landscape — and its meeting of fictional and non-fictional 
spaces provides in that sense for a non-intentionalist reading, in as far as it is assumed that Cervantes’s 
intention extended as far as a simple satire.  Don Quijote’s mad quest through a fictional reality that 
contains itself does not permit the reader to assume — as the satirical reading would — that the reality 
they inhabit has an objective nature.  In this context it seems far from incidental that Unamuno is 
mentioned among the readers who Borges believes identified in the Quijote ideas unavailable to 
Cervantes at the moment of writing.  The idea that the metafictional devices of the Quijote fictionalise 
the reader is removed from Unamuno’s insistence that Quijote and Sancho were the creators of 
Cervantes only in terms of emphasis.  Their obfuscations of fact and fiction, of dream and 
wakefulness, prosaic reality with poetic imagination; all are the products of arguments in favour of a 
reading of the original text that Cervantes may never have identified.103  
 
Dreams are an important motif in Borges’s works.104 The narrator of Las ruinas circulares tells of 
his humiliation at realising that he is the dream of another.  In the prologue to El informe de Brodie, 
he refers to literature itself as a dream directed by the dreamer: ‘la literatura no es otra cosa que un 
sueño dirigido,’ he explains (OC I: 1022).  This is emblematic of the role of intention in Borges’s 
reading.  As in Unamuno’s Vida, to consider literature a type of dream is to remove some creative 
                                               
103 For that reason I do not agree with Julio Rodríguez-Luis, who argued that the objective of Magias 
parciales is simply to deny reality (Rodríguez-Luis 1988: 486). 
104 In fact, Rodríguez-Luis argues that the understanding of literature as an oneiric projection is a 
cornerstone of Borges’s aesthetics (Rodríguez-Luis 2010: 230). 
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authority from the writer.  It posits that literature is not the deliberate product of a mind, but something 
that imposes itself, something that arrives into the mind of the author in a somewhat complete form.  
Also, nothing can be dreamt without the framework for imagining it having existed before the dream 
takes place.  To apply that to literature, everything that is written must be written according to literary 
and cultural models that pre-exist the author. The author is the figure who directs the influences 
external to him and produces a literary work. The dream motif — which is, not to forget, a part of the 
philosophical games that Borges plays in some of his fictions — is therefore also relevant to the 
divide between intentionalist and non-intentionalist readings.105 For how can the author’s intention 
provide the whole meaning of the work when the cultural frameworks that the author profited from 
are what enabled the work to be written at all?   
 
In a 1964 work appropriately entitled ‘Lectores’, Borges makes a claim totally contrary to the 
understanding of the Quijote that all readers presumably share.  Don Quijote did not in fact become 
a knight-errant wandering across La Mancha in search of adventure.  Rather, Alonso Quijano dreamt 
up Don Quijote safely within the confines of his library: 
 
De aquel hidalgo de cetrina y seca  
Tez y de heroico afán se conjetura 
Que, en víspera perpetua de aventura,  
No salió nunca de su biblioteca.  
La crónica puntual que sus empeños 
Narra y sus tragicómicos desplantes 
Fue soñada por él, no por Cervantes. (OC I: 892) 
 
The attribution of the creative influence over the work to a character within that work expands on the 
assumptions behind ‘Pierre Menard’.  The author is never wholly responsible for the act of writing.  
On the most basic level this eschews the cult of personality often attributed to authors.  It also 
empowers the text ahead of the author.  The claim that Quijote was a creation of Quijano and not 
Cervantes ought not to be read literally.  In my view, it implies that the text is the guiding principle 
for literary interpretation, and that texts are produced according to literary rules and norms that the 
author cannot himself dictate.  Moreover, it implies that literary practices are a kind of platonic form, 
not created by the author but only able to be discovered by him.  The text, to use Iser’s words, is itself 
a set of governing rules for its own interpretation.  The claim that Quijano created Quijote is symbolic 
                                               
105 As Piglia notes, ‘Hay una relación entre la lectura y lo real, pero también hay una relación entre 
la lectura y los sueños’ (Piglia 2005: 23). 
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of the text’s position in a reader-based aesthetics.  The text, and not the author, is the sole guiding 
principle which permits and discards certain readings.   
 
For the reader this is equally empowering.  The very fact of reading the novels of chivalry is enough 
to transport the reader, Quijano, across the whole of the Peninsula, tilting at windmills and freeing 
galley slaves from their bounds.  Simply by reading, Quijano has authored his own story, focalised 
entirely through his unique experience.  The creative literary act is reading, not writing.  The text is 
brought to life, and meaning is created within it, purely at the moment of reading.  The apparently 
absurd claim that Quijano authored Quijote is a metaphor for the relationship between the text and 
the reader. The text sets out the rules which govern the aesthetic experience possible to the reader; 
the reader’s unique aesthetic experience of the text awakens a meaning in it that is unique to the 
individual. What I mean by ‘meaning’ here, is not strictly an intellectual interpretation or analysis.  
‘Lectores’ shows that the aesthetic experience of reading is a unique interaction between text and 
reader. ‘Meaning’ here is best understood as the effect of the text on the reader. That unique 
interaction is the basis for intellectual interpretations.  In other words, when a reader experiences a 
text in a way no other reader does, then their active interpretation of the text will be equally unique.   
 
The poem makes a more explicit combination between reading and dreaming that will inform the rest 
of this section:  
 
Tal es también mi suerte.  Sé que hay algo  
Inmortal y esencial que he sepultado  
En esa biblioteca del pasado 
En que leí la historia del hidalgo. 
Las lentas hojas vuelve un niño y grave 
Sueña con vagas cosas que no sabe. (892) 
 
Dreaming is used here as a synonym for reading.  For reading is a process of the imagination just as 
dreaming is.  This problematises the position of the reader.  Dreams take place within the individual 
mind, yet are something that happens to the dreamer, they impose themselves on the mind and are 
processed by the unconscious imagination.  Texts impose themselves also on the mind of the reader, 
providing them with a set of orchestrating rules, including characters, places and events, which are 
processed automatically by the reader’s unconscious imagination.  The reader’s role in the text is vital 
for the production of meaning, because the text needs to be experienced aesthetically in order for 
interpretation to be possible.  But the potential of the reader to play an active part in the production 
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of meaning in the text is entirely limited by their imagination, or their horizon of expectations.  This 
characterises the metaphor of dreaming as reading in all of Borges’s later works on the Quijote. 
 
It also does not seem incidental that a major work of El oro de los tigres in ‘Sueña Alonso Quijano’ 
specifically explores the relationship between author and text through the dream motif.106 The 
ekphrastic poem shows Quijano’s renunciation of Quijote’s chivalric ambitions as the act of waking 
from a dream.  Here, the dream referred to is the fantasy that Quijote could reinstate the age of 
chivalry in his contemporary setting.  But the poem concludes by providing a more significant 
resonance to the term:  
 
El hidalgo fue un sueño de Cervantes 
Y don Quijote un sueño del hidalgo 
El doble sueño los confunde y algo 
Está pasando que pasó muchos años antes. 
 
Quijano duerme y sueña.  Una batalla: 
Los mares de Lepanto y la metralla. (OC I: 1096)  
 
The poem is striking for its confusion of existential levels.  The hidalgo was a dream of Cervantes’s, 
but don Quijote was a dream of Quijano!  Cervantes is not responsible for authoring Quijote; Quijano 
is.  That is simultaneously empowering and disempowering to the author.  Cervantes passively 
produces the tale of Alonso Quijano, a tale that has an agency unto itself.  Quijano’s transformation 
into don Quijote is a condition of the work as it appears to Cervantes, as, to borrow Unamuno’s term, 
it imposes itself on the writer.  The literary work develops in a way that the author cannot fully intend 
or plan for.  Its subversion of the chivalric form relies upon the existence of that form, and as such is 
guided by external forces that the author cannot control.  The notion that literature is a dream directed 
by the author is part of Borges’s method for reading the Quijote.  He holds Cervantes as a dreamer, 
whose authority over the way the work is written is far from absolute.107 When the author has only a 
limited role in the creation of literature, they cannot be held as the source of truth in any individual 
work. 
                                               
106 He also does this in his 1975 poem ‘Quince monedas’, where he takes Cervantes as a mouthpiece, 
reminiscing on the starry night ‘En que soñé el Quijote’ (OC II: 91). 
107 For this reason Unamuno’s view that the Quijote is authored by an eternal Spanish cultural spirit 
is relevant to Borges’s readings also.  Both subvert the author’s authority by proposing that a work is 
never written free of external cultural influences.   
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The poem’s conclusion problematises this discussion.  Quijano does not just dream himself as don 
Quijote, but also dreams of the very real historical events that Cervantes witnessed first-hand.  In that 
sense Cervantes and his reality become the creation of Quijano.  Cervantes is secondary to the Quijote 
because he is identified as a metonym for the work.  That is, he is known simply as the author of a 
work, whereas don Quijote is known for his adventures, including tilting at windmills and freeing the 
galley-slaves.108 Quijano exists in a reality that is constantly reinstated whenever a reader receives 
the work.  Cervantes’s reality is fleeting by comparison.  The claim that Quijano can dream of the 
reality of Cervantes is a playful, self-ironic symbol of the primacy of the work over the author, 
developed by the New Critics and which culminated in various types of theories which explore the 
text in its relationship to the reader.  To consider the work superior to the author is to permit the reader 
to interpret the work without considering the author’s specific intended plan.   
 
Moreover, the idea that producing literature is akin to dreaming unites reading and writing in an 
important sense.  The author is always beholden to the horizon of expectations through which they 
write.  Cervantes’s will have included the works of Montalvo, Ariosto and Boiardo.  He could not 
have written the Quijote free of their influence.  The reader’s horizon of expectations functions 
similarly.  As Borges shows in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’, when a new work becomes part of our 
cultural knowledge, it inevitably changes how we read others, even anachronistically.  For works 
influence each other not according to the order in which they are written, but in which they are read.  
Both reading and authorship also entail a limited amount of deliberate action.  A reader can 
deliberately receive the work, attribute it to other authors, contextualise it within other times and 
places, and collate it next to other works so as to show how they enlighten each other.  An author 
must deliberately decide to write a work through their own endeavour.  Yet in both cases the horizon 
of expectations is decisive.  What a reader can deliberately find in the work is limited by their 
conceptual framework, their time and place, their cultural points of reference.  What an author can 
deliberately create is limited in precisely the same way.  As such Paisley Livingston’s notion of a 
conditional intentionalism — which takes into account what the author would have been able to 
                                               
108 The narratological interest in the claim that Cervantes is less real, or similarly fictional, to his 
characters was explored by Unamuno in one of his early essays, ‘El caballero de la triste figura’: 
‘Cuando volvamos a la tierra de que salimos, ¿quedará de nosotros mucho más que de Don Quijote 
queda?  ¿Qué queda de Cide Hamete, su biógrafo?  El mundo pasajero y contingente va produciendo 
el permanente y necesario de nuestro espíritu, es su mayor realidad ésta: la historia toda es la 
idealización de lo real por la realización del ideal.  ¿Hizo Homero a Aquiles, o éste a aquél?’ (OC 
VII: 917-918). 
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intend at the moment of writing — is a useful reflection of Borges’s arguments on reading and 
authorship.  Interpretation is ultimately a matter of what the reader is historically and culturally 
capable of perceiving in the work, and what the author is historically and culturally capable of putting 
there.  Reading and authorship are equal in that they both entail a deliberate action under the 
constraints of a mind conditioned by external circumstances.  Borges’s reflection that literature is a 
directed dream applies to reading just as much as it does to authorship.  
 
Borges’s final major work on the Quijote, ‘Ni siquiera soy polvo’ published in Historia de la noche, 
places Alonso Quijano and Miguel de Cervantes in a similar relationship to that shared by Augusto 
Pérez and Miguel de Unamuno.  Quijano recognises, unlike in the Quijote, that he is the dream of 
another: 
 
Ni siquiera soy polvo. Soy un sueño 
Que entreteje en el sueño y la vigilia  
Mi hermano y padre, el capitán Cervantes, 
Que militó en los mares de Lepanto 
Y supo unos latines y algo de árabe… 
Para que yo pueda soñar al otro 
Cuya verde memoria será parte 
De los días del hombre, te suplico: 
Mi Dios, mi soñador, sigue soñándome.’ (OC II: 177-178) 
 
This will aid my comparison in the next chapter between Borges’s and Unamuno’s respective 
conceptualisation of dreams in the following chapter.  A few key features of this sonnet stand out to 
the reader.  Quijano narrates it from a first-person perspective.  He explains that, in his desire to 
reinstate the age of chivalry, he will deliberately dream himself into Quijote: 
 
Quiera Dios que un enviado restituya 
a nuestro tiempo ese ejercicio noble.   
Mis sueños lo divisan.  Lo he sentido 
a veces en mi triste carne célibe.  
No sé aún su nombre.  Yo, Quijano, 
seré ese paladín.  Seré mi sueño. (177) 
 
This connotation of dreaming is present also in the poem ‘Lectores’.  The whole adventure was 
nothing other than an act of reading, of giving life to the text at the moment of reception.  In both of 
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these cases, the conflict between Quijano’s dream and Cervantes’s is reflective of the relationship 
between the author and text.  When an author writes, at what point does the text have a life of its 
own?  To what extent is the text dependent on the meaning of the author?  The paradoxical use of 
dreams here highlights these questions without offering a straightforward answer to them.  Quijano 
has agency over his decision to become Quijote.  It is his choice.  Yet this agency does not seem to 
mutually cancel with the fact that his existence depends entirely on Cervantes.109 In fact, Quijano is 
brought into being through the kind of waking dream that Borges uses as a model for literature.  He 
is a product of the author’s horizon of expectations — Quijano could never have existed were it not 
for his author’s participation at the Battle of Lepanto, or his command of Latin and Arabic.  This 
posits an extremely difficult relationship between author and text, and one that is heavily reflected in 
the work of Unamuno.110 It posits, paradoxically, that a text cannot exist without an author, yet the 
text has an autonomy free of that author’s deliberate influence. Such an idea clearly recalls Barthes: 
 
We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the 
‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, 
                                               
109 A striking resemblance to Unamuno’s Niebla appears here.  The dialogue between Pérez and 
Unamuno treats dreams in much the same way.  The author and text are interdependent yet 
autonomous.  The representation of literature as a dream complicates the relationship between author 
and text: 
 
Cuando un hombre dormido e inerte en la cama sueña algo, ¿qué es lo que más existe: él como 
conciencia que sueña, o su sueño? 
—¿Y si sueña que existe él mismo, el soñador?— le repliqué a mi vez. 
—En ese caso, amigo don Miguel, le pregunto yo a mi vez: ¿de qué manera existe él, como 
soñador que se sueña, o como soñado por sí mismo?  Y fíjese, además, en que al admitir esta 
discusión conmigo me reconoce ya existencia independiente de sí. 
—¡No, eso no!  ¡Eso no! —le dije vivamente—.  Yo necesito discutir, sin discusión no vivo 
y sin contradicción, y cuando no hay fuera de mí quien me discuta y contradiga, invento dentro 
de mí quien lo haga.  Mis monólogos son diálogos. (Unamuno 2014: 256) 
 
110 Unamuno uses dreams to convey a more serious metaphysical doubt.  At the end of his Vida de 
Don Quijote y Sancho he makes an invocation very similar to the conclusion of ‘Ni siquiera soy 
polvo’: ‘Intercede, pues, en favor mío, ¡oh mi señor y patrón! […] Y si es la vida sueño, ¡déjame 
soñarla inacabable!’ (Unamuno 2011: 527).  Though Augusto’s relationship to Unamuno in Niebla 
is also indicative of the conflict between an author-God and his creation.   
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none of them original, blend and clash.  The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the 
innumerable centres of culture. (Barthes 1987: 146) 
 
The author writes a text from their horizon of expectations, which contains a series of influences 
drawn from various centres of culture.  A text is not imbued with a single theological meaning, but is 
the canvas onto which the reader can project their own interpretation.  The author in that sense 
becomes a kind of Abrahamic Author-God, one responsible for creating the fiction, but one who must 
give his creations autonomy.  For the author need not be the one who understands the work best, and 
the author can also be a critic of their own work.  And as Jauß and Fish argue, the acceptable readings 
of the text change across time, according to new historical moments and updated canons of reading.  
In this sense, dreams become the ideal expression of the difficult relationship between authors, texts 
and readers in the work of Borges and Unamuno.  Authorship is akin to a waking dream in that it 
deliberately shapes a set of unconscious external influences into a coherent unit that we call the text.  
Those unconscious influences — or the horizon of expectations as I have referred to it — prohibit the 
author from dictating the total meaning of the work.  Reading is akin to a waking dream in the same 
sense.  External influences — historical events and other texts — impact unavoidably on the reading 
moment.  Reading and authorship are both the active projection of an unconscious horizon of 
expectations, much akin to a waking dream.  This will be one of the key points of comparison between 
Unamuno and Borges in the chapter to come.  The dream is an image common to their theories of 
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VI. Comparing Unamuno and Borges 
 
Unamuno and Borges constantly efface the ultimate authority of the author.  Unamuno’s great essay 
on literary production, Cómo se hace una novela establishes a parity between the reader and author 
that echoes in much of Borges’s work.  A novel is written, says Unamuno, so that both reader and 
author can enter into a life-giving, existentially-affirming discourse, so that both can be saved from 
their ‘soledad radical’. In the reading act, which in Unamuno’s view is the interaction between the 
mind of the reader and the mind of the author, there is little to separate the two poles of reading and 
writing.  For the author, too, is a reader: ‘Porque el que lee una novela puede vivirla, revivirla — y 
quien dice una novela dice una historia —, y el que lee un poema, una criatura — poema es criatura 
y poesía creación — puede recrearlo.  Entre ellos el autor mismo’ (Unamuno 2009: 108).  In the same 
text, Unamuno sets out a norm of reading in which the guiding principle behind reading is that the 
reader must be brought into intellectual action.  This norm is mutually exclusive with a reliance on 
the author’s intended meaning as a hermeneutic crutch: ‘¿Qué me importa que no leas, lector, lo que 
yo quise poner en ella [mi obra], si es que lees lo que te enciende en vida?  Me parece necio que un 
autor se distraiga en explicar lo que quiso decir, pues lo que nos importa no es lo que quiso decir, 
sino lo que dijo, o mejor lo que oímos’ (121).  The reading act is the authoring act; what the author 
said is equal to what the reader heard.  There is no more radical non-intentionalist position than that. 
 
Borges shares this interest with Unamuno.  He too argues that reading is the communication between 
the opposing voices of the author and the reader.  ‘A quien leyere’ is an apology to the reader for 
possibly usurping their creative role in the interpretation of the text solely by having been the one to 
put pen to paper.  The young Borges saw little distinction between the two roles: ‘Nuestras nadas 
poco difieren’ (OC I: 15 - emphasis in original), which yielded later in his career to a more explicit 
favouring of the reader over the author.  His 1935 Historia universal de la infamia is prefaced with a 
discussion of the superiority of the reader over the author: ‘A veces creo que los buenos lectores son 
cisnes aun más tenebrosos y singulares que los buenos autores […] Leer, por lo pronto, es una 
actividad posterior a la de escribir: más resignada, más civil, más intelectual’ (OC I: 289).  In 1939 
even the great Golden Age author Miguel de Cervantes finds himself despoiled of his own work by 
a reader well outside of his own time and place, and by 1952’s publication of Otras inquisiciones he 
has all but promoted reading to the status of the sole creative act in literature: ‘Una literatura difiere 
de otra, ulterior o anterior, menos por el texto que por la manera de ser leída: si me fuera otorgado 
leer cualquier página actual — ésta, por ejemplo — como la leerán el año 2000, yo sabría cómo será 
la literatura del año 2000’ (‘Nota sobre (hacia) Bernard Shaw’, Otras inquisiciones, Borges 2013: 
342).  Literature is not a set of words printed on paper during any given time period, but the set of 
possible interpretations permitted at any given historical moment.  What an author can say, or what 
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a reader might hear, as Unamuno put it in Cómo se hace una novela, is conditioned by circumstances 
outside of the text, and as such, is different at any given moment in human history.   
 
This gives rise to both comparisons and contrasts between their respective methods of reading.  
Unamuno and Borges very clearly share a non-intentionalist approach to reading, one that favours 
the reader’s perspective above any formalist or intentionalist interpretation.  However, Borges 
qualifies Unamuno’s view on reading.  It is true, in Borges’s view, to argue that a text is defined by 
what a reader finds in the text.  Though both differ on the weight they give to the author in the reading 
act.  Borges de-emphasises the author’s role, reducing it to an accident of history that has no 
meaningful relationship to the content of the work.  Unamuno claims in Cómo se hace una novela 
that all acts of writing are autobiographical: ‘Sí, toda novela, toda obra de ficción, todo poema, cuando 
es vivo, es autobiográfico.  Todo ser de ficción, todo personaje poético que crea un autor hace parte 
del autor mismo’ (Unamuno 2009: 136) and that the reader as such invokes the author at the point of 
reception.  For Unamuno’s wish was to ‘hacer una novela en la que quería poner la más íntima 
experiencia de mi destierro, crearme, eternizarme, bajo los rasgos de desterrado y de proscrito’ (140). 
Unamuno in that sense theorises reading as a process of personal communication.  The author is not 
an irrelevance, but as he explains in Cómo se hace una novela, the author’s intention does not dictate 
the reader’s response.  Every reading is a unique discourse between the reader and the author, one 
whose meaning is determined by what the reader hears, ‘lo que oímos’.  In Borges’s view, the author 
is not present or invoked at the moment of reading, and therefore has no such redemptive power for 
the person who only by accident of fate is writing and not reading.  After all, Pierre Menard’s reading, 
which is filtered through cultural and historical circumstances unavailable to Cervantes, are sufficient 
to create a new text altogether.  Though in Menard’s case, there is still an interpretive use for 
Menard’s version, if only to show that each act of reading differs from every other.   
 
Herein lie the comparisons and the contrasts between Unamuno’s and Borges’s views on reading.  
The author’s position in a tripartite process between author, reader and text is affirmed much more 
strongly in Unamuno’s case.  To have written, and to be read, grants the author a metaphysical 
immunity from physical death.  The author’s role in Borges’s method of reading is twofold.  First, it 
acts as a metonym for literary corpora, real or imagined, among which the reader can trace 
comparisons that inform readings of various texts.  Two, it illustrates his argument that interpretations 
are in constant renewal by constructing the author’s possible horizon of expectations, and using it as 
a comparative tool between preceding and contemporary interpretations.  For, as he proposes in ‘Nota 
sobre (hacia) Bernard Shaw’, ‘La literatura no es agotable, por la suficiente y simple razón de que un 
solo libro no lo es’ (342).  This is where Unamuno’s theory of reading re-converges with Borges’s.  
For the latter does not theorise reading as a communicative relationship between reader and 
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author.111He does, however, provide the grounds on which such a communication could be said to 
take place.  Because in Unamuno’s model, a text’s meaning is determined by what the author says to 
a given reader, or at least, what a given reader hears in the text.  Borges provides grounds for taking 
that proposition seriously: a given reader obeys a unique horizon of expectations, different from that 
of each other reader as well as the author, which causes a single text to be infinitely polysemic 
according to the individual perspective.  Changing historical circumstances might cause readers to 
hear certain resonances in the text and be deaf to others, to identify and value in the text concepts that 
others, the author included, may not have identified.  Borges expresses this idea, appropriately, 
through a reading of the Quijote in ‘Las versiones homéricas’:  
 
Ya no sé si el informe: En un lugar de la Mancha, de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme no ha 
mucho tiempo que vivía un hidalgo de los de lanza en astillero, adarga antigua, rocín flaco y 
galgo corredor, es bueno para una divinidad, imparcial; sé únicamente que toda modificación 
es sacrílega y que no puedo concebir otra iniciación del Quijote. Cervantes, creo, prescindió 
de esa leve superstición, y tal vez no hubiera identificado ese párrafo. Yo, en cambio, no podré 
sino repudiar cualquier divergencia. El Quijote, debido a mi ejercicio congénito del español, 
es un monumento uniforme, sin otras variaciones que las deparadas por el editor, el 
encuadernador y el cajista. (‘Las versiones homéricas’, OC I: 239-240) 
 
As a Spanish-speaking man of letters, he is an inheritor —even if a distant and peripheral one— of a 
national literature which has left an indelible mark on the way he reads.  The opening line, ‘En un 
lugar de la Mancha, de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme’ is arguably the most canonical phrase in 
all of Hispanic literature. His linguistic and cultural closeness to Spain has transformed into a 
monolith a phrase that Cervantes may never have considered in depth.  Moreover, this phrase becomes 
a protension by which the rest of the text is interpreted: it becomes the narrative experiment of a 
provably unreliable narrator, of an author who understands the limits of his position.  In other contexts 
it might cause a reader to see this as the work of a malicious historian, who scornfully mocks the 
misfortunes of a selfless national hero.  Both of these are interpretations that can present themselves 
to specific readers, whether the author intended this or not.  And what an author can say to specific 
readers is determined by the reader’s own historical and cultural circumstances.   
 
VI.1 The relevance of literary tradition to reader-response theory 
                                               
111 This, as Iser points out, does not adequately describe the true relationship between author and 
reader, given the author’s physical absence at the moment of reading.  Unlike in a verbal discussion, 
there is no means outside of the text to interrogate or challenge the author (Iser 1982: 227). 
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What allows us to compare Unamuno’s work on the Quijote to that of Borges is a shared interest in 
reader-based responses to texts.  Their reader-based responses are, in both cases, embedded in 
cosmopolitan literary and intellectual contexts that wrest some interpretive authority from the author.  
Their effacements of the hegemony of the writer over the reader show an acute awareness of their 
own finitude in an infinite chain of human cultural progress.  It is worth exploring the cultural 
backdrop that allows them to promote the reader as the creative influence in the text.  For both 
Unamuno and Borges see literature as a condition of human nature, which filters itself through 
individuals in their time and place.  A collective human consciousness produces and reproduces ideas 
ad infinitum AND crystallises into literary works thanks to individuals who exist within it.   
 
Unamuno thinks of Spanish culture, from Menéndez y Pelayo to Cervantes, as firmly embedded in a 
much broader European context (Unamuno 2014: 130-131).  For no culture, and no phenomena 
within that culture, are free of the influence of external factors.  For that reason Cervantes, as aware 
of his place in an infinite string of human cultural output as Unamuno is, provides universal moral 
tales for all of humanity by embodying the full spirit of his pueblo into the protagonist of his 
masterpiece.  Spanishness is not mutually exclusive with universality.  Equally, Spanish texts cannot 
be extricated from the universal human cultural condition, or the arte eterno, which gave rise to them.  
As such, the text is not only in some sense authored and propagated by a latent human spirit, reducing 
the role of author to a scribe of literary commonplaces as they present themselves in his time and 
place.  It is also an aesthetic event unique to each reader across all moments and spaces.  The text has 
a universal significance that offers a personal validity to readers who are separated by cultural 
boundaries, but united by their human condition.  That is how, in En torno al casticismo, Quijano 
becomes the universal man.  He symbolises at once the Golden Age interest in chivalric norms, as 
well as a common human thread.  Unamuno’s reader-centric approach, explored through the Quijote, 
is built therefore on a basis of shared interpretive authority, not just in the reader, but across all 
readers, no matter the temporal or cultural circumstances.  The very notion that the protagonist of 
what many consider to be the Spanish national text can embody a universal human spirit relies on a 
non-intentionalist method of reading, for it must open the text to interpretations from readers well 
outside of Cervantes’s time and place. 
 
In En torno al casticismo, Unamuno also appropriates the Quijote to propose that literature is a series 
of texts which contain other texts, suggesting for example that Alonso Quijano is at the heart of 
Segismundo’s existential woes, ‘es el fondo eterno y permanente de los héroes de Calderón, que son 
los que mejor revelan la manifestación histórica, la meramente histórica de aquel pueblo’ (Unamuno 
2014: 170).  Calderón is a successor to Cervantes, who is a successor to Ariosto, and so on.  Calderón 
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has a similar function in Unamuno’s work to Coleridge in Borges’s: ‘Detrás de la invención de 
Coleridge está la general y antigua invención de las generaciones de amantes que pidieron como 
prenda una flor’ (Borges 2013: 162).  The credit for the authorship of each literary work must be 
shared between all of the authors who have participated in the intrahistoric causal chain which has 
produced each individual literary phenomenon.   For the same reason, interpretive power over a work 
is shared across all readers across all cultural spaces, as no nation’s culture can be removed from a 
system of total human thought.   
 
What if, for example, the Quijote is derived from a national literary culture that prima facie bears 
little relation to the Spanish literary culture in which it’s written, as Borges asks in ‘Un problema’?  
Does that not validate different interpretations of the Quijote according to the norms of international 
cultures?  Unamuno argued for that position in 1896, stating in ‘El caballero de la triste figura’ that 
‘Hay un tipo diverso de Don Quijote para los diversos pueblos que más o menos le han comprendido’ 
(Unamuno 1966: 923).  And in fact, he puts forth in his 1905 ‘Sobre la lectura e interpretación del 
Quijote’ that the cosmopolitan nature of the work invalidates any insistence on Spanish hegemony 
on interpreting it: ‘Puede asegurarse que España es una de las naciones en que menos se lee el Quijote, 
y desde luego es aquella en que peor se lee’ (Unamuno 1966: 1227).  Menard’s project is, on one 
level, to demonstrate how reading the text from one national perspective impoverishes its meaning.  
So their non-intentionalist method of reading the Quijote is paired at all times with an insistence on 
reading it from marginal and international perspectives.112  They both practice a sort of conditional 
intentionalism, where what the author might have conceived it set in opposition to the meaning that 
a reader could find in the work, in order to legitimise marginal voices on texts that are firmly 
entrenched in a national canon.  Their readings also deliberately represent countercurrents to the 
majority interpretation of the work.  Ultimately, when no reader or author can dictate the total 
meaning of a work, the interpretation of the work is opened across all national borders.  How apt that 
two writers on the margins of Hispanic literary culture should argue for a reader-centric system of 
reading based on shared humanity rather than exclusive cultural specificity.   
                                               
112 In this sense I am indebted to Anthony Kerrigan’s argument in ‘Borges/Unamuno’ (1972) that a 
comparison between the authors must not ignore their position as marginal figures in the field of 
Castilian letters.  It is beyond my scope to identify how specific marginal produce specific types of 
responses to canonical literature.  I do, however, propose that their peripheral relationship to the 
Spanish literary canon is at the heart of their responses to the most famous item within that canon.  
Empowering the reader to produce meaning in a canonical work also empowers the communities in 
which reading takes place.  Both open up the Quijote to cosmopolitan and transnational discourse by 
interpreting it according to reader-centric methods. 
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That is at the heart of Unamuno’s declaring the hidalgo ‘Nuestro Señor Don Quijote’ in Del 
sentimiento trágico de la vida.  There is no absolute version of the protagonist, no total understanding 
of him or his adventures, but simply individual perspectives filtered through finite frameworks.  Jacob 
Boehme’s Aurora is what Unamuno holds to be the Quijote born of the German philosophical 
tradition.  And tellingly, he proposes that cultural advancements are made when national phenomena 
are viewed from foreign perspectives, in the same way that German culture has assimilated the 
Quijote and reproduced it from a different horizon of expectations: ‘Los progresos suelen venir del 
bárbaro, y nada más estancado que la filosofía de los filósofos y la teología de los teólogos’ (Unamuno 
2007: 307-308).  The peripheral perspective has an inherent value.  Those who do not meet a narrow 
description of a Castilian reader can vivify the study of the national text.   
 
Barbarians, who in the purely etymological sense are those who do not speak the majority language, 
are the ones who promote intellectually novel approaches to given forms.  Borges shows his reader 
precisely what such progress would look like.  ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ puts forth that a 20th 
German-speaking Czech author has recast the discussion of various works of literature from well 
outside of his time and place, including those of Zeno and Browning.  Kafka is the barbarian who has 
advanced the literary discourse of the British, Danish and Greek traditions.113 Pierre Menard is a 
French intellectual who, it is not unreasonable to think, has a command of Spanish only as a second 
language.  His reading of the Quijote from an admittedly controversial modern perspective, and his 
application of some of that novel’s techniques to his contemporary setting, imbue the text with a 
series of significances it could never have conveyed when it was first published.  Pierre Menard is 
the embodiment of Unamuno’s views on cultural progress, and how the specific circumstances of the 
individual are simply the expression of cultural and intellectual commonalities between all human 
beings.  For, just as Unamuno says that one can discover the eternal, cosmopolitan Spanish tradition 
through a close reading of texts, ‘Pierre Menard’ provides a sense of the development of that tradition, 
of the development of human thought and history by comparing a modern reading with a previous 
reading.  In the intervening period of time between Cervantes’s Quijote and Menard’s arose a 
philosophical discourse that gave additional profundity to the notion that history is the mother of 
truth.  The history of European colonialism has reduced comments from the dishonesty of the Arabic 
nation, from a self-ironic joke on the novel’s unreliable narration, to a racially problematic and 
                                               
113 That Borges essay is autological, that is, it exemplifies its own argument by building very heavily 
on T.S Eliot’s own work.  ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ is felt everywhere in that essay.  But 
were Borges’s reader to revisit Eliot, then they would still read the latter through the lens of the 
former.   
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culturally ignorant slur.  To compare the two versions is to understand how the progress of human 
history has made itself known in specific national boundaries. 
 
This gives rise, however, to an important distinction.  For as much as Borges legitimises much of 
Unamuno’s ‘intra-historic’ reading of the Quijote, it is worth bearing in mind his view that the text 
has gained nothing from Unamuno’s effusive and anachronistic interference (Borges 1986: 79).  
Borges in fact criticises Unamuno in 1947 for a reductive reading of the work: 
 
Del culto de la letra se ha pasado al culto del espíritu; del culto de Miguel de Cervantes al de 
Alonso Quijano. Este ha sido exaltado a semidios; su inventor —el hombre que escribió: 
«Para mí solo nació don Quijote, y yo para él; él supo obrar, y yo escribir»— ha sido rebajado 
por Unamuno a irreverente historiador o a evangelista incomprensivo y erróneo. (‘Nota sobre 
el Quijote’, in Textos recobrados 1931-1955, Emecé, Barcelona, 2001, p. 251) 
 
In Borges’s view, Unamuno’s reading of the work is no less reductive than that of a reader who 
worships at the altar of Cervantes.  The text in Borges’s view cannot be reduced to a single guiding 
principle.  Given that Borges also viewed literary tradition in spiritual terms, this is a subtle 
distinction.  Borges highlights that positioning texts in a tradition of reception and passing on can 
reveal the infinite polysemy of the words on the page.  The very words ‘la verdad, cuya madre es la 
historia’ is itself a statement that can convey multiple meanings depending on the context in which it 
is read.  But in Unamuno’s view, positioning texts in a tradition of reception and passing on does not 
just allow for the words on the page to be read polysemantically.  It also allows readers to trace the 
constants of an eternal human tradition.  If there is a way to distinguish Unamuno’s view of literature 
in tradition from Borges’s, perhaps we can express it as follows.  Unamuno favours the discovery of 
a shared meaning across all works of literature.  Borges favours the discovery of a unique meaning 
in just some works of literature.  In that sense, both are non-intentionalist authors, but the way they 
frame their positions is different.  Unamuno takes against the author in promotion of the reader; 
Borges promotes the reader in spite of the author.   
 
The latter approach is, in my view, more informative from a reader-response point of view.  For the 
different ways in which they frame an essentially shared understanding of the power of the reader to 
create meaning in the work accounts for the different ways in which they rewrote the Quijote.  For 
both Unamuno and Pierre Menard fragment Cervantes’s work.  But Unamuno replaces narrative 
moments in the text with his own commentary, he changes the form of the work in and of itself.  
While Menard’s rewriting constitutes a transformation of Cervantes’s work, given that he both writes 
it from an anatopic and anachronistic perspective, and his text is of course a fragmentation, he does 
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not alter any of the content per se.  Borges’s thought experiment on how the meaning of the Quijote 
would change when read from an external perspective is a more successful defence of non-
intentionalist readings, for it demonstrates the thematic richness of a text in a process of constant 
historical updating.  Unamuno’s method for defending his spiritualist and voluntarist interpretation 
of the Quijote relies on a formal transformation of the given text.  While Unamuno’s rewritten version 
represents, to a large degree, the Quijote’s ability to mean all things to all readers, he ultimately asks 
his reader to arrive at a new reading of the original Quijote through a text that has little in common 
with the original.  Borges does not need to rely on an act of vandalism on the original text to profess 
an argument, common to Unamuno, that the text can convey a set of meanings that no author can 
ever account for.  
 
VI.2 Miguel de Unamuno, author of Pierre Menard? 
 
In their major re-writings of the Quijote in Vida and ‘Pierre Menard’, both Unamuno and Borges 
explore the various interpretive strategies114 that can provide interpretations of the Quijote that go 
well beyond intentionalist, satirical ones.  The attribution of the text to an apocryphal author is a 
technique within the Quijote that requires exegesis on the part of the reader.  It is an interpretive 
strategy entirely in keeping with Cervantes’s literary games to attribute the text to a fictional author.  
It is a way of exercising the reader’s horizon of expectations to produce a meaning in the text they 
may never have considered.  This is common to Unamuno, who, even at his most daring and 
provocative, both implicitly and explicitly invites his reader to re-read the original Quijote according 
to a new framework.  His rewriting is also based on the attribution of the text to a fictive author in 
Benengeli.  At times, Benengeli is treated as a kind of evangelist whose work has been maliciously 
vandalised by an inadequate historian in Cervantes.  At one point, Unamuno even instructs the reader 
to re-read the adventure at Montesinos as if it were an evangelical text.  In both cases, the Quijote 
becomes a canvas onto which Unamuno and Borges ask the reader to actively project a new set of 
expectations in order to to produce a new set of interpretations.   
 
It is worth looking closely at the specific chapters rewritten by both Menard and Unamuno for the 
purposes of a comparison between the two respective theories of reader-centrism that we have 
identified.  Often the most striking aspects of Menard’s version are absent in Unamuno’s, and vice 
versa.  That is the case in their versions of Chapter IX.  Cide Hamete Benengeli, who is the subject 
                                               
114 ‘A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of opposition to the old, 
which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) from which it can emerge 
into respectability’ (Fish 1980: 349). 
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of a self-ironic joke on unreliable narration in Cervantes’s version, and who is invented as a racial 
caricature of a colonised other in Menard’s version, is absent in Unamuno’s chapter.  Benengeli is 
instead taken for granted as the real author whose work Cervantes has simply distorted.  And the 
thrust of Unamuno’s work is to make the Quijote the subject of the patriotic self-congratulations that 
Menard is critical of.  The fact that the Quijote features a Basque antagonist is a source of personal 
involvement in the novel from Unamuno’s perspective: ‘¡Oh, tierra de mi cuna, de mis padres, de 
mis abuelos y trasabuelos todos, tierra de mi infancia y de mis mocedades, tierra en que tomé a la 
compañera de mi vida, tierra de mis amores, tú eres el corazón de mi alma!’ (206).  It represents a 
quite odd, meandering rewriting of one of the finest chapters of the original.  Unamuno subverts the 
literary expectations of the reader in an equal and opposite way to Cervantes.  A reader of chivalric 
novels such as Amadís de Gaula would be told in the prologue to expect a narrative build on a 
foundation of real history experienced and documented by real people.  On reading the Quijote, such 
a reader would find those expectations frustrated.  When a contemporary reader who has also read 
the Quijote goes on to read Unamuno’s version of this chapter, they will be disappointed to find no 
such narrative games, but a simple tract on the timelessness of the Basques.  In other words, the 
reader’s expectation, that their expectations will be subverted, is itself subverted!   
 
This is not so far removed from Menard’s use of Chapter IX.  As I discussed in the previous chapter, 
Menard’s version of Chapter IX does not remove the comments on the unreliability of a narrative 
written by a Moor, but they are decontextualised from the introductory chapter which problematises 
the search for truth in an obvious fiction.115 The humour of the ninth chapter goes somewhat missing 
in Menard’s version.  Chapter IX of the Quijote serves two equal yet opposite nationalistic interests 
in the respective rewritings.  In Unamuno’s case, it is appropriated in order to legitimise the presence 
of Basque culture in the Spanish literary canon.  In Menard’s, it is appropriated in order to legitimise 
the political hegemony of his native France over the Maghreb to which Cide Hamete Benengeli is a 
native.  What unites both approaches, beyond a personal, nationalistic interest is the Jaußian idea that 
history allows texts to legitimately strike new interpretive resonances between readers.   
 
In the intervening period between the publication of the Quijote, and the start of Unamuno’s and 
Borges’s respective literary careers, the face of world history has changed enough to legitimise 
different perspectives on the work.  The 1812 Constitution of Cádiz rejected Basque self-
determination.  The Basque fueros were ultimately abolished late in the 19th Century, homogenising 
                                               
115 I refer here to some of the features of the first chapter, from the narrator’s unwillingness or inability 
to recall where the action is set, the various conjectures around the very name of the protagonist, and 
the obviously ironic comment that the history will not stray an inch from the truth. 
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political rule over the Spanish regions.  Antonio Rivera (2005: 155) shows how Unamuno, an 
unwavering fuerista, was so deeply affected by the ensuing political crisis in his native Basque 
Country.  It is hard to avoid reading that sort of significance into his work on the Quijote.  The 
presence of a Biscayan in the narrative becomes an opportunity for Unamuno to defend the 
exceptionalism of a political and cultural region which has been subsumed into a homogenous 
Spanish nation.  It is an attempt both to legitimise his regional culture under a Spanish banner by 
pointing to the Basque involvement in the Spanish literary canon, as well as to re-marginalise that 
culture, to return it to some extent to the fringes by differentiating the Basques from the Castilians.  
The inherent paradox of such an approach is in keeping with the dualistic relationship between 
Spanish and European cultures in Unamuno’s writing as expressed in En torno al casticismo: ‘sólo 
abriendo las ventanas a vientos europeos, empapándonos en el ambiente continente, teniendo fe en 
que no perderemos nuestra personalidad al hacerlo, europeizándonos para hacer España y 
chapuzándonos en pueblo, regeneraremos esta estepa moral’ (Unamuno 2014: 268).  Unamuno’s 
cosmopolitan views on culture and politics, which on the microscopic level go hand in hand with an 
appeal to the reader’s personal interpretation, are present at and supported by this instance of the text.  
What to Menard might have seemed little more than a patriotic toast (and in a Cervantine twist we 
may wish to imagine that the fictional Menard has read the work of the real Unamuno) might in fact 
hide a more nuanced take on the relationship between Basque culture and Spanish culture, between 
Spanish culture and European culture.  To understand a Basque perspective on the work is to 
understand the Basque position in the broader national and supra-national cultural frameworks in 
which it participates.   
 
I have already discussed at length the culturally problematic side of version Menard’s Chapter IX, 
which legitimises the subjugation of Arabic-speaking nations by his native France.  It must not be 
forgotten, however, that Menard’s rewriting is the product of Borges’s own writing on the Quijote.  
There are important commonalities in fact between Unamuno, Borges and Pierre Menard.  All of 
them take on the most famous text in the Spanish literary canon from a perspective that is never 
wholly Castilian.  Unamuno’s sense of Basque exceptionalism couples with Menard’s justification 
of French colonial hegemony, as well as what might be seen as Borges’s attempt to legitimise his 
own position as a commentator on a canonical Spanish work.  For the claim that Menard’s version 
can be superior to the original ultimately promotes cross-border discussions of the work.  If a French 
version can be better than a Spanish one, then so too can an Argentine version.  A unifying factor 
between Vida and ‘Pierre Menard’ is a shared desire between Unamuno and Borges to promote the 
particular perspectives from which they read the Quijote. 
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The ninth chapter also supports the shared method by which the two read the novel.  While only 
‘Pierre Menard’ draws the reader’s attention to the philosophical profundity of the idea that history 
is the mother of truth, the narrator’s exposition of that idea serves both authors well: ‘Menard, 
contemporáneo de William James, no define la historia como una indagación de la realidad sino como 
su origen.  La verdad histórica, para él, no es lo que sucedió; es lo que juzgamos que sucedió’ (Borges 
2015: 51).  In Unamuno’s view, such a judgement has to be defended forcefully, with full faith in its 
veracity.  Don Quijote turns an object without inherent meaning into a legendary helmet through his 
willingness to take up arms to defend that perspective.  In Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’, by contrast, don 
Quijote is an emblem of the automatic validity of each individual perspective.  Menard’s approach to 
the text is equal to Quijote’s approach to objects mentioned within that text: don Quijote projects the 
horizon of expectations of a reader of chivalric literature onto objects in his environment in the same 
way that Menard projects the horizon of expectations of a racially-supremacist, intellectually self-
superior French author onto the Quijote itself.  This is not as creative a process in Borges’s writing 
as it is in Unamuno’s; rather it represents an automatic function of the mind which has been 
contaminated by a specific set of influences in a specific time and place.  Borges’s work on a text 
which forbids author-centric interpretations does not come with an explicit instruction to defend the 
interpretation the reader must then arrive at.  The reader’s mind participates only passively in the 
interpretation.  Borges’s reader does not so much produce and defend an interpretation as much as 
the interpretation is an effect exerted on a reader who exists within specific cultural coordinates.116  
 
A specific comparison between their version of Chapter XXII is made all the more difficult by the 
fact that the reader can only make educated guesses as to which fragment Menard rewrote.  Various 
moments in the chapter may have caught his attention.  It might have been don Quijote’s decision to 
override the rule of law by obeying an ostensibly higher principle of human justice.  Equally it could 
have been the famous conversation with Ginés de Pasamonte, whose life story is richer than that of 
Lazarillo de Tormes.  Ginés would be a useful feature of a rewriting by Pierre Menard in light of his 
propensity towards textual experimentation.  It might have been useful to Unamuno for precisely the 
same reason, but Ginés is mentioned only obliquely in favour of a discussion of quixotic justice.  
Unamuno reads into the episode a lesson on higher principles of human morality and justice than can 
                                               
116 This is one of various reasons that I cannot agree with critics such as Yahni (1992) and Cauti 
(2005) that Unamuno is the chief motivator of Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, or that 
Menard is a simple copy of Unamuno.  The perspectives from which, and the techniques according 
to which they rewrite the Quijote are enough to separate them and to allow for contrasts to be made.  
To argue that Pierre Menard is another Miguel de Unamuno is to ignore the myriad distinctions 
between them that can enlighten their versions of the Quijote when they are examined in parallel. 
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be set out legislatively.  There is therefore an ethical significance in Unamuno’s reading.  And 
whatever the fragment that Menard took on, there is a clear ethical implication in his reading of the 
other two chapters in his own version.   
 
For the reader must question both Unamuno’s and Menard’s treatment of Chapter XXXVIII.  The 
inclusion of this chapter in Menard’s rewriting of the Quijote can be seen to problematise Vida’s 
insistence on the individual’s faith in their particular worldview.  For, although Unamuno effectively 
ignores the postprandial speech on arms and letters, the chapter retains a relevance to a comparison 
between the two rewritings.  For Unamuno’s disregard for the speech is embedded in the context of 
his claim, in a rewritten XLV, that national progress relies on a civil war.  Menard announces the 
discussion to his reader by making it a major feature of a much-shortened version of the original text, 
a discussion in which the narrator delights.  A comparison between both approaches highlights the 
risks inherent to a reader-centric model.  For it is perfectly possible that Unamuno did not intend to 
refer to a Civil War in the most literal sense.  It is also possible that Menard was defending a position 
that was contrary to his true view, as he did in his diatribe against Valéry’s works.  Appealing to the 
author’s true intention in neither case invalidates the literal interpretation of the words on the page: 
that Spanish regeneration relies on a Civil War in the most material sense, and that weapons are a 
valid legislative tool in a European context heading inexorably to war.  For the text itself permits both 
interpretations.  Intentional or otherwise, and we can only suspect either way, Unamuno and Menard 
have added intellectual fillip to causes which led to the onset and consolidation of fascist rule in their 
own cultural contexts.  This problematises the voluntarist statements Unamuno makes in Vida.  The 
imposition of the individual will onto the world is not arbitrated simply by an intellectual process of 
thought.  It must be regulated by an overarching concern for the ethical impact of intellectual thought 
on the world around us117.  For as don Quijote himself said, arms are the tools by which laws, which 
are the product of the intellect, are imposed.  This brings the reader back to the Cervantine principle 
                                               
117 For this reason my analysis does not overwrite that of Terreros, who examines the role of the mind 
in eternalising the self in the works of Unamuno and Borges.  Both subscribe to idea that total 
knowledge is impossible (Terreros 2009: 204).  For this reason, Unamuno recommends that his reader 
adopt a boundless faith in their specific worldview.  By the same token, Borges seems to argue for a 
kind of stoic pessimism, an acceptance of one’s fleeting place in a chain of infinite human discourse.  
Pierre Menard rewrites a text starring a protagonist with the most extreme faith in his own worldview, 
in a way similar yet distinct from Unamuno, an author who proposed that quixotic faith has a practical 
use.  In doing so, he helps to show that such undying faith in one’s worldview can have ethically 
unacceptable consequences, and that the eternalising oneself by making a material impact on the 
world in line with one’s faith is not an end in itself.   
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as set out in the Novelas ejemplares.  That Cervantes would sooner cut off his hand than incite his 
reader to ill thought or action goes well beyond a self-ironic joke about his obvious inability to 
perform such a deed; it becomes a relevant statement to reader-response theory.  The reader’s power 
to determine meaning in their interaction with the text must be regulated by a concern for the way 
their projections onto the text might materially impact on the world.  This goes some way to 
answering Stanley Fish’s query on acceptable readings.  Ethical interests must become a key 
motivation by which interpretations are accepted or rejected. 
 
For both Unamuno’s and Menard’s rewritings of the Quijote credit Fish’s argument that the text 
cannot be the source of core agreement or disagreement on what constitutes an acceptable reading 
versus an unacceptable one.  Such a statement is appropriately Cervantine.  Sancho’s neologism, 
baciyelmo, whose purpose is to legislate for the differing interpretations of the object according to 
individual viewers, is a perfect metaphor for the way in which the text is read in ‘Pierre Menard, autor 
del Quijote’.  The objective features of the object — the fact that it is made of metal, its round shape, 
its size relative to the human head — simultaneously support the view that it is a basin and that it is 
a helmet.  In precisely the same way, Borges demonstrates that a finite number of words support 
infinitely polysemic interpretations.  The objective features of the text — the comment on Arab 
dishonesty, the speech on arms and letters, the discussion of history’s role in determining truth — 
simultaneously support satirical readings, as well as philosophically profound and politically 
controversial ones.  No interpretation violates what Wolfgang Iser calls the rules of the game.  What 
promotes such different interpretations is the historical process by which canons of acceptability 
change.  The author, and it is by no means a contradiction to refer to an author when discussing 
reader-response theory, is the embodiment of the way in which canons of acceptability have 
transformed.  To Menard, the Quijote is the baciyelmo that Sancho proposes within the very text.  
Unamuno, despite his rejection of the neologism, projects meaning onto the text according to the 
same quixotic principle.   
 
The major difference between Borges’s and Unamuno’s discussions of the Quijote is that in Borges’s 
case, the novel’s interpretive polysemy is interesting more strictly from an aesthetic point of view; in 
Unamuno’s, that interpretive polysemy requires the reader to defend their view vehemently, even to 
the point of civil war.  Unamuno appropriates the Quijote to recommend a philosophical and political 
system based on the idealist, not to say Tlönian, practice of seeing in the world that which we wish 
to see.  The fact that canons of acceptability change over time problematises Unamuno’s and 
Menard’s project.  In the intervening period between 1934, when Menard declares his intention to 
write the Quijote, and the publication of his work in 1939, his racial and militaristic comments will 
appear just as infelicitous as the promotion of civil war in Unamuno’s 1905 work.  The context of 
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writing and that of reading interact.  Unamuno wrote Vida thirty-one years before the onset of a Civil 
War that he would live to see, at least in part.  The modern reader would surely not be ignorant of the 
outcome of that event, nor the murderous regime that ensued.  What, after 1898 might have been 
intended as a desperate cry for a redefinition of Spanishness has, due to the historical events since the 
text’s publication, been redefined as a profession of the necessity of a war that cost so many so much.  
One might wonder if Menard, by contrast, kept his writing secret once he realised the way in which 
history would condemn the statements made in his rewritten Quijote.  Even if Borges did not have 
Unamuno in mind when writing ‘Pierre Menard’, that text can still be read as a commentary on 
Unamuno’s world-oriented reading of a text.  For imposing one’s ideals onto the world, a practice 
that Unamuno recommends so violently, is not universally valid.  His melioristic insistence on it is 
naive in the extreme.  For very real totalitarian regimes have imposed ideals common to Otto Dietrich 
zur Linde and Pierre Menard in very real ways.  If only Unamuno would have sooner cut off his hand 
than incited his reader to ill thought or action. 
 
VI.3 The author as dreamer 
 
The final major principle that underlies their respective works on the Quijote is the idea of dreaming 
as an act of literary creation.  Unamuno’s Vida closes with an anachronistic quote from Calderón’s 
La vida es sueño: ‘¡La vida es sueño!  ¿Será acaso también sueño, Dios mío, este tu Universo de que 
eres la Conciencia eterna e infinita?, ¿será un sueño tuyo?, ¿será que nos estás soñando?…’ 
(Unamuno 2011: 521).  The use of dreams in the work of both Unamuno and Borges is extremely 
multifaceted.  On the most basic level, it is a metaphysical query common to both writers.  The 
Calderonian quote could equally be the internal monologue of the protagonist of Borges’s ‘Las ruinas 
circulares’.  Dreams are a common motif to Unamuno’s and Borges’s work on Cervantes.  While it 
prima facie appears to question the very nature of existence, it has an important literary function.118 
                                               
118 This is where I differ somewhat to critics such as Dolores Koch, whose 1984 ‘Borges y Unamuno: 
Convergencias y divergencias’ compared Niebla to ‘Las ruinas circulares’.  I agree with Koch that 
their oneiric narratives open themselves up to questions on the nature of existence and the divide 
between reality and the imagination.  I have identified an additional function: the denial of an 
objective meaning in the text that promotes the reader into an intellectually active engagement with 
the text in order to project meaning onto it.  This places my analysis more closely alongside that of J. 
Óscar Carrascosa-Tinoco, who notes that in Niebla and ‘Las ruinas circulares’, dreaming is akin to 
production.  This, he argues places them in a literary tradition that goes back all the way to Cervantes.  
However, our analysis must not end at how Unamuno and Borges inherit ideas from Cervantes, but 
how they build upon them.  There are indeed Cervantine echoes in works such as Niebla and ‘Las 
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For across all of the texts they produce on Quijote, the life-as-dream idea promotes interpretations of 
texts that would be of interest to reader-response theory.  For the introduction of Calderón’s work 
into Cervantes’s as an anachronistic commentary supports the argument that new literary canons have 
permitted new readings.  The fact that the Quijote permits metaphysical enquiries aligns the two 
authors neatly with the argument made by Jauß that new historical materialisations provide the 
horizons of expectations which permit new interpretations.119 For those metaphysical enquiries were 
not fully and explicitly developed until Calderón penned his La vida es sueño.  Calderón can be seen 
to inaugurate a philosophical method of reading Cervantes, one that allows Unamuno and Borges to 
theorise reading in and of itself. 
 
Borges’s ‘Magias parciales del Quijote’, might be interpreted a Calderonian reading of that novel’s 
technique of mise-en-abyme, one that speaks to the possible fictionality of the reader beyond the 
possible reality of the characters depicted.  That technique is also shared by Unamuno’s Cómo se 
hace una novela: he, like Quijote and Sancho, reads his own story within the same text that the reader 
holds.  Unamuno and Borges paint such metaphysical doubts onto a text entirely deserving of it: the 
presence of the first volume of the Quijote in the second gives way to genuine doubt on the sureness 
of the individual existence.  For that reason Unamuno’s conclusion to Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho 
is equivalent to the conclusion of Borges’s ‘Ni siquiera soy polvo’.  Unamuno finishes with a 
declaration of existential anguish that would be explored in the fullest sense in Del sentimiento 
trágico: ‘Y si es la vida sueño, ¡déjame soñarla inacabablemente!’ (Unamuno 2007: 527).  Borges 
ends similarly, imploring an unknown deity to continue to dream his existence: ‘Mi Dios, mi soñador, 
sigue soñándome’ (‘Ni siquiera soy polvo’, OC II: 178). The philosophical richness of such 
commentaries is undeniable. However, the realisation of the fictional character and the 
fictionalisation of the real reader; the reduction of the life of the individual to a dream contained in 
an endless number of other dreams: these are techniques of interest from a literary-theoretical point 
of view.   
                                               
ruinas circulares’, but their specific works on the Quijote use the motif of dreams in order to discuss 
the nature of the text and its relationship to the author.  Positing the text as a dream and an author as 
a dreamer arrests interpretive authority from the author in a way reminiscent of the confused question 
of authorship in the Quijote that culminates in Quijote and Sancho reading their own story.  It also 
supports my argument that Unamuno and Borges, as inheritors of Cervantes, also anticipate the 
literary-theoretical movement that would later be termed reader-response theory. 
119 It also clearly reminiscent of the argument in Borges’s ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ that each new 
work of literature retrospectively alters the reading of every other.  Unamuno's anachronistic 
introduction of Calderón into Cervantes prospectively credits Borges’s argument. 
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In ‘Parábola de Cervantes y de Quijote’, Borges posits the author and protagonist as a dreamer and 
the dreamed.  The aesthetic quality of the dream is also present in Unamuno: his friend don Hilario, 
an avid, quixotic reader whose story is narrated in his essay ‘Sueño’, turns to his dreams as a source 
of literary analogy after he has exhausted all of the texts he could hope to read (OC I: 781-783).  The 
connotation of a dream as an act of literary production is common to both.  And that connotation is 
particularly relevant to reader-response theory as it negates the possibility of appealing to the author 
in the reading act.  For, if literature is a dream, it cannot be the wholly active process of a creative 
mind.  Rather, it posits that the act of authorship is a somewhat passive activity that interweaves 
various strands, from previous literary movements to historical and linguistic circumstances, and 
produces a text almost inevitably.   
 
This mirrors Borges’s claim, as I discussed in the last chapter, that literature is nothing other than a 
directed dream.  The author has a limited agency of their own text, simply becoming the time and 
space when previous historical and cultural moments combine.  Paradoxically, however, this does not 
remove the author as a consideration.  Unamuno theorises reading as a tripartite relationship, where 
the author and reader communicate through the text.  Borges theorises reading as an act of attributing 
text to people within certain moments of cultural and historical progress.  Both reinstate the author to 
some extent.  Unamuno’s claim that the text is autobiographical, speaks the same language as 
Borges’s game of attribution.  For the life of the author is a moment in history and culture, which 
provides the horizon of expectations in which a text can be read.  Menard’s rewritten Quijote is 
autobiographical in the same sense: he produces a hypertext identical in form to the hypotext, but the 
meaning of the text changes according to the moment of writing.  That is not an appeal to the author’s 
intention per se, but an appeal to the circumstances and context of writing.  And just as all texts are 
autobiographical, readings are also.  The way a reader interprets the text is as directed by historical 
and cultural circumstances as the way we write.   
 
Such a theory could find an original meaning in Unamuno’s claim that Cervantes simply extracted 
don Quijote from the spirit of his pueblo and returned him to that pueblo fully formed.  Similarly the 
notion that Quijano dreams himself into Quijote without the interference of Cervantes, as made in 
‘Lectores’, and that Cervantes is himself a dream of his fiction, as made in ‘Sueña Alonso Quijano’.  
The artist is created by the work, and not vice versa.  I do not wish to deny that such statements deny 
the objectivity of the world of the reader.  I do, however, wish to add that these various statements 
can also be read from a reader-response point of view.  For when the author cannot take sole 
responsibility for the work, then the whole meaning of the work cannot lie in the author’s mind alone.  
This supports the reader-response argument that literature is an interactive event that takes place 
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between the reader and the author.  For when a text is produced by an unimaginable number of factors 
external to it, then no reader can hope to extrapolate the text’s whole meaning, which must to some 
extent be given by its interaction with other texts in the canon in which they are written.  The meaning 
of the text is limited in that sense to what the reader can find in it, as no objective principle exists by 
which to unite all of the possible meanings of a text within one interpretation.  Unamuno therefore 
does not pay much attention to what Cervantes may or may not have intended in his Quijote 
(Unamuno 2007: 312).  And for Pierre Menard, history is not what happened, but what we judge to 
have happened.  In literary terms, a text is not what is said, but what the reader hears.   
 
This brings my argument back to where it began.  Implicit in the argument that Sancho and Quijote 
imposed themselves on Cervantes, and that Quijano dreamed Cervantes rather than vice versa, is an 
acknowledgement of the fact that the literary work is created at least in part through factors external 
to and predating the author.  It therefore suggests, in my view, an acknowledgement of the role of 
literary tradition in the act of writing.  Unamuno and Borges are of course quick to point out the 
international influences and relevance of the work.  The Quijote itself was penned in a pan-European 
literary context.  As such, the empowerment of the reader cannot be extricated from a cosmopolitan 
interest in the work.  There is no single interpretive authority over the work.  And whatever meaning 
the work can provide, it cannot remain within one set of national borders.  Their metaphysical and 
oneiric interpretations of aspects of the Quijote contain the more subtle function of inviting cross-
border perspectives on the novel.  So when they wrest interpretive control from the author, they also 
remove it from the specific time and place that Cervantes occupied, providing for valid readings of 
the text within a universal human context.  As Unamuno said, the emblem of Spanish culture is given 
universality through his Spanishness.  It is now the privilege of the reader to interpret the text from 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
The chief contribution of my thesis has been to further outline the importance of comparing the two 
authors.  I have built on the work of critics such as J. Óscar Carrascosa-Tinoco and Miguel Gorka 
Bilbao-Terreros who have sought a communicative relationship between Miguel de Unamuno and 
Jorge Luis Borges, by reading their works through the lens of non-intentionalist theories of literature 
such as reader-response.  This has opened a new door into establishing the commonalities and 
contrasts in their works on an individual and collective level.   
 
To a much smaller extent, I have been able to show that the works of Cervantes may also be read 
from such a theoretical point of view.  The various meanings that Unamuno and Borges find in the 
Quijote can only have been arrived at through a non-intentionalist method of reading.  My study of 
their works on the novel has therefore contributed to the study of it, by showing that interpretations 
in line with reader-response theory can enrich the text, and find more than just a satirical imitation of 
chivalric narratives in it.  Cervantes’s works are interesting and challenging to reader-response 
theorists.  They could provide modern thinkers with useful theoretical tools.  From the prologues 
which ironise the conventional relationship between a reader and an author, to a protagonist who 
defines the world by what he sees in it, Cervantes’s works provide ideal material for reader-response 
theory.  Perhaps Cervantes scholars might be interested in reading and re-reading his works according 
to such theories.  This might advance discourse on the novel way beyond the arguments of critics like 
Close and Russell, who read it exclusively as a satire.   
 
More fundamentally, one of the great pitfalls of the kind of theory I have used is its insistence on the 
freedom of reading according to personal circumstances.  Such a theory cannot adequately define the 
conventions according to which reading takes place, because there are no objective markers in the 
text by which to reject interpretations, as Stanley Fish explains.  Don Quijote’s propensity to see the 
fantastical in the mundane, say a legendary helmet in a metal basin, is a kind of idealism that underlies 
Unamuno’s reading of the text.  What the text says to him and him alone is the deciding factor as to 
its meaning.  It is also reflected in Borges’s approach to it, where the same words produced according 
to different perspectives inevitably produce different meanings.  All three are articulations of the 
same pitfall in reader-response theory.  By what convention can we disprove Quijote’s view of the 
object?  Or Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of the text?   
 
Perhaps no such convention exists.  But a possible answer as to one way to reject interpretations of 
the text is in accordance with personal ethics.  Such a convention would itself not be textual.  Rather 
it would be world-oriented.  Could we reject interpretations of texts when the text is appropriated to 
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particular ends that have real and infelicitous consequences in the world.  That might keep an 
important check on readers such as Miguel de Unamuno and Pierre Menard.  For, within the 
communities in which they read and wrote, they gave vocal support to radical political trends that 
would have dire consequences for so many.  That would imbue the statement in the prologue to 
Cervantes’s Novelas ejemplares with a theoretical significance: ‘Una cosa me atreveré a decirte: que, 
si por algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún 
mal deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la mano con que las escribí, que sacarlas en público’ 
(Cervantes 2005: 135).  Future literary theorists might wish to look more closely at Cervantes’s works 
as part of a discussion on reading conventions.120 
 
Beyond that, I have also shown that much of the blending of existential levels in the fictions of 
Unamuno and Borges can be read as statements of reader-response aesthetics.  I have only dealt with 
a small number, and in most cases I have engaged with some of the authors’ more ‘minor’ texts.  A 
sustained engagement with Niebla or ‘Las ruinas circulares’ for instance might bring my conclusions 
into sharper focus.  For in my dealings with texts such as ‘Magias parciales del Quijote’, ‘Sueña 
Alonso Quijano’, as well as Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, I have invited the reader to revisit them 
as if they were manifestoes for non-intentionalist methods of reading.  I have done so by arguing that 
the inherent passivity of the dream —a key metaphor for literary creation across both authors’ 
oeuvres— is more than just a sign of existential doubt.  It entails the view that an author is never fully 
in control of the various strands that weave together into the literary work.  It therefore proposes that 
the author is an imperfect convention by which to interpret.  This is not to overwrite the metaphysical 
aspects of texts such as Vida and ‘Magias parciales’.  Questions on the nature of the world, time and 
existence are ever-present in those and many other works by both authors.  I have simply enriched 
the discussion and shown that their various fictions are capacious enough to posit various theoretical 
and philosophical quandaries at once.  They are rich in possible meanings, only some of which have 
been fully explored thus far. 
 
Another contribution has been to expand the discussion of literature according to aspects of reader-
response theory.  I have added weight in particular to Hans-Robert Jauß’s argument that successive 
moments in history change the horizon of expectations by which readers interpret, and into which 
they assimilate new literary works.  This process, as Jauß argues, provides for ever new interpretations 
of texts across time and space.  The various works that Unamuno and Borges produce on the Quijote 
strongly defend such a notion.  Unamuno finds in the Quijote a manifesto of modern political and 
                                               
120 Including ethics in any method of reading entails its own problems.  According to which ethical 
principle ought we to read?  For obvious reasons such a question is beyond my scope. 
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philosophical thinking, as well as a method of reading that trusts interpretive validity to his mind 
alone.  Borges’s greatest work on the Quijote shows specifically how anatopic and anachronistic 
readings can invigorate a text and produce a meaning in it that could never have been predicted by 
the author.   
 
In neither Unamuno’s nor Borges’s case do their readings disobey what Wolfgang Iser has referred 
to as the rules of the game of interpretation.  For Iser, the text itself is the convention by which reading 
is produced.  Literary theory has, as yet, not been able to demonstrate that this limits the number of 
possible interpretations permitted by a work.  Unamuno and Borges enjoy the interpretive freedom 
that the Quijote permits them.  Even their most controversial responses to the work result from aspects 
of it that are objectively there.  The presence of the first Volume inside the second provides theoretical 
material to Borges, allowing him to argue that the self might be the fiction of another in the same way 
Quijote and Sancho are.  This provides for some of his later readings, which posit that Cervantes is 
the creation of Quijano, and not vice versa.  Unamuno’s statement that his contemporary Spain would 
benefit from a civil war is based on don Quijote’s inability to use reason in order to establish that the 
item he has despoiled from a wandering barber is a legendary helmet.  Unamuno extrapolates from 
this moment in the Quijote that violence is an intellectual arbiter.  His evangelical reading of the novel 
is hardly prohibited either.  Through a different interpretive strategy, one that does not assume from 
the outset that the work is a simple comedy, Unamuno sees enough Christ-like resonances in the 
protagonist to extrapolate a code of ethics woven into the fabric of the intra-historic Spanish culture.  
Ultimately, Unamuno and Borges demonstrate that taking the text as a restrictive convention on 
reading does not preclude all manner of readings.  Since competing and incompatible interpretations 
are permitted by the same text, as most deftly argued in ‘Pierre Menard’.  The text cannot, as Stanley 
Fish argued, be the source of core agreement on what makes a reading permissible or not. 
 
Even under the restrictive conventions of form and content, there might remain infinite possibilities 
of reading inasmuch as there may be infinite possible readers.  That problematises the notion of 
understanding.  Borges as the narrator of ‘El Aleph’ loses his ability to make conceptual abstractions 
after seeing the absolute.  Equally ‘La biblioteca de Babel’ shows that ordering all of the possible 
meaningful statements in human language would remain chaotic, impenetrable and ultimately 
useless.  Countless perspectives and interpretations can be defended according to the conventions of 
the same text or object.  The conventions themselves are the source of core disagreement on what 
constitutes an acceptable reading of a work.  As I have argued, readers should reject interpretations 
that abide by the rules of the text when such interpretations violate the Cervantine principle that the 
author should sooner not write at all than risk inciting the reader to ill thought or action.  Given that 
authors cannot account for the total possible meanings of their works, including those which compete 
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or mutually exclude with other readings, the responsibility to read well lies with the reader alone.  
Readers therefore have a freedom to read according to their personal horizon of expectations, which 
is formed by the sum of their historical and cultural experiences at the moment of reading.  But they 
have a responsibility to ensure that their reading stays within ethical boundaries.   
 
I am aware that my research has taken place within certain limitations.  A significant limitation has 
been a theoretical one.  Up until now there had been no sustained reader-response investigation into 
either Unamuno or Borges.  The need for such a study of Unamuno’s works was identified by Charles 
Alex Longhurst in 2014, and I hope to have done justice to that wish.  This work, however, is 
inaugural.  It is an introduction into rather than an overview of the potential value of reader-response 
theory to Unamuno and Borges.  The most appropriate way to engage with such a theory was to 
investigate some of its most central arguments.  That included looking at some of its earliest and 
foremost practitioners, including and especially Jauß and Iser.  It also involved dealing with some of 
its most fundamental terms, from the horizon of expectations, to the acceptability of readings, and so 
forth, and stretching those terms to their limits in order to provide a basis for a reader-response 
interpretation of their works.  What I have not and could not have done was to take on every single 
theorist who might reasonably be brought under a reader-response framework.   
 
As such, the possibility of further study into the value of different reader-centric theories of 
interpretation in Unamuno and Borges criticism is very much open.  David Bleich’s subjective reader-
response theory is more radical than many of the theories I have dealt with.  The fundamental 
argument of his 1978 Subjective criticism is that the text is defined purely as the experience of the 
reader, thereby rejecting the idea that the text sets out conventions of reading.  He sets out a method 
of understanding texts by chronicling the specific personal experience of reading.  This would offer 
an interesting counterpoint to my conclusion that Borges and Unamuno rely on the text as a 
convention by which to read personal significance into the work.  My discussion of how acceptable 
their readings of the Quijote are has veered towards the ethical, but this could be furthered by taking 
into account Jonathan Culler’s definition of literary competence, where valid interpretations are 
produced by readers with ‘an implicit understanding of the operations of literary discourse which tells 
one what to look for’ (Culler 2002: 132).  Investigating how competently readers like Unamuno and 
Pierre Menard read the Quijote would help to broaden the discussion on acceptable readings beyond 
the ethical concern I have identified.   
 
That could also be bolstered by looking into Peter Rabinowitz’s 1987 work ‘Before Reading’, which 
analyses the impact of the reader’s knowledge of narrative conventions on their interpretation.  This 
would sharpen the discussion of Jauß’s concept of the horizon of expectations, which informs and is 
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informed by every act of reading.  Also, Peter Bürger’s 1984 work on fragmentation would be of 
specific use to Unamuno and Borges, who both fragment the Quijote in their rewritings.  Bürger 
distances collage, the technique that Menard and Unamuno take when rewriting the novel, from 
literary creation.  Those rewritings can critique and be critiqued by Bürger’s theory of fragmentation.  
 
Future studies must take into account that reader-response theory has in fact been engaged with and 
critiqued.  Steven Mailloux’s system of ‘rhetorical hermeneutics’ is essentially a theory of 
interpretation and misinterpretation, aimed at establishing a system for dividing acceptable and 
unacceptable readings of literature.  He is himself not a reader-response theorist.  He argues that in 
reader-response theory, the correct interpretation is that which is produced by the ideal reader.  While 
I disagree that reader-response theory generally posits such an ideal reader, his work takes an 
overview of hermeneutic theory that could provide the basis for a later critique of my own work.  
Mailloux suggests that reader-response theory is a kind of hermeneutic idealism (Mailloux 1985: 
622).  That description fits very neatly with the way don Quijote approaches the world, and the 
quixotic approach to the text that Unamuno and Borges take.  Mailloux contrasts this against ‘textual 
realism’ — the idea that the text can set out its own conventions (623).121 Mailloux points to a 
weakness in one of the key arguments of reader-response theory, in that it shows how reading 
conventions are constantly changing and providing for new interpretations, but does not adequately 
explain what those conventions look like in any given time or place: ‘But such a claim only leads to 
a more difficult question for the idealist: What constrains the use of interpretive conventions in a 
specific context?’ (625).  In other words, literary idealism can be vague, and it might be impossible 
to construct each reader’s conceptual framework.  As such, Mailloux argues that the tenets of reader-
response theory are ‘not formalizable’ into a coherent system (626). 
 
Rhetorical hermeneutics is what Mailloux calls an ‘anti-Theory theory’ (629).  Its key argument is 
that texts become meaningful through an exchange of various hermeneutic approaches.  It posits that 
all theoretical models can shed light on works and communicate with interpretations produced in 
accordance with other theories (629-630).  It could become a useful model by which to further critique 
the works of Unamuno and Borges, either together or separately.  Particularly in Borges’s works, 
there is no system that can explain all of the meaning in the text, or in the world.  Meaning is a mere 
projection of the content of the human mind, a production of the frameworks that we create so as to 
bring the world around us into a coherent order.  Moreover, it might provide a useful comment on the 
specific ways in which they read the Quijote.  For Unamuno explicitly negates any interpretive value 
                                               
121 A complicating factor is that a text can set out its own conventions yet still allow for a reader to 
interpret it in any number of ways. 
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in Cervantes’s version, with his most explicit non-intentionalist comment coming in the concluding 
essay of Del sentimiento trágico de la vida.  A theory that allows for intentionalism and non-
intentionalism to communicate, without one negating the other, could provide a more nuanced way 
of reading the Quijote than would otherwise be possible.  Can a reader-centric argument not unite 
with an author-centric one?  Could one not revisit a text having interpreted it according to a reader-
centric method, then compare it to a reading produced by an intentionalist one?  
 
That question must be left for further study.  But answering it would help to further comment on the 
comparison that I have made.  Because in Unamuno and Borges I have found two differences of what 
might be broadly referred to as reader-centrism.  Unamuno’s reading veers closer to what has been 
referred to as strict anti-intentionalism or ‘conventionalism’ (Irvin 2006: 120-121).  Borges’s reading, 
in particular through ‘Pierre Menard’ is evidence of some interest in the author at the moment of 
writing.  The quality of Menard’s version is only relative to Cervantes’s.  Producing a work like the 
Quijote from the conceptual framework of a 20th Century French intellectual is much more 
impressive than doing so from Cervantes’s conceptual framework.  Borges in that sense practises a 
sort of ‘conditional intentionalism’ (Livingston 2005: 140-141) where what the author could have 
conceived is relevant to the reader’s interpretation.  In that sense, Borges’s reading might bridge the 
gap between intentionalism and non-intentionalism.  His interpretation might sit more comfortably 
in the realm of rhetorical hermeneutics than in reader-response theory.  This presents an obvious next 
step for investigations into Borges as a reader of fiction. 
 
Other possible research might wish to look at Unamuno and Borges as readers of the Quijote within 
their specific contexts.  My approach has been transnational.  This works in service of my point that 
reader-centric contributions to the literary canon empower readers on the periphery.  But it may be 
possible to bring that argument into sharper focus by focusing more specifically on their respective 
peripheries.  Borges is by no means the first Latin American author to reclaim the Quijote from a 
transatlantic point of view.  Ecuadorian Juan Montalvo anticipated Borges by writing about the 
chapters that Cervantes had forgotten in Capítulos que se le olvidaron a Cervantes.  My research 
could bolster further studies on Latin American approaches to the Quijote.  Equally, Unamuno’s 
reworkings of the novel could be more strongly positioned in the discourse of the 98 Generation as a 
result of my work. Montserrat Herrero (1998) showed that Unamuno, Azorín and Maeztu took the 
Quijote as a symbol of particular politics, and conducted a discussion on national regeneration by 
way of the novel.  Pedro Pascual (1999) also shows that the Generation have a shared interest in the 
Quijote, and Rachel Schmidt (2011) showed that the trend of the ’98 group was to think of don Quijote 
as an emblem of the failure of Spanish culture (166).  Future work could explain what these thinkers 
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contributed to the understanding of the novel as a work of literature, to unpick the theoretical 
approaches at play when prominent thinkers at the turn of the 20th Century turn their attentions to it. 
My work has emphasised the possibility and importance of reading the Cervantine works of Unamuno 
and Borges in connection with modern, reader-oriented literary theories.  Yet in what represents a 
first step into opening this discussion, I leave my study with contemporary theoretical approaches to 
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